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Yugoslavia

Bosnia-Hercegovina—The Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency met to consider the "political and security situation" and asked the republican government "to immediately form and dispatch a mixed group" to cooperate with the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and "defuse the situation and seek effective solutions" in Gorazde, Visegrad, Bosanski Brod, Mostar, and Neum, TANJUG reports. In Gorazde, the Presidency statement says, "a number of units of territorial defense" will be mobilized "with the special purpose of securing vital installations and the safety of citizens in the region." The Ministry of Internal Affairs was asked to cooperate with the JNA to secure the release of the Sarajevo TV transmitter "seized by a group of armed persons," according to the Presidency statement. It "demands" that all blockades be removed and a halt to "threats to the lives of citizens."

International—U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman attended the opening of a Pristina exhibition marking VOA's 50th anniversary, TANJUG reports. The ceremony "deviated from the agreed protocol" resulting in "a great deal of confusion" over Zimmerman's speech which may have been misinterpreted by the translator who "translated the speech into Albanian and then into very bad Serbian." It was "unofficially learned" that "there was an argument" between Miodrag Djuricic, the organizer, and Warren Zimermann and that "the ambassador had apologized..."

Croatia—In a statement to POLITIKA, Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Milan Ramljak "confirmed that the legal order" in Krajina and territories "controlled by Serbia" will not be maintained by Croatia, TANJUG reports. Ramljak, who "is the first Croatian senior official" to confirm this, claims that "it is not possible for the Croatian political and legal systems to be applied" in UN protected areas. He also believes that Serbian control of these areas would "prejudice a political solution."

TANJUG reports that the Knin Corps Command issued a statement denying that a JNA officer reportedly attempted to assassinate Milan Babic, calling the allegation "pure insinuation and a perfidious political game." The statement refers to an incident at Babic's home when a JNA officer "entered my apartment" and "threatened to kill my security guards," "showed me a dum-dum bullet and loaded his gun with it aiming at me," according to Babic. He "moved it away from me and fired it, hitting the ceiling." The Knin Corps Command maintains that "a Winchester .357 Magnum went off accidentally" at Babic's residence.

Albania

Democratic Party leader Sali Berisha announced that he intends to form a "coalition government" and bring in Western technical aid, AFP reports. He believes that Europe and the United States will "come to Albania's aid" and the Democratic Party "would like to see outside personalities taking part in the government." Berisha "has been considered" a possible presidential candidate, but he is not ruling out that Ismail Kadare, the well-known writer who is preparing to return to Albania from political asylum in France, may be chosen president.

Czechoslovakia

The State Defense Council met on 24 March to consider the issue of arms exports from Czechoslovakia, CSTK reports. Prime Minister Marian Calfa stated that decisionmaking on "heavy weaponry" exports will be up to the State Defense Council. Calfa explained that "this applies to" planes, tanks, missiles, armored vehicles, and large amounts of ammunition and weapons. "This step was necessary," Calfa pointed out, "in view of Czechoslovakia's international commitments" and the Federal Assembly's "failure to pass a new draft constitution." The decision was made to give the state control over the arms trade, Calfa said.

Visegrad Trio, Benelux Countries Hold Conference

LD2003194292 Budapest MTI in English 1422 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Brussels, March 20 (MTI)—"Experts from the Benelux countries and the Visegrad Trio of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary held their first conference at the Benelux countries, Brussels Secretariat on Thursday [19 March]," Ambassador Gyorgy Misur, head of the Foreign Ministry's regional cooperation department who led the Hungarian delegation to the meeting, told MTI's correspondent.

Unlike the Benelux scheme, the Visegrad Trio lacks a central organization, but this is no impediment to concrete cooperation within political frameworks provided by the governments as a result of popular diplomacy.

A week after the successful Warsaw security policy seminar between NATO and the Visegrad Trio, the Thursday Brussels conference showed that the Visegrad cooperation stands to win growing international recognition and ensure new possibilities in many respects, Misur said.

"In Brussels we agreed to draw up a list of areas for the transfer of Benelux experience by July 1, including economic cooperation between the Benelux countries, their relationships with the European Community and cooperation between border-region villages and towns.

"We would like to make our partners familiar with the Tisza-Carpathian working community of Hungarian, south Polish, Ukrainian and Slovak settlements.

"Our partners and the EC will provide funding for the "3+3" project on the basis of the proposed themes," Misur said.

Three Visegrad Leaders Discuss Ties

AU2003134192 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 14 Mar 92 pp 3,4,5

[Interview with Polish President Lech Walesa, CSFR President Vaclav Havel, and Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, by Attila Szalai, Andras Erdelyi, and Attila Vodros; place and date not given: "Twelve Questions for the Visegrad Three"]

[Text] It was more than a year ago when, in the Visegrad Royal Palace's Hall of the Knights, the top leaders of Hungary, the CSFR, and Poland signed the document that, based on the experiences of common history, embraced in a framework of political law the hope for a balanced and happier future for the countries of this region that had suffered so much. Since then, the Visegrad Three has become a concept in diplomacy and in analyses on international affairs. On the occasion of our national day, the editors of UJ MAGYARORSZAG offer a 12-point interview to our readers, in which three outstanding personalities who signed this document talk about their thoughts on current affairs. Attila Szalai, our domestic affairs editor, visited Lech Walesa, Andras Erdelyi, our foreign affairs editor, was received by Vaclav Havel, and Jozsef Antall answered the questions of deputy chief editor Attila Vodros.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] The date 15 March is the greatest national day of the Hungarians. It was one of the flowers of the civil movement known as the Spring of Nations in Europe's history, and it was part of forming the nations in East European societies. Forming a nation is a great cohesive force and is concomitant with establishing the national consciousness. In the name of internationalism that revokes bad memories, the foreign rule of the last four decades tried to eliminate the interlocking chain of common traditions, continuity, and national consciousness. Along with the difficulties of establishing a bourgeois democracy, our days are characterized by the fight for our national identity and by regeneration efforts. At what stage is this process, what obstacles do we have to face, and what prospects do all these have in your country?

[Walesa] We are at the beginning of the era of freedom. The possibility of freedom was returned to us. Internationalism and the efforts to make foreign rule prevail indeed threatened national identity. Respecting and preserving traditions and maintaining the national character often met with difficulties, and people who fought for these values deserve every respect. Thank God, our roots proved to be strong. We are on the map as an independent and sovereign country, and we can be truly proud of our traditions. Naturally, it is very important to be clear about ourselves, who we are, and where we came from. However, the most important question today is: Where am I going?

In today's Europe, tendencies point toward a situation when borders will only have a symbolic significance. Let us, for example, look at the money. The dollar has almost become a world currency, everyone uses dollars for the transactions and to assess the state of the economy.

We have to reassess everything that our brave parents and honest teachers told us. Or rather, we have to add something to that. They said that the nation was the biggest value. Now we add: a prospering nation, and the prospering nations. The world has shrunk to a big village where the fence between the yards is so low that we hardly need to lift up our foot to step over it. We can see into each other's yards. Therefore, we have to live differently because we are being seen by each other. It is a great task and an outstanding goal to see Europe as a big family. Naturally, all this does not mean that we give up certain intimacies and our private affairs, because we must not allow our inheritance and traditions to be forgotten. However, economic relations and environmental protection are supranational issues, and we who can fly around the world at any time must see the interests of the whole. In this big entirety, we must find the place of our small- or medium-sized countries. All

this requires a new approach and a new attitude. The eyes that have been used to a limited vision must learn to see wide and far.

The task, therefore, is to try to enrich the colors and the diversity of our world while preserving everything that is close to our hearts, namely our national values. By doing this, we can probably make our future common big European home—and through this, the world, too—more beautiful.

[Havel] As a matter of fact, in some form, this process is still continuing in the post-communist world. It is true that, during the long years of communism and even in the decades and maybe centuries preceding it, certain nations did not have adequate opportunity to express their characteristics in an independent state or at least in a certain autonomy. It is also true that most of these processes took place in the last century, and they were violently interrupted in the first half of our century. After all that our countries had to endure during this time, national identity has returned, and it is taking a new shape. Many nations would like to finish this development and express it in a visible way. At the moment, we are in a rather dramatic stage of this process, because we are building a bourgeois democratic society. At the same time, we have to catch up with our historical shortfall and find the independence of our nations while expressing these processes in a just political law. It is natural for one wish often to clash with the other. This is the fundamental problem of the current day CSFR. However, I believe that we will be able to resolve the tension between the national identity and the search for a democracy specific to us, and to find the system of political law equally suitable for all citizens and the CSFR's nations.

[Antall] A national belonging and a sense of national identity are cohesive forces that no nation can do without if it wants to survive. A common language and culture and, in addition, the common way of thinking and historical awareness are part of the sense of identity. The shared historical experiences, whether victories or failures, are necessary parts of the sense of national identity, and together they shape our conscience. The common origin or "relations by blood" only mean some kind of clan-tribal affinity that is turned into a national identity by the continuous readiness for revival that lives in the culture and the national institutional system. Nations are welded together by successes and tragedies. It is precisely the revolution and freedom fight of 1848-1849 that symbolizes in a concentrated form the victorious revolution, the victorious battles, the great desire for revival, the desire for modernization, and the tragic fall. Following that, it also symbolizes the cohesive force of the hiding and fear during the autocracy, and the acceptance of the possibilities, or what were considered possibilities, in 1867, and the renewal and the program of modernization based on the compromise [with the Habsburg empire]. These 50 years between 1825 and 1875 were the Hungarian Risorgimento, a kindred process of the Italian and German unity movements for the establishment of national independence and a modern economic, social, and political order.

The great historical experience that connects us is part of the Hungarian historical mythology, and through this we relive our previous great independence battles, from which we created a system of symbols that we could use as a secret language against the foreign and Hungarian dictatorships during the years of oppression. Everyone understood the spoken and unspoken words, and then, our fight was inspired by the ideals of independence and freedom. The last of these was in 1956 and in the following years, including the peaceful transformation—or if you like, a constitutional revolution—of 1989-1990. Today, in conjunction with European thought, national identity can be a propelling force of the great enterprise. However, to make the sense of national identity continue to be an effective force, in addition to the power of the past, we also need the common will of building the great future enterprise. This is well depicted by a young nation like the Americans, which from the sons of many nations turned into a real modern and proud nation during the independence war, the "North-South" Civil War, and the common efforts of the great enterprise and construction. Therefore, the basis of the current sense of national identity is provided by the cohesive force of the common past and the great common goal, the establishment of a modern enterprising Hungary that fits into Europe. However, to achieve this, we also have to learn what John F. Kennedy said: "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country."

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] All three of you were opposed to the past regime, naturally, in a completely different political and social environment. Now, in a position of power, how do you see the role of opposition whose criticisms, understandably, appear in a different form from yours at the time?

[Walesa] Every power needs an opposition. Opposition is a necessary part of the hygiene of power. One is stimulated by contrary opinion and forced to obey the laws of the day if one would be inclined to deviate from them. Some incredible damage would be done if people currently in power tried to remove the opposition. There is room for differing opinions, including contrary opinions, providing that it is obviously constructive and bears the good of the country in mind, if it tries to serve it, just in a different way.

In the past, we were forced to go underground, and we were not given the chance to freely express our views. The current opposition has this chance. This is good. This is how it should be. We are suggesting various ways, but in the end we are all trying to push the country in the same direction. The only thing that is not allowed is destruction.

[Havel] Opposition is part of democratic conditions. This is a basic trait of pluralist democracies where the various existing political forces fight for the power, and the citizens decide at free elections which one they

prefer. Political opposition of a democracy is completely different from the opposition of a totalitarian system. At that time, political competition did not exist, and power was not a question of two forces. On one side, there was the monolithic total system, and this was opposed by the group of people who publicly resisted and who fought with their words and justice and by calling things by their names. Later, certain social groups, movements, or initiatives were formed around these, which the regime persecuted in the most varied ways. Therefore, this was a somewhat different opposition. However, transition from that opposition and its methods into a normal and stabilized society's opposition is not a simple task. Some people, rather involuntarily, keep their habits from their dissident days, others quite often copy them, without considering the changed circumstances. In conclusion, I can say that this current opposition is having a difficult birth, and it is suffering a number of childhood illnesses. This is connected to the immaturity of our democracy and to its search for identity.

[Antall] The role of the opposition and its criticisms are part of a functioning multiparty democracy. We, the government coalition, must do everything to govern well, make use of the possibilities, and avoid the pitfalls, and at the same time it is in our interest to allow the opposition to voice its opinion. I believe that, in this respect, the opposition and the media that supports opposition views cannot complain in Hungary, and the political role of the opposition prevails in every area, as is befitting of democracy. Naturally, the notion of opposition has a completely different meaning in a totalitarian system and in a functioning democracy. Precisely because of the total dictatorship, intellectual and political resistance took various forms in Hungary in the past decades. Some of its forms emerged within Marxism itself as a Marxist critical tendency. Others went further than that. A very broad based intellectual-political solidarity standing on a national and democratic basis emerged, which used the existing public forums, the legal press, and the fact that it was possible to be constructive in Hungary. Voicing certain opposing opinions in a totalitarian system is one form of intellectual-political resistance, and the other is when, not identifying with or accepting the given political system, someone uses the opportunity to be constructive in the broad areas of society, economy, and sciences for the Hungary that will always exist. We can say that at a time when there is foreign rule in the country and the government is forcibly controlled by a political regime alien to the people, then the construction of the country's infrastructure and institutional system is the task of every decently thinking person. Therefore, I believe that, in addition to the intellectual-political resistance of the intelligentsia, the broad cooperation of Hungarian society, which wanted to act and construct but did not accept political identity with the regime, very considerably contributed to the overthrow of the regime.

Today, opposition in Hungary can operate the same way as in any other democracy. It is a different issue that neither the government parties nor the opposition parties—especially the ones that became legal political parties overnight, similarly to the government parties—possess the qualities already achieved by the many-decade old big political parties in the European or American democracies.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Resulting from the type of this regime, the current opposition is given far more publicity than the opposition of the totalitarian system. At the same time, in the countries of quiet, velvet, and bloodless revolutions, the press and the national media transferred itself into the new system virtually unchanged. Can this peculiar situation be reconciled with the tasks and the mission of the national media? Would you consider it necessary to intervene in the internal matters of these institutions to establish the spirit of democracy?

[Walesa] This transitional period is very difficult. I admit that I often think how good it would be to silence all that holds back, disturbs, hinders, or foments me, just as the communists—because I am talking about them—did not hesitate for a moment shutting our mouths at the time. However, we cannot allow ourselves to do this because we would be exactly the same as they were. Obviously, this is the more difficult road, and it requires a lot of patience. At all costs, we must allow things to mature because, in the long term, we are right, and it is only a matter of time before every thinking person realizes this.

A certain philosophy discredited itself and the power representing it collapsed. Naturally, it is hard for its followers to resign themselves to this. There are many people who cannot accept this and believe that everything that happened was just an accident and that they will soon have their turn again. Sometimes they also come up with the idea of revenge and retaliation.

We, the previous opposition who are in power now, and the current democratic opposition, too, must understand that there is no point in trying to find the so-called positive traits of the past regime, even if it did have some. I emphasize that that certain philosophy has lost and been discredited for once and forever. We must not believe that communism can have a human face. It only wears the human mask until it takes power again. Unfortunately, we have already seen what it does in power. Anyone who fights purely for power—perhaps for regaining power—damages the country. However, people who have a constructive program, gain power in a legitimate way, and try to serve the development and uplift of the country, do have a place in the broad political arena. This is democracy, and this is what we fought for.

The truth is that it is extremely difficult to close the fight with the former regime. Rather than the current opposition, the problems are created by the people who deceivingly declare that it was better in their time and they try to convince people about this in case they will say:

"Come back, communism!" I am not saying that there is no room for them in the political spectrum, but they should first admit that their deeds were bad and harmful, and apologize at least for their crimes. This is their entry ticket to democracy. They must understand that power in itself is not worth anything. It has to serve society. People who want to rule instead of serving have no place in democracy.

[Havel] Our situation was perhaps slightly different from the one prevailing in Hungary. Although we inherited the institutions of several large newspapers and primarily our radio and television from the past period, these institutions have changed internally. There are other people in these institutions today, and the ideals of the media have changed and they are trying to play a role compatible with the prevailing democratic situation. In addition, there are many new mass media means, primarily new newspapers, but also new radio stations that emerged under the new constitutional conditions. In the case of our state television, we are also preparing legal foundations for the existence of competition here and for independent television stations or corporations to be able to obtain broadcasting rights. For example, our radio has many stations today that are hardly the successors of the previous large state radio.

As for our relations with the mass media, the state does not interfere in their affairs, and it does not even have the possibility to do so. However, a certain amount of loose influence can and should be asserted in the case of mass media that are still in our government's jurisdiction, all the more so because we finance these organizations with taxpayers' money. For example, our television will become a public institution headed by a council appointed by our parliaments. Some kind of separation from the state will occur here, but this is not a complete separation. Some ties will continue to exist, at least for some time, ties that continue to bind the state with these mass media institutions. However, this does not mean the existence of any censorship, or any possibility for government politicians to have any direct influence on our present television or radio stations. On the contrary, the very existence of occasional public debates and open conflicts shows that there is no interference here whatsoever.

[Antall] The issue of state interference or direct interference can very easily be misinterpreted after an era in which the state was identical with a totalitarian dictatorship. State interference and its limitation are part of the theory of liberalism; stating the limits of state interference is also part of a liberal, a Christian-democratic, or even a social-democratic state concept and government ideology. The essential thing is that state interference should be limited in all the areas, and should be carried out in public interest, but only within the boundaries of a constitutional state and in harmony with the public concept created by a free market economy.

As for the radio and television, the word "national" here means its public service character rather than a given political trend. Therefore, everyone misinterprets this concept if they want to understand a different thing. Direct interference is only necessary when we are talking about violation of the law, and then it is unavoidable. Thus, this case also shows our constitutional state character, and this also applies to the observation of the budget law and other laws. All the things that have been going on in connection with the radio and television in Hungary for quite some time are definitely not normal.

During the appointment of the heads of radio and television, or during the regulation of these appointments, ideas emerged that would demand a more complex and a broader consensus than the one required for the election of the president of the republic in accordance with our valid constitution. This shows the extent to which our domestic political and journalistic breed [beltenyeszet] overestimated the problem of our radio and television, and this has become intolerable. Therefore, we need objective television and radio stations that provide news correctly and without distortions, fulfill the requirements of information and presentation of various views, and present different opinions in accordance with this country's public opinion. It is impossible to imagine state interference in a democracy in which only the government position prevails; nor do I know of any democracy in which the majority political forces—forces that make up the majority in a given governing cycle—represent a minority in the national television and radio both in their general program policy and their obvious political programs.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] The previous regime created a rather firm enemy image for the society. Is there still such an enemy image today, or has a new enemy image replaced the old one?

[Walesa] The enemy image was good for many things, and the foreign and domestic enemy could be blamed for many things. This enemy was sometimes real and sometimes fabricated to have someone to blame for the mistakes and lack of results. Coming up with the German, Russian, or other enemy is useless today. Such a thing would hinder our development. We spoke about the common European home where all of us are heading. How could we build and live together with enemies?

Many programs can work very well in a computer, while the system remains the same. I heard that there are so-called study programs that are constantly perfecting themselves. We must strive to also learn from each other: One nation is better in something, the other nation is better in something else. We must work for each other, rather than against each other.

[Havel] One can notice that some political forces are trying to anticipate such demands, let us say, to create some kind of a new enemy. In some cases, this is natural to some extent. For example, if some political forces try to settle their accounts with the mafia originating from the previous nomenklatura community and warn the society against them in order to reveal these phenomena,

then all this is justified. However, we also witness the creation of some kind of a sham enemy, a very cheap method of self-determination and of gaining support by referring to the similar more primitive self-identification features of our society. Naturally, this is a dangerous phenomenon. We must openly oppose such phenomena, because there are always some totalitarian elements involved here.

[Antall] Both from a domestic and foreign political view, only the political systems or politics with a bad conscience need an enemy image. A political system feels the need for an enemy image when it lacks a balanced national identity and future building self-confidence. A constitutional democratic and independent country does not need this enemy image either in the country or abroad. An internal enemy image was needed for the emotional system of the so-called class struggle, in fact, an external enemy image is usually needed by certain systems for domestic political reasons. Obviously, we must also admit that, in addition to domestic political reasons, sometimes it is necessary to create psychological strength through an enemy image to hold together certain groups of states. In my view, if a healthy Hungarian national consciousness and an adequate faith in the future exists, then there is no need for either a domestic or a foreign enemy image in Hungary today.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] The economic position of the three countries can be defined in an exact way on the basis of inflation, unemployment, and the repayment of foreign loans. In these key issues, what differences would you point out in the economic policies of the three countries?

[Walesa] The most important thing to realize is that two times two is always four in the economy. Emotions do not exist, because they disturb things in this area. You either do it well and remain in the market, or you fail. This, at last, is a normal situation. Of course, it is in vain to explain to the workers of an uneconomical large factory or a bankrupt enterprise that no one can finance the factory operating in the red anymore. Even if people understand this, they protest losing their workplaces. This is what we have to understand. The transition is very hard because we cannot leave the workers to themselves. The leadership and the workers together have to find the least painful solution. A rushed-through change may even seem a spectacular acceleration in the short term, while it creates huge social tensions.

It is cruel, but we must all understand that the previous regime left us a bankrupt estate. There is no other solution. We cannot step forward without sacrifices. The circumstances are given. People must realize that they are in control of their fate, and we, their elected leaders, can only act in their favor if they also actively seek the solutions and do not expect everything from us. They must get used to the machinery of democracy that assumes both independent thinking and thinking together.

Everything is hinged on the order in the economy, including the issues of debts and inflation. There is one key issue that is the key to everything, namely a functioning economy.

[Havel] I am afraid I cannot give a substantial answer to this. In the aspects of transition, every one of the three countries is ahead of the other two in certain aspects and behind in others. To make a more serious assessment and to solve the most important problems of the reform, all countries would need to do a detailed analysis or a comparative study of the economic situation.

[Antall] In my view, the problems of the three Visegrad countries cannot be limited to these three areas. Not only because the symptoms are different, but also because the circumstances are also different. I do not think it appropriate to compare the domestic difficulties of these three countries either to our advantage or at our expense. I would rather say that the three countries have to try to find the solutions together. The program of our economic policy was formed in renewing internal debates. Our most important goal is to make our economic policy secure and predictable for the foreign capital investors and domestic enterprises. Our overall debts were first reduced in 1991, and our monetary policy is successfully serving the gradual establishment of convertibility. We are settling the property ownership on the basis of existing laws. We expect that we can noticeably keep the speed of privatization, the rate of unemployment, and inflation in balance in 1992. All this, unfortunately, will not yet mean a considerable reduction of the population's burden, but we are progressing in this direction through the expected growth of production.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] What is your view on the full EC membership of the three Visegrad countries? What would be better, to join individually or together? Do you, perhaps, see a third way?

[Walesa] I am a practical man. Theoreticians see many things differently. In my view, we three have to cooperate. Political possibilities are one thing, and the economy is another. We have inferior factories and enterprises, and our products do not reach the world standard. It is impossible to change this overnight.

We ended CEMA. However, I feel that we might have also thrown out the baby with the bathwater in the heat of our emotions. In other words, we also eliminated those areas of cooperation that we could have continued after renegotiating them and adjusting them to the new conditions. I am convinced that we could easily have made the frail but not pointless relations economical. However, it has been done, but we should not hesitate to find each other again as soon as possible. The products that cannot yet compete in the European market can often be exchanged or sold profitably on each other's markets.

The theory "Face Europe!" is very nice, but it means a long journey in practice. I am absolutely convinced that we can efficiently help each other on this journey.

Let me add that, if some 70 percent of the economic contacts of the world's richest countries—Japan, the United States, France, or Germany—ceased overnight, these countries would deteriorate even more than we have. As you can see, we are still living somehow. This is a fantastic thing.

[Havel] The essence of our tripartite agreement is that we coordinate our policies in various areas, primarily in our attitude toward the EC, and in the benefit of joining the community of democratic states as a whole. Of course, it is much better to have a coordinated policy and to try to mutually help each other, rather than compete with each other or push each other away. All the three countries in question have already understood this. Of course, I do not know whether the EC will accept us all at once, but one thing is certain, namely that the EC signed the partnership treaty with all of us at the same time. There is some chance of all the three countries becoming EC members within the foreseeable future, perhaps by the end of the century, and perhaps it would be a good thing to become members all at once. However, we cannot tell whether this will happen or not. On one hand, this depends on these countries' development; on the other hand, this also depends on the EC member states themselves. On our part, I can say that the CSFR is not driven by prestige in this matter, and we will not feel bitter if another country is the first to become an EC member.

[Antall] The essential thing is the joint EC partnership of the Visegrad three. I can definitely say that—after the cooperation of the Visegrad three, namely after Bratislava, Visegrad, and Krakow— this was the really common success, when we signed the EC partnership together, after parallel negotiations. Actually, in the next period, individual or group membership is a detail we cannot deal with today. One thing is certain: There will be considerable changes in the internal develoment of the EC, its internal structure, and in the bilateral relations between its members in the coming years. We must not only be aware of the present conditions in the EC, but we must also consider the future EC and European Union that we intend to join at the end of this century. Therefore, one of the questions is what will take place in the EC; the other question is what will take place in our three countries. If we develop simultaneously and in a similar way, and we fulfill the conditions, we will be able to join the EC together. If one country fulfills the conditions while the other one does not, our countries will join the EC individually. It is already clear that Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Norway will precede the Visegrad three.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] No doubt, the confidence among our countries has increased since the summit in Visegrad. There are both limiting and expanding historical precedents to this tripartite agreement, and we must also face present-day conflicts like the Bos-Nagymaros issue. To what extent do such differences of views threaten this tripartite cooperation? Talking about Bos-Nagymaros, can you envisage a mediatory role played by the third "neutral" side in such a conflict situation?

[Walesa] Giant-mania large-scale investment projects started in the old regime are often carried on by the force of inertia, and it is extremely difficult to abandon them. This particularly applies to energy production. Instead of seeking alternative solutions, the officials in the old regime planned huge centers, disregarding the environmental damage and everything else. It could also happen that halting such a giant project would force us to use candles the next day for lack of other power source. Both ways are wrong. Huge sums of money are wasted, and we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and our neighbors. However, no one should be confronted with an accomplished fact. We depend on each other, and we have no other alternative: We need a solution that will make it possible to solve such problems without conflicts. Something like this: Look, friend, let us agree that this cannot go on for long, and this cannot operate for long; I understand that you need it at the moment; all right, I will tolerate it for a while, and I understand your problems, but let us seek a good solution day and night, to be able to stop this monster as soon as possible. We use the water, the land, and the air jointly; there is nothing here that is yours or mine; we have one environment, just like we have one Europe. If we disagree and destroy our environment, who will accept us?

These are very important issues. We must not let our bilateral relations deteriorate. Not only a third side, but a fourth, fifth, or 10th side can also help us solve our controversial issues, with professional advice and by calming the hotheads. We are talking here about common problems of our common fate, and therefore, we should solve these problems jointly.

[Havel] Gabcikovo (Bos) is a characteristic heritage of the past. We are not the ones who signed the contract on building this gigantic project; nor was the current Hungarian Government involved in it; our predecessors in the communist era signed this contract, and we only inherited this huge problem from them. I think that such problems should not cause any kind of alienation in our political relations. As for Gabcikovo, I would like to see this issue completely depoliticized and turned into a matter discussed by relevant experts.

I remember when, shortly after my election—this was still in the communist times, before your elections—on the occasion of my visit in Hungary in 1990, I spoke with Hungarian officials about this subject, and we agreed that we should set up a highly professional committee that would enjoy the confidence of both sides, a committee that would examine the whole issue and all the alternatives from economic, legal, ecological, and other points of view. After this meeting, both sides occasionally mentioned the idea of such a committee, but we have been unable to advance in this matter to this very day. Of course, even after a two-year delay, I would welcome the creation of such a committee and the

examination of the entire question in a totally objective way, free of political influences, interests, and prestige. I would also welcome the participation of another partner in this work, like the EC or another international organization, that has no direct interest in this matter, like we do.

[Antall] The Visegrad trio is actually a political club that cooperates with the EC in formulating its policy toward the NATO, a club that takes a common stand in some cases. Bilateral conflicts should generally be solved through bilateral negotiations, and it is noteworthy that the three countries involved in the Visegrad Agreement have signed and are signing bilateral basic agreements with each other. Therefore, it seems more plausible that, to solve a crisis situation, these countries will hold bilateral negotiations or will make use of European crisis-management organizations like the relevant CSCE institutions. Naturally, this also applies to issues like Bos-Nagymaros, but it can also apply to the national minority issue, issues that should be included in international treaties, including the use of the services of the Council of Europe if possible.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] The national minority issue and the situation of minorities living beyond our borders are part of the difficult historical heritage of these three countries. Could this conflict also be dealt with in a way similar to the issues mentioned above?

[Walesa] Here again, this is mostly a burden originating from the previous regime. Although national minority conflicts are often much older than that, the previous regime did not even try to deal with this issue, let alone try to solve it, in the past 50 years. Untreated wounds are opening up again and again. It is very fortunate if a sober third party happens to be near two conflicting sides, a third party that puts a negotiating table between the two sides. I want to stress again that we depend on each other. No one can defeat the other without punishment because, sooner or later, that country will suffer itself and will harm all of us. As I said, the economic situation is the key to everything; if our region emerges from the current bankruptcy pit and the people start having a better life, they will also be less angry at each other.

[Havel] I think that Central Europe is a region with a large number of minorities, minorities within minorities, and various ethnic groups; that is, an area richly divided into various national minorities. Therefore, I think that we should pay increased attention to the national minority rights in this region. I am not sure that it would benefit anyone if we included other, foreign factors in this issue; on the contrary, we would probably exacerbate the situation. In such sensitive matters, each country has the obligation to seek democratic and just solutions. We can find international support primarily in the existing international documents, like the Copenhagen document on national minority rights. This legal basis should mean more than the aforementioned foreign element; in any case, our governments should regard it as a guideline. I think that, precisely because Central Europe is so varied and divided, we should seek solutions on how to reduce the role of the borders dividing individual countries and how to make these borders more open; we should also seek the opportunities for close cooperation in which ethnic affiliation is not the decisive thing.

[Antall] The national minority problem is not necessarily equal in these three countries because, in the case of Poland and Hungary, we are talking about a relatively more homogeneous population; at the same time, in the CSFR, we are not only talking about two separate nations with separate state and government federal structures and certain efforts of independent policy, but we are also talking about considerable national minorities here, compared with the two other countries. At the same time, both Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Poland have a big problem, namely that a large minority of Hungarians and Polish people are living beyond their borders, sometimes quite across the border. I think that the Visegrad three should deal with this issue in the framework of their bilateral relations. I do not think that the Visegrad three as a whole would be the proper forum to deal with this problem. In any case, we think that it is very important to grant the national minority rights according to the European norms. Moreover, we are more sensitive in this area, and we might even advance more, because it is intolerable that this issue should destroy our cooperation.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] The Visegrad three were represented by the Hungarian foreign minister at the summit meeting in New York and the Security Council meeting held at the end of January. This uniform stand elicited general appreciation in the international politics. Should we regard this as the beginning of a long-term close cooperation process in the foreign policy of these three countries?

[Walesa] Yes, I think so. This was a nice and a convincing example of a joint appearance in the international arena. I have already mentioned that I am a practical man. Well, the West also likes practical solutions. If we individually see these countries on various matters, often the same ones, then they see this as wasting time and they are right. If something can be done all at one time then it is a crime to waste time by splitting it up. Understandably, the West would like to see peace and security in our region and the establishment of this depends almost only on us. We desperately need large investments in these three countries, while the investors prefer to think in terms of regions rather than individual states. Therefore, a common stand is better for them and for us both on economic and foreign policy issues. This is very clear.

[Havel] I very much welcome this example of joint action. This is in perfect harmony with our intention to coordinate the direction of our policies. I am happy that the relations of the three are not limited to the leaders' summits like the ones we held in Bratislava, Visegrad, and Krakow, but the foreign ministers, defense ministers, and others also have constant negotiations; they try

to coordinate this policy, and on one occasion one of them was trusted with negotiating for the three. In my view, this is a very positive achievement, which simplifies the situation of all three countries in the international arena because it makes our integration into Europe easier if we, who are in a similar situation, are seen by our partners to be able to agree and cooperate with each other.

[Antall] We considered it a great success that Hungary was able to successfully represent the Visegrad Three at the New York summit. This united and common appearance met with general approval. I believe that this also proves that cooperation is worthwhile because the Czechoslovak or the Polish Government can represent our common interests in another place. It is very important that our cooperation be characterized by a maximum amount of trust because this is the only way to ensure that the three countries do not compete with each other to such an extent that they try to increase their prestige in other countries or international organizations to the detriment of each other. I believe that political cooperation and the discussion of foreign policy and diplomatic steps will continue to characterize these three countries in the future. However, I will go one step further and say that it is also worth having political cooperation and coordination with the EC countries because this way we can cooperate in international politics before we achieve full EC membership and, similar to the way the Yugoslav crisis was handled, it is also expedient to consult with each other on other issues affecting our region or even on issues outside our region.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and amidst the Yugoslav crisis, the notion of the security policy vacuum often crops up in connection with our region. Does this vacuum exist? If it does, how do you envisage the military policy cooperation of the three countries, especially bearing in mind that NATO takes a rather restrained attitude toward the membership of Central European countries.

[Walesa] I understand the West but I also understand us. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, one of the opposing sides disappeared. This left a—may I say—"uncovered" area. In fact, the truth is that there is no need for a strong military block because—thank God—there is no enemy. Nevertheless, we do need some military policy cooperation. The reason is simple: Some very poor and economically underdeveloped nations are living in our area—and who knows what they are planning. It might not be peaceful economic cooperation.... This is why I think that in this transitional period, chic is full of unresolved problems, we do need some forces that would prevent what might be a Yugoslav-type conflict. We have problems, too, but the Soviet successor states have to face immeasurably bigger problems. Their emerging situation may become a source of great danger. We hope that no such thing will happen but this does not mean that we do not reckon with the possibility of unrest. Unfortunately, in the interest of our security, we must not disregard the most pessimistic outcome. I have already spoken about my suggestions: We should prepare our countries' armies or a part of them to take joint action if trouble were to start at the border of one of these countries. I do not even mean a deliberate and organized intervention or defense against some attack; I am thinking of hungry and desperate masses suddenly swooping across the border in a desperate search for survival. Such a crowd could only be handled and kept in order by an organized force—this is where the Army would be needed. In addition, it could be used to clear away great environmental damage. All this requires organization, good training, preparation, and a willingness to cooperate.

[Havel] A certain kind of security vacuum has indeed emerged here, although I do not think this is very dangerous just now. In my view, none of our countries is threatened by an open, visible, or tangible danger. Nevertheless, we must think of our security, search for the common linking points, and find our place in the broader security structures and organizations. Our defense ministers maintain close cooperation. They also met recently and agreed in several concrete areas of cooperation. In fact, they accepted a common stand that expresses our intentions for the closest possible cooperation with NATO.

It is not true that NATO is completely closed to us once and for all. NATO is interested in cooperation and is aware of the fact that precisely these three countries have a major role for Western Europe and for the future all-European security system. Of course, the creation of close and mutual contacts depends both on NATO and on us. Coordinated advance seems to be the correct method in this endeavor, too. Our common stand on security issues, a position adopted in Krakow, elicited great attention in the West, precisely because this included these three countries' common stand.

[Antall] Of course, the concept of a security policy vacuum has become fashionable today, primarily in the sense that in the former bipolar world order, the regions that were covered by the existing military blocs were not regarded as a security vacuum. Of course, the question is to what extent such a military alliance could be regarded as a security guarantee. At best, one can say that such a military alliance would make it possible to foresee the strategic and political issues, and the leaders of the two world powers could be sure that no steps would be taken without their will, steps that could really threaten world peace. They could also be sure that such steps would not create unforeseeable conflicts between them. In this respect, one could regard this bipolar, or military bloc policy, as one free of a security vacuum. If we look at all this from this viewpoint, such a vacuum has indeed emerged with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, I do not think that the former confrontation and the former military alliances represented such a guarantee in the long-term development of the world at large and in the history of these nations that one should remember and miss those days in an emotional or even a rational way.

I think that we can deal with this security vacuum, and I think it is extremely important for NATO to continue to exist and to guarantee the U.S. presence in Europe, and the international organizations—from the United Nations to the CSCE—should do everything in their power to guarantee security in Europe. I do not regard the previous situation as ideal at all. Of course, these three countries have to cooperate in this. NATO is reserved about the fate of these three countries, and I would even say that it is understandable that this organization is reserved when it witnesses uncertainties in the eastern part of Europe. However, NATO leaders must also realize that it is impossible to isolate the more fortunate part of Europe from the problems of Eastern-Central Europe and Eastern Europe. Therefore, it is absolutely important for them to have a comprehensive military and political strategy in dealing with the overall problems of our region.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] What is your opinion about Ukraine's desire to join the Visegrad Three?

[Walesa] For the time being, this question is under debate. Whether Ukraine joins the Visegrad Three or not, we will have to count on the emergence of a broad cooperation in the future. This is a country bordering each member of the Visegrad Three and, under proper conditions and circumstances, we can definitely have a fruitful cooperation with it. I also have heard opinions according to which the size of Ukraine—if it joined us—would create a strong and dominant force in this region. This is not true at all. The only possible goal is the activity of equal partners on uniform bases. We need calm and clever deliberation before making a decision.

[Havel] I am not sure that it would be sensible to expand such a regional alliance in all directions. Alliances created on the basis of geographical proximity as well as on the basis of a similarity of problems are practical or even pragmatic ones. I am aware that in addition to Ukraine, other countries would also like to join us. I think that we should strive for the closest possible cooperation with all the countries that want to join us. However, I am not sure that it would be a sensible thing to expand such a small regional formation because this cooperation might lose its framework, its clear content, and its efficiency later. The three members of the Visegrad Three are in a largely identical phase of development, and we have concrete subjects that connect us and in which we cooperate. Other countries, like Ukraine, are in a slightly different situation, and they are in a different development phase. The expansion of the Visegrad Three with such countries would necessarily lead to the reduced efficiency of our existing cooperation. Of course, this does not mean that we oppose cooperation with Ukraine. On the contrary, we are well aware of the fact that we need to develop the closest possible cooperation with this eastern neighbor.

[Antall] Ukraine should be given the opportunity to approach the European countries with its own economic, cultural, and political heritage. Ukraine should be able to join the world and the European countries through various channels. However, I do not think it would be expedient to include Ukraine or other Eastern European or Eastern-Central European countries in the Visegrad Three. Actually, the Visegrad Three represents three countries who are directly dependent on one another. However, this, in itself, would not be enough to exclude other countries from this political club. The point is that three countries with a relatively similar level of development have become associate members of the EC. In other words, the cohesive force of the Visegrad Three lies in the fact that the EC signed a partnership agreement with these three countries. There are no economic or political reasons to expand European cooperation through this Visegrad Three. We can find innumerable other possibilities that are more suitable for the inclusion of Ukraine or other countries.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] In the last few years, all three countries have undoubtedly made great progress in establishing democratic institutions. At the same time, every day we can see that we cannot talk at all about completed processes. People have many fears and many of them are worried that these positive historical processes may slow down, or at the worst, they may be reversed. Can you perceive this danger and what are the guarantees for avoiding such a dramatic change in our region?

[Walesa] I do not think that anyone would willingly give up the achievements of the 20th century at the threshold of the 21st century and would like to sink back into the Middle Ages. We are progressing along a natural road in a good direction. We can even call this a revolutionary road. We do not yet know how many sacrifices it will demand of us or how long it will take to achieve the goal. If we persevere, taking into consideration our nations and societies in our progress and serve them, and try to solve the tormenting questions of the transition with all our might, then we can get to the goal sooner. However, if we miss the appropriate moments and do not try hard enough to maintain international and domestic cooperation then it might take longer. The longer the transitional period lasts, the later the democratic mechanisms can begin to show their effects and this could wind up in increasing social unrest.

We might sometimes make mistakes or start to implement some reforms the wrong way. After all, we are only beginners; others would be beginners, too.... No one else has been on this road before us. We need help and understanding, not hindering. We have already spoken about the existence of certain forces that consciously try to discredit us. They keep trying to put a monkey wrench in the works. However, I do not think that they represent a real danger. It is partly up to us to make them understand that their time is over. There is no return to the past. They are trying to wind up a watch that has a broken spring.

[Havel] In my view, this development has progressed far enough that it cannot be reversed anymore. I find any

kind of return to the totalitarian system impossible. Naturally, in fragile new democracies, the danger of serious constitutional, political, or state crises exists. It is obvious that in this situation various occult and demagogic politicians will want to use the general uncertainties and the imbalance of the system to shout for the policy of the stick. To a certain extent, they are doing this now and this can also be expected in the future. I believe that these phenomena can slow our development but they cannot reverse it.

[Antall] I do not believe that East-Central Europe or East Europe will face such dramatic changes in the future that they could reverse historical progress and the processes that have already started. Today, this has neither a foreign policy nor an economic policy basis. I think that we can state that with the economic, social, and political system that belonged to the so-called existing socialism, communism took our whole region into a historical dead- end that clearly proved its impossibility. We can also say that these countries and those who forced this political system on us could easily have been saved from this "development' or this "stage of development" if these people had read the writings of the great thinkers of the 19th century, including, for example, Jozsef Eotvos. I could also quote several Hungarian politicians who, at the time, without knowing of any existing socialist or communist countries, clearly wrote that this would be hardly workable as an economic, social, or political system. Looking at it from a historical perspective, the communist political systems proved to be unviable a long time ago. Therefore, a return to this is unlikely. However, it is not impossible that the former ruling elite, the so-called communist nomenclature, will make an attempt to regain influence or power as employers or as employees, or in the framework of political or interest protection organizations. It is certain that their goal is to try to regain power, possibly through parliamentary democracy, based on the propaganda opportunity that will be provided when the country is emerging from the social problems and serious troubles that they could not resolve. If the political rotation system can prevail in a country, it can never again be an exclusive power that would in any sense mean a return to the past. However, I trust the wisdom and clear judgment of the Hungarian people that in spite of all economic and social difficulties, it will not again give way to the political forces that already once destroyed the country, and that it will oppose all demagogic attempts. The same way, I think it is unlikely that this region has to be afraid of the return of a foreign military power to reorganize its former military, political, and economic influence in this region. Naturally, such intentions and thoughts may exist in certain politicians or soldiers, and it is certain that in their hidden thoughts and dreams, the idea of reconquering this region often appears, just as these superpower aspirations for our region not only manifested themselves during and after World War II. Much longer ago, in other political ideological systems, even in the ideology of pan-slavism or on the basis of other ideas, efforts aimed at gaining political control over the area of East Europe or the Balkans always existed. I trust that we do not need to be afraid of this, and I mainly trust that the world will be wise enough not to allow any countries to gain hegemony over Europe or even a part of Europe in the future.

EC Ready To Assist Talks on Gabcikovo Dam

LD2003181392 Budapest MTI in English 2105 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] Brussels, March 19 (MTI)—The Commission of the European Communities is ready to contribute on a technical level to the discussion of Czechoslovakia and Hungary concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydropower system, to help the sides work out a settlement through negotiations, EC spokesman Nico Wegter told MTI's correspondent today, after Hungarian Minister Without Portfolio Ferenc Madl held talks with EC Commission Vice-President Frans Andriessen and other EC leading officials.

The EC contribution, even if on a "technical" level only, would be the first time the integration organization of the 12 countries directly contributes to resolving a debate between Central European countries that concluded association accords with the EC on 16 December 1991.

President Alia Addresses Nation After Elections

AU2403163392 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1300 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Statement by President Ramiz Alia in Tirana; date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] First I want to greet the people after their participation in the 22 March elections. This participation and the order and calm the electors showed in the polling stations and after the announcement of the results indicate respect for democracy. Moreover, the acceptance of these results by the various parties shows their awareness of the role and the place they deserve in Albania's political life. Some people rejoiced, and some people were disappointed after these elections. However, let us respect the will of the majority, and let it be for the good of Albania.

I make use of this opportunity to wish all the people better days, to congratulate the victors for the result they scored and to hope that they successfully carry out their duties and responsibilities. These elections marked a great step forward in consolidating our new democracy and strengthening our political institutions. What is left is to accelerate the reform of society and to apply the reform in other state structures, the economy, culture, and elsewhere. The new parliament will soon meet for its first session. I am drafting the relevant decree to summon it and will talk with the leaders of the parliamentary parties to coordinate our work according to the regular legal procedures. At the same time, I will hold talks with the leaders of the Democratic Party that won a majority in these elections and, according to the Constitutional Law, must form the new government. I hope that all these complicated procedures will be completed quickly, before the end of next week. Meanwhile, Mr. Ahmeti's government will continue to perform all its functions. I appeal to the people to show patience and understanding in everything and to develop a democratic culture in conformity with the law.

Berisha: Victors To Form Coalition Government

AU2503093092 Paris AFP in English 2327 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Nicolas Miletitch report]

[Text] Tirana, March 25 (AFP)—Albania's Democratic Party, victorious in landmark parliamentary elections on Sunday [22 March], intends to form a coalition government and bring in Western technical aid, party leader Sali Berisha said here Tuesday [24 March]. The party, which swept away 45 years of communist rule in the Balkan state, "would like to see outside personalities taking part in the government", Berisha said, also expressing confidence that Europe and the United States would "come to Albania's aid".

Berisha, who has been seen as a possible president, said he could not rule out the possibility of Albania's best-known writer, Ismail Kadare, returning to his homeland and standing for the post of head of state. "He has never been involved in politics", the 47-year-old doctor told AFP. Kadare, who sought political asylum in France in 1990, said Monday [23 March] he was preparing to return to Albania.

Under the Albanian Constitution, the incumbent president can only be removed by a 67 percent majority vote in parliament. President Ramiz Alia, a former aide to Stalinist leader Enver Hoxha and his successor since 1985, was elected last year with a five-year mandate.

"We already have that 67 percent", Berisha said. Figures provided Tuesday by Albania's electoral commission showed that in 99 of the 100 zones so far assessed, the Democratic Party had won 79 seats with 62.29 percent of the vote while the Socialists—the renamed communists—had won just six seats with 25.51 percent. The Greek minority party had won two seats with a 2.95 percent score, while the Social-Democrats and Republicans had won one seat each, Radio Tirana said. The Democratic Party is favourably placed in run-off polls to take place in some zones next Sunday [29 March].

The new rulers will inherit the task of governing Europe's poorest nation. In the past year, annual per capita revenue has dropped from 850 dollars to 550 dollars and the average monthly wage of 800 to 1,000 leks is the equivalent of less than 15 dollars.

A leading official in the Democratic Party, former Culture Minister Prec Zogaj, said the future government would be seeking support from the Albanian diaspora abroad, particularly in the United States. Berisha indicated Monday that returnees would be given Albanian nationality.

The Democratic Party newspaper RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE was jubilant Tuesday, exulting that the party had won "two-thirds of the seats in parliament". The Socialist newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT was putting on a brave face: Party members "must not cry since in Europe the future belongs to democratic socialism", it wrote. It called on the new rulers to "respect the promises and hopes that (their party) raised, thanks to which it won the elections".

Nexhmije Hoxha, widow of Enver Hoxha whose harsh rule kept Albania isolated from the rest of the world for decades, refused to vote in a polling booth specially installed in the prison where she is being held on charges of misuse of public funds, RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE reported. "I am refusing to vote because I have been arrested unjustly", an unrepentant Hoxha told a group of Albanian journalists. "I want real democracy to triumph".

However other former communist dignitaries held on corruption charges, including former Interior Minister Hekuran Isai and former Politburo members Manush

Myftiu and Rita Marko, did not scorn the opportunity to express their democratic choice.

PSDSh's Gjinushi Hails Election Results

AU2403201292 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1830 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Professor Skender Gjinushi, chairman of the Social Democratic Party [PSDSh], gave a news conference in the Press Center at 1700 GMT today.

After congratulating the Albanian people on the victory of 22 March, which he called a spectacular one, Gjinushi said that the PSDSh has made and will continue to make its contribution to progress on the road of democracy. The Albanian people, although it lived under a dictatorship for 50 years, were able to create an opposition and lead it to victory. The 22 March election result was a minimal one for the PSDSh, but nonetheless represents a success when one bears in mind that 12 parties competed. The PSDSh considers the start of parliamentary life to be difficult but necessary. For us as a party, the most important thing under present circumstances was for the opposition to win, and we made this principle part of our electoral platform even though it damaged our immediate party interests.

The coalition among the Democratic Party, Republican Party, and the PSDSh exerted a great influence on the people and led to the victory of the opposition and the defeat of the Socialists.

The PSDSh appreciates more than anything else the calm that prevails after the elections, something that indicates our people's high level of democratic culture and shows that they, including the Socialist Party members and supporters, want calm and democracy in order to build their new life.

The parliamentary parties have difficult tasks ahead, and one of the most important is to eradicate communism. We therefore believe that cooperation among our three parties will be necessary in the future too. The communists lost their political base in the 22 March elections. It is up to the new parliament to remove their economic and judicial base.

Gjinushi then answered journalists' questions.

Electoral Commission Reports on New Deputies

AU2403160692

[Editorial Report] Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian at 1430 GMT on 24 March carries an eight-minute live Zamira Koleci report from the headquarters of the Central Electoral Commission, in which Koleci provides a list of newly elected People's Assembly deputies as follows:

Berat District: Agron Musaraj, Democratic Party [PD]; Abdi Baleta, PD; Fatos Nano, Socialist Party [PSSh]; Tefik Ajazi (PSSh); runoff to be held in one Berat constituency.

Diber District: Safet Xhulali, PD; Agron Coku, PD; Natasha Shehu, PD; Bashkim Gazidede, PD.

Durres District: Nevruz Cela, PD; Bashkim Kopliku, PD; Vedat Sazani, PD; Azem Hajdari, PD; Rustem Gjata, PD.

Elbasan District: Engjell Dakli, PD; Agim Hoxha, PD; Robert Ndrenika, PD; Gezim Mema, PD; Skender Gjinushi, Social Democratic Party; Ibrahim Celiku, Republican Party; Runoff to be held in one Elbasan constituency.

Fier District: Rexhep Uka, PD; Bujar Nepravishta, PD; Llazar Lengu, PD; Hasan Halili, PD; Mitro Cela, PD; Daim Rrapaj, PD; Fadil Cepele, PD; Kastriot Islami, PSSh.

Gramsh District: Bashkim Koci, PSSh.

Gjirokaster District: Kosta (?Makajazi), Human Rights Union; Runoff to be held in Gjirokaster's other constituency.

Kavaje District: Sali Berisha, PD; Halit Shamata, PD; Luan Skuqi, PD.

Kolonje District: Runoff to be held in Kolonje's sole constituency.

Korce District: Gezim Agastra PD, Bahri Bregu, PD; Teodor Keko, PD; Eduard Selami, PD; Natasha Lako, PD; Petrika Minga, PD; Sotiraq Stratobardha.

Kruje District: Sadedin Balla, PD; Rushen Golemi, PD; Alfred Sarreqi, PD.

Kukes District: Mustafe Mustafa, PD; Shefqet Hoxha, PD; Skender Jaku, PD.

Lezhe District: Rudolf Marku, PD; Tonin Alimehilli, PD.

Librazhd District: Runoffs to be held in both Librazhd constituencies.

Lushnje District: Tritan Shehu, PD; Izet Shehu, PD; Ihsan Cabej, PD; Kujtim Gina, PD.

Mat District: Shyqyri Cela, PD; Agim Cupi, PD.

Mirdite District: Ndue Gjika, PD; Zef Brozi, PD.

Permet District: Runoff to be held in Permet's sole constituency.

Pogradec District: Arben Mece, PD; Jemin Gjana, PD.

Puke District: Simon Puta, PD; Marash Ibraj, PD.

Sarande District: Thoma Mico, Human Rights Union; Runoffs to be held in Sarande's two other constituencies.

Skrapar District: Bashkim Caka, PSSh; Ilir Meta, PSSh.

Shkoder District: Pjeter Arbnori, PD; Ahmet Osja, PD; Ali Spahia, PD; Gezim Luli, PD; Dode Kacaj, PD; Menduh Derguti, PD; Pjeter Pepa, PD; Kol Tonaj, PD.

Tepelene District: Runoffs to be held in both Tepelene constituencies.

Tirana District: Ylli Vejsiu, PD; Arben Imami, PD; Dylber Vrioni, PD; Skender Shkupi, PD; Tomor Malasi, PD; Dashamir Shehu, PD; Aleksander Meksi, PD; Maksim Konomi, PD; Shaban Memia, PD; Emanuel Heba, PD; Petrit Kalakula, PD; Ferdinant Petrela, PD.

Tropoje District: Besnik Mustafaj, PD.

Vlore District: Ibrahim Vasjari, PD; Abedin Elmazi, PD; Dhimiter Anagnosti; Afrim Jupi, PD; Gramoz Pashko, PD; Roland Tafili, PD.

Runoffs are to be held in 11 constituencies on 29 March between the following candidates:

Peri Dishnica (PD) and Xhemal Dauti (PSSh) in Berat.

Gaqo Rrota (PD) and Ndricim Hysa (PSSh) in Elbasan.

Genc Rruli (PD) and Leontiev Cuci (PSSh) in Gjirokaster.

Uran Butka (PD) and Sotir Kokeri (PSSh) in Kolonje.

Pellumb Malaj (PD) and Qemal Alla (PSSh) in Librazhd.

Kurt Xhepa (PD) and Fatos Zharri (PSSh) in Librazhd.

Vasil Gjika (PD) and Ethem Kolleshi (PSSh) in Permet.

Gramoz Ruci (PSSh) and Ridvan Peshkepia (PD) in Sarande.

Limoz Dizdari (PSSh) and Leka Toto (PD) in Sarande.

Blerim Cela (PD) and Ethem Ruka (PSSh) in Tepelene.

Sadik Bejko (PD) and Xhafer Ruci (PSSh) in Tepelene.

Collapse of Economic, Social Order Detailed

92BA0648A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 9 Mar 92 pp 188, 190, 191, 194, 198

[Article by editorial staff member Walter Mayr: "The War for Bread Is Lost: Hunger and Hopelessness in Albania"]

[Text] The pilots arrive from Bari as the sun is sinking. In front of them lies the western tip of Albania, the country so long forbidden. With high beams on, they steer the enormous Chinook CH-47 helicopters of the Italian Air Force over the port of Durres. Their target is a narrow strip of sandy beach in front of the Cemal Stafa pioneer camp.

Since September, 900 officers and soldiers of the Italian Army have been camping here among the palm trees and heroes of labor chiseled in marble. The camp had been home for generations of young Albanian communists who swore the oath of allegiance to party leader Enver Hoxha under the red flag. Now the Italians, occupation power in World War II and later class enemy, in NATO uniform have again set foot on Albanian soil. Their mission is called "Pellicano".

With each of the Chinook helicopters, which glide lazily like sated dragonflies across the Mediterranean to Durres, the rich neighbors bring 7,000 tons of sugar, flour and grain into the country. Fifty sea miles east of the heel of the Italian boot threatens the worst European famine since World War II.

The patient, Albania, is kept alive only by the daily infusion of 1,800 tons of food. The Pellicano shuttle, financed by Rome with 195 million German marks, is to help prevent tens of thousands of Albanians from again overrunning the Italian coastal cities of Bari and Brindisi. "One Albanian in Italy costs us 25,000 lire daily—if we feed them here, it is cheaper for us," says Colonello [Colonel] Francesco Merlino in front of the Italian embassy in Tirana.

In the mountain hamlet of Bajram Curri, near the border to the Kosovo, the Italians are greeted like liberators by hundreds of hungry and tattered children. The little ones come running through the deep snow in plastic beach sandals. The village can no longer be reached overland. The soldiers unload their helicopter, take souvenir photographs and, smiling kindly, distribute chocolate as Americans once did packs of Lucky Strikes in war-ravaged postwar Germany.

The victims of Stalinist mismanagement are stuck in the midst of civilized Europe. Several times a week it is feeding time, but otherwise the cage remains shut: The country's eastern borders are closed tightly by Greek and Serbian customs guards, and in the port cities of the West stands the Italian coast guard.

"Although Albania has conquered fascism, it has lost the war for bread," as Capitano [Captain] Andrea Gagnoni of the 22nd Italian Navy Corps justifies himself. He commands three patrol boats which cruise the Albanian waters as an early warning system against people willing to flee.

Two years ago, the people in Tirana went into the streets against the communist bigwigs. They toppled their pillar saints, arrested a few functionaries, and founded parties. Meanwhile most of them no longer even care about the parliamentary elections on 22 March. On that day, the Socialists under President Ramiz Alia could finally be driven away from the levers of power.

But the humiliated people of Albania have decided to use blazes and fire against this state which no longer feeds its citizens. Warehouses are set on fire, food storage depots are stormed. During the latest hunger revolts in the cities of Lushnje and Pogradec, at least five people died.

The opposition leaders still seem sure of victory. But they also admit that it is hard on democracy when shortages rule. A low voter turnout would favor the ex-communists whose adherents were trained to exercise their electoral duty.

There is no longer any work in Albania. Nobody knows why the Boulevard of Martyrs in the capital, Tirana, is full of busy people shortly after sunrise. Pedestrians, cyclists on bikes built under Chinese license, and Western cars ready for the scrap heap all move in an anarchic zigzag up the showpiece mile lined with nut pines from the university to Skanderbeg Square. Here the money traders of Albania jostle outdoors.

"The Bank," as the band of tattered currency traders is called by Tirana inhabitants, is considered a seismograph of the shattered economy. At the end of January, the dollar cost 60 domestic lek, now it is almost 90. On the average, Albanians have 8 dollars per month to live on. Whoever still has some gold coins—a customary currency in the country before the war—, sells them.

The statistical daily wage pays for a pound of cheese or a bottle of Macedonian beer. Loaves of bread are handed out through barred little windows from plundered and destroyed bakeries; youths fight for, and gain, the best places.

"Growing vegetables is a national mandate," ideologues of yesterday have brushed on the wall of the supermarket in Iordan-Misja street and painted plump tropical fruit next to it. The store is empty. The inexpensive grilled steaks around the corner are bought only by the poorest. It is being said that lately even dog meat is on the grill.

While all of Tirana strolls about or stands in line because the bankrupt state enterprises no longer produce anything, hard work goes on at the central bus parking lot next to the Albanian movie studios. A handful of strong men are "scalping" a Mercedes bus, already stripped down to a skeleton. With a sledge hammer and mortise chisel they slice open the roofing sheet like a tin can—it is to be nailed as a roof onto someone's cow barn.

Ibrahim Cela, 36, a former policeman, who is supposed to guard the ruined dinosaurs of Western production, shrugs his shoulders listlessly. The puritanical communists dismissed him from the civil service because he had gotten divorced. Now he vegetates at the edge of the parking lot in a lean-to, size one square meter, which serves as kitchen, bedroom, and living room. No great zeal can be expected of him. "There is no state authority any more, everybody takes what he can get," says Cela tiredly.

Total anarchy, bemoaned by Mafia-plagued southern Italians on the other shore of the Mediterranean with the sigh, "Lo stato e assente," is now also gripping Albania. "Dognapping," which happened to the French ambassador who had to buy back his favorite dog for a considerable ransom, is among the minor crimes.

The number of murders has almost doubled in the past year. At the beginning of February, a naval officer in the harbor of Durres was decapitated with an axe—the criminals wanted his weapon. In northern Albania the murderous Hakmarrje, blood revenge between feuding families, is flourishing again.

"Communal power is lacking," says Sali Berisha who, with his Democratic Party, accompanied by the good wishes of the European right, fights for a change of power. In particularly controversial electoral precincts, this physician wants to stand together with the Republicans and the Social Democrats against the Socialist Party under ex-Premier Fatos Nano. The proposal to bundle togeether the opposition forces for the good of Albania comes from U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, who visited Tirana last summer on Berisha's invitation.

The election law provides for a mixture of majority and proportional representation. A 4-percent hurdle is to accelerate the way to a stable party system. But the political controversies before the election, fought out in the thin opposition and government newspapers, raise doubts regarding the parties' capabilities to lead Albania rapidly out of the crisis. The left press tries to libel the opposition leaders Berisha and Gramoz Pashko as turncoats. The opposition counters with corruption affairs from the communist past, difficult to prove.

In the party headquarters of the Democrats sits Sali Berisha, the opposition leader, in his winter overcoat. His office is dark and unheated. It is located in one of the sections of Tirana that have been without electricity for a month now. This time the opposition will finally make it, prophesies the physician who is said to have presidential ambitions: "Then the people will regain hope, foreign investors will come, and Albania is assured of international support."

In March of last year the Socialists, carried by the continued solidarity of farm workers, once more had attained the absolute majority of votes. Especially in the north the ex-communists profited from the archaic code of honor of the peasant population: Whoever has given the "besa"—his sacred promise—to the Reds, must remain loyal to them.

The technocrats still in government under Premier Vilson Ahmeti, of no party affiliation, meanwhile keep the balance sheets on Albania's fierce downswing. Prices have more than doubled compared to the previous year. Industrial production has declined to the level of 1976.

The collapsed goods circulation between the East bloc countries, who now want to see dollars, is driving Albania into the abyss. The wheels are standing still, with only bakeries, power plants, and a few chromium ore mines still operating. Officially the unemployment rate in state enterprises is listed as 22 percent, but the actual figures are noticeably higher.

Through privatization, two-thirds implemented, the majority of the more than 500,000 farm workers have

received three "dueluem"—0.3 hectares—of land. From a statistical viewpoint, they are considered provided for. In reality, most of them have not seen any money in over a year.

The farmers in the 1,000-inhabitant hamlet of Kalush, south of Durres, have been able to sow only one-fifth of the winter corn because there is no seed. "The children have been living for months on bread, beans, and water," says Habil Chaba, the village schoolteacher. At the same time he is proud because he and his colleagues, with a great deal of painstaking detailed work, managed to rescue at least the precious schoolbooks in the transition to the new era: On orders of the culture minister, the teachers deleted with black ink all passages in which the "glorious commander Enver Hoxha" is mentioned. Only every other sentence is now still useable.

The people in Kalush till their cracked soil with spade and hoe; whoever can do so, puts two oxen to the wooden yoke. The tractor was taken by the tractor driver of the cooperative who demands fees that no one can pay. "We need 1 million tons of grain annually," says Economics Minister Gjergj Kondo, "and we only produce one-third of that ourselves."

True, the EC is helping with several million Ecus and already plans Operation Pellicano II which, under Italian management, is to continue to bring grain, flour and oil to the Mediterranean country. But bread alone is not enough. It appears to the Albanians that the world has forgotten them.

"Rrofte Xorxi Bushi"—long live George Bush—is written on the walls of houses in the country. The U.S. president has acceded to the succession of patron saints—Tito, Stalin, and Mao—and now is to point the way to freedom and prosperity. An entire country wants to be saved by America. But the balance sheet of relations since the Baker visit is meager. Washington has promised $45 million for fertilizers; 18,000 tons of wheat have arrived, and in July one of the last white spots will disappear from the Coca-Cola globe—at the edge of Tirana a bottling plant is being built.

"Albania has treasures on which we can build," says Prime Minister Vilson Ahmeti defiantly. There are the first joint ventures and preliminary agreements. Deminex Essen is drilling offshore for oil, and Krupp Polysius plans a cement factory. Italians and Canadians dream of yacht harbors on the untouched Mediterranean cost. An Austrian-Albanian consortium will plant a congress and trade center in the stony wasteland of Skanderbeg Square—precisely at the spot where the bronze statue of dictator Enver Hoxha was toppled from its base.

The hotel lobbies of Tirana are dominated by wearers of pin striped suits from all those sectors which promise quick profits with low risk. But decades will pass before the ruined Albanian polity is restructured.

In mid-February, railroad traffic in the entire country was closed down. At the terminal station in Vora stand the pine-green freight cars unattended, dating back to the Albanian monarchy. What remains are overcrowded buses with broken windows. From remote villages, the ill are transported by oxcart to the nearest major road.

Medical services are of Third World standard. There is a lack of hypodermic syringes, sterile compresses, X-ray equipment and surgical kits. The newborn are bedded down on newspapers. Eighty percent of Albanian children suffer from scabies.

Because there is no wood for heating apartments, electric radiators run round the clock. The transformers burn out, and the distribution grid collapses. So the unnerved Albanians get their own firewood. On the main road from Tirana to Durres, only one out of ten trees is still standing. People cut down centuries-old willow trees, chop them up and hack at the tree stumps until they yield not even one more sliver. Albania is putting the axe to its own roots.

In Building 1, Room 218, of the new student town in eastern Tirana sits budding construction engineer Ilir Lagji, 21, on his sagging cot and talks about Ravenna. On 31 January he started out for the country whose high-gloss facade, thanks to the TV programs of RAI-Italia, is reflected every evening on Albanian black-and-white television screens.

Where long-legged models give away millions of lire in game shows and where the shelves are full, thought the student, someone like him would be in the right place. Ilir Lagji sneaked aboard the freighter "Butrinti" carrying copper.

For four days the ship was lay at anchor in the harbor of Ravenna, then the Promised Land sent a special unit of Carabinieri as a welcoming committee. The Italians had been tipped off by their compatriots, who, in the harbor of Durres, guard the coast. The flight of citizen Ilir Lagji from Tirana, Albania, was over before it had begun. Provisionally taken care of, the student was shipped back a day later to his inhospitable homeland.

Now he again lives behind broken windows covered with the title pages of the CORRIERE DELLA SERA and eats donated American corned beef out of plastic bags a la Kurdistan assistance. At the next opportunity, he swears, he will try it again. "In five years," says Lagji, "we'll all be gone from here."

Parliament Debates Dimitrov Statement, Budget

AU2503085292 Sofia BTA in English 1946 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Sofia, March 24 (BTA) - Parliament started debating the 1992 budget bill today after it heard a statement on the cabinet's intentions by Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov and a report on the cabinet's 1992 financial policy by Finance Minister Ivan Kostov. An M.P. [member of parliament] of the Bulgarian Socialist Party criticized the government and said that the socialist-led parliamentary faction would not vote for the budget bill. The parliamentary committees made remarks on the bill but recommended that it pass on principle.

In his statement the prime minister said that the cabinet will implement the platform of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) which won it the October 1991 elections. The government will also reckon with the requirements set by the international financial institutions and will "optimize" its actions. The cabinet sets a high priority on privatization, the creation of an attractive environment for foreign investment and the settlement of the foreign debt problem, Mr. Dimitrov said.

Finance Minister Ivan Kostov described the 1992 budget bill as modest as compared to Bulgaria's potential. However, it takes into account the projections for 1992: 65 per cent annual rate of inflation, a further slump in production and a rise in unemployment up to 12 per cent. The budget bill envisages 44,500 million leva revenues, 53,600 million leva expenditure and a 9,000 million leva deficit.

This budget will allow the government to achieve its aims and is attuned to the cabinet's intentions for 1992, Mr. Kostov said. He added that this is the first time the cabinet has submitted a budget bill with a structure and classification which meet the international standards. BSP floor leader Zhan Videnov was the first to take the floor in the debates. He sharply criticized the cabinet for the lack of a medium-term programme. The Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy will not vote for the budget, he said. SDS floor leader Aleksandur Yordanov and Dimitur Buchkov of the Ethnic Turks' Movement or Rights and Freedoms, the third parliamentary force, spoke in favor of the budget bill. The parliamentary committees recommended that the budget be voted on principle.

BSP To Further Debate Privatization Bill

AU2503085692 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] The Socialists accept the current Privatization Bill, but only as a basis for further debate. The Bulgarian Socialist Party's [BSP] Parliamentary Union will firmly support the establishment of privatization funds envisaging the distribution of state property through bonds. The BSP justified its view by expressing its wish for nationwide support of privatization. This explanation was provided by BSP deputy Stefan Stoilov at the regular BSP news conference. There must be absolute openness in the privatization process in order to put an end to the secret selling out of state property and ensure that the law stimulates economic development. The general formula should include a wide spectrum of socially oriented methods and mechanisms for privatization. These are the main requirements of the Socialists' faction in connection with the Privatization Act. Will the BSP support possible trade union strikes, for which indications exist, a journalist asked. It depends on the circumstances and the demands, BSP leader Zhan Videnov answered.

Podkrepa Miners Explain Demands To SDS Group

AU2503091792 Sofia BTA in English 0805 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Sofia, March 25 (BTA)—TRUD and PODKREPA, the newspapers of the two most influential trade union amalgamations, are commenting again on the conflict between the miners and the government. The miners threatened recently that unless an agreement is reached with the cabinet, women and children will go down into the mines. Late last night the miners of the Podkrepa Labour Confederation met with the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] parliamentary group to explain the motives for their demands to the cabinet headed by Filip Dimitrov. They confirmed their demands for a wage rise and for the resignation of some ministers. According to the MP's [member of parliament] of the SDS, all demands should be consistent with the realities and with the new criteria for remuneration in the spheres of manual and intellectual labour. They see negotiations with the cabinet as the only way of solving the problems in the mining industry.

Workers in the petrochemical industry are also preparing for a strike but will wait until Monday, March 30, the press reports. Minister of Industry and Trade Ivan Pushkarov has invited the Trade Union of the Workers in the Petrochemical Industry to official talks on their demands, PODKREPA reports.

24 CHASA also writes about a possible strike. Under the headline "Radio and TV Trade Unions Plan To Resist Parliament," the daily writes that the trade unions of the broadcasting media will hold consultations on their joint actions. They consider the decision for the liquidation of the national radio and television illegal. The trade unions see this "fictitious" liquidation as a way of suppressing the protest of those dismissed.

Podkrepa Leader Describes Strike Preparations

AU2403142492 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Telephone interview with Engineer Dimitur Dimov, president of the Podkrepa Miners Trade Union Federation, by Petur Donchev at the Podkrepa headquarters in Sofia—live]

[Text] [Announcer Georgi Papakochev] My colleague Petur Donchev is at the headquarters of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation in Sofia with hot news about the miners strike.

[Donchev] Hot, but alarming news, I would say, colleague Papakochev, because even yesterday, in my direct report from the Council of Ministers, I said that following the fruitless—as I would call them—negotiations between the representatives of the Podkrepa Miners Trade Union Federation, Minister Pushkarov, his experts, and Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov, the chairman of the Central Strike Committee of the Podkrepa Miners Federation and his deputy set off for Madan. Everybody is there, and probably the command headquarters will be there, if I may speak figuratively. However, now I learn that the entire leadership of the Podkrepa Miners Trade Union Federation is setting off shortly for Madan. I have therefore invited the federation's president, Engineer Dimitur Dimov to answer my questions. Mr. Dimov, what is the reason for this new development?

[Dimov] At midnight last night, the strike committee issued an instruction to start sealing [prikopka] the coal mines.

[Donchev] What does this term sealing mean? It does not mean anything to me, and I do not think our listeners will understand it either.

[Dimov] Because coal is subject to spontaneous ignition, in order to prevent any possibility of fires in the mines and of explosions, a start is being made to sealing the mines, that is, cutting off the access of air to the actual coal faces. In this way we will save the mines. This is being done during the so-called three-day period. We are starting a three-day period, and within three days a strike will probably break out.

[Donchev] I have a few further questions, but let me put them in order. First of all, will the electricity be switched off, because in the final analysis everything depends on the Maritsa-East energy complex.

[Dimov] No, the Bulgarian citizens can be fully reassured. Maritsa-East will not be included in the strike actions unless this becomes necessary. I declare this officially. We have delivered sufficient coal—815,000 tonnes more than last year—so that there will be electric power. The Bulgarian people can be calm.

[Donchev] Bearing in mind, Mr. Dimov, that this is a serious declaration and that at the moment all the people are listening to us, I believe that if you break this commitment, the entire responsibility will fall on the Podkrepa miners. However, there is a further alarming piece of news. Many people are asking whether women and children will be in the mines, at the coal faces.

[Dimov] They probably will be there, because the strike committee has taken people's opinions. You do not know what the situation is like in Gorubso-Madan, or in the zinc mines there in general. The situation is catastrophic. I even had the chance to ask a child why he is going underground. He said that it is to help his father.

[Donchev] In conclusion—and I may say that this does not sound optimistic at all, on the contrary, it sounds very alarming, to put it mildly—finally, nonetheless, Mr. Dimov, let us end our transmission from here with this question: Are there any chances that this strike can be prevented? We want this, and the social peace and calm in the country also require this.

[Dimov] Naturally, chances exist. I am hoping for very sober assessments to be made by the Bulgarian Government, and I will wait for them to telephone me.

[Donchev] That already sounds optimistic. Thank you, and please convey our wishes for a positive outcome. We do not want to have a strike like this.

Poll Shows Widespread Doubt on Reforms' Progress

AU2203162792 Sofia BTA in English 2007 GMT 21 Mar 92

[Text] Sofia, March 21 (BTA)—Half of the Bulgarians believe that the reform is slipping, only 8 per cent believe that it is making progress, 16 per cent believe that it is proceeding in the wrong direction and 26 per cent are wavering in their opinion. These are the results of the latest survey of the National Public Opinion Centre. But to make up for his pessimism as regards the present situation, the Bulgarian is an optimist as regards the more distant future. Almost 60 per cent of the respondents believe that after 30 years they will live in a better society.

In March 1992 the supporters of monarchy were 11 per cent, whereas Simeon II received the approval of 33 per cent of the respondents. The approval of the monarchy and Simeon II have marked a slight decline as against June 1991. Eighty-five per cent of the respondents are for stepping up Bulgaria's contacts with Europe, 81 per cent with Russia, 77 per cent with the United States, and 54 per cent with Turkey. The percentage of those who believe that the Bulgarian citizens should bear only Bulgarian names dropped from 74 to 44 per cent in the past two years. Half of the Bulgarians do not fear repressions for expressing their personal opinion, according to the poll. The support for democracy has not become unconditional yet. 46 per cent of the respondents believe that democracy should be temporarily restricted. 62 per cent of the Bulgarians believe that the maximum wage should not exceed the minimum one more than three-fold. This socialist prejudice has marked no change over the past two years. 47 per cent of the respondents believe that Bulgaria should not be divided into rich and poor, and 41 per cent believe that privatization should be suspended because for the time being it will profit only the rich.

Havel on Relations With Germans, Nationalism

AU2403125992 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 20 Mar 92 p 5

[Interview with CSFR President Vaclav Havel by Marion Graefin Doenhoff and Helga Hirsch; place and date not given: "Speeding Things up"]

[Text] [DIE ZEIT] As far as political conditions are concerned, there is no longer any obstacle to good relations between the Germans, Czechs, and Slovaks after the signing of the German-Czechoslovak Treaty. A rather emotional discussion about the relationship with the Germans was ignited, however, in connection with the agreement. Are these old fears among the older generation linked with the war, or are these new fears linked with worries about foreign infiltration and "Germanization"?

You, Mr. President, have made considerable efforts to establish a good relationship with Germany. Your first visit abroad as president was to Germany. Are you disappointed that the German Government did not make a gesture toward Prague, that it did not initial the recently-signed treaty earlier?

[Havel] For a number of reasons related to domestic policy, the CSFR would have welcomed the initialing of the agreement at an earlier date. Germany had its own political reasons why it was not ready earlier. I have no right to judge the reasons of the Germans. I am simply glad that the treaty has now been signed.

As far as opposition in Czechoslovakia to the agreement is concerned, I believe that a mixture of all kinds of different motives and people are involved here. I do not want to go into detail, but I would like to mention four groups that I believe are putting up resistance.

The first group: It is characteristic of every postcommunist country that the achievement of freedom is linked with frustration, depression, and shocks. People become impatient. The radically minded are particularly inclined to use every opportunity to protest against the government or attack it. This applies both to those on the right side of the political spectrum and those more oriented toward the left. This became evident during a rally where the flag of the extremely right wing Republican Party and the communist flag were seen side by side.

The second opposition group consists of those who are linked with the former regime, of communists for whom the things that happened to the German population after World War II are a dogma, part of their propaganda, and part of their way to power. The Communist Party probably wants to win supporters by fomenting anti-German feelings and criticizing the democratic government for adopting too positive an attitude toward Germany.

The third, and probably a very important group, are honest people who experienced the atrocities of World War II, and who may have lost relatives in the concentration camps, but who have believed since World War II that our side is not guilty at all because we were the victims. After 45 years characterized by the absence of truth, it is now difficult for us to make it clear to the people that criticism might also be addressed to our side and not only to those who caused the suffering of World War II.

The fourth group is probably not very large but it is active. It consists of those who participated in the revenge against the Germans after the war. At the time they considered this revenge an expression of justified anger and as proof of their patriotism. Now they feel that the attitude they adopted at the time is being challenged.

[DIE ZEIT] Does the issue of "Germanization" play a big role?

[Havel] Fears are expressed occasionally that we might develop into some kind of German colony, and that too much German capital is being invested here, which might have unfavorable political consequences for us. There is no real basis, however, for such demagogic positions. The share of foreign investments in Czechoslovakia is still very small if we compare our situation with that of Hungary or other countries. Germany naturally plays an important role. But this is primarily due to the agreement between Skoda and Volkswagen. Otherwise the capital has been internationalized to an extent that I consider it unwise to assess this issue from a national viewpoint.

Being our neighbors, the Germans are, of course, familiar with the situation in our country, they have considerable knowledge and experience, and thus they often submit more attractive offers than companies from other countries. Under the conditions of the market, it is only natural that we give priority to these offers. Apart from that, if Skoda had concluded an agreement with Renault and not with Volkswagen nobody would see a danger that we are becoming a French colony. For this reason, I believe that these arguments are not objective.

[DIE ZEIT] In the past, the state was viewed as an oppressor everywhere in the East. Now it has become the addressee of pent-up expectations. Expectations are maximal, but readiness to do something for the state is minimal. Can a pluralist democracy handle this difficult situation, or do you consider it possible that the systems in the East will gradually take on an authoritarian character?

[Havel] The democratic power is naturally making efforts to fulfill the wishes and needs of the citizens. During a period of fundamental restructuring of the economy, of the legal system, and of the whole life, nothing can be achieved overnight. It is impossible to change things as fast as people might want. This leads to a certain dissatisfaction and impatience, which is quite understandable. This also applies to other postcommunist countries. Demagogues who offer simple and quick solutions and people who call for a powerful government

take advantage of the situation. I do not see a danger in our country that the democratic system might be replaced by an authoritarian regime. I believe, however, that it is necessary to strengthen the democratic institutions and consolidate their authority. I am confident that the situation will be stabilized as time passes, and that we will become a normal pluralistic and stable democracy.

[DIE ZEIT] Mr. President, passages in your books—in "Living in Truth," for example—suggest that you have interesting ideas as to how more closeness to the citizens can be achieved outside the framework of the parties or in addition to the parties. What do you think?

[Havel] I have certain ideas about the policies that the current state of civilization requires, and I have been trying to incorporate this philosophical idea into specific political concepts.

Of course, I do not advocate the dissolution of all parties. They are part of the pluralist democracy. But I am against the dictatorship of parties. I am against the existence of a shadow state of parties beside the state. For this reason, I am in favor of a combined election system and of closer ties between the citizens and their representatives. I support the forming of a consensus in society as early as during the election process and not later during the coalition talks among the parties. This is the application of my idea at the level of practical political consequences.

In addition, I believe that the time is near when we should assume a certain general and global responsibility because the world is exposed to a global threat. It seems to me that the pursuit of individual interests is against the flow of time. I support all steps that open up opportunities to assume global responsibility. I think that in a majority system elected representatives are able to represent the citizens in their district in a much better way. My reservations toward an elaborate system of parties—most stabilized democracies are turning away from it—does not at all mean that I am against political parties.

[DIE ZEIT] Our life has really become global to a large extent. Is this the reason—particularly in the East—for people to retreat to familiar things, to their home, their religion, and their ethnic group? In short, is this the reason for nationalism? Will this be a lasting tendency—not only in Czechoslovakia but in the East in general? Or is this an expression of joy about the end of communist repression and the newly won identity?

[Havel] The eruption of nationalism is understandable from a historical viewpoint, because the people's national identity was suppressed for decades. Everything was the same from Berlin to Vladivostok: The same red stars and the same inscriptions. Following liberation, this phase with some extreme phenomena was unavoidable. Actually, this is only the manifestation of a certain historical delay. I believe that we will quickly overcome this period without major damage, that we will make up for what we missed in the past, and that we will finally develop a society that is based on the citizens' needs.

[DIE ZEIT] Mr. President, don't you have the impression that you are sometimes moving ahead too fast? You spoke about the "expulsion" at a time when your nation had not yet come to terms with the Germans. If you speak of a global threat at this point, your people may not be able to follow your thoughts because they are still dealing with national issues. If you urge parliament to solve the constitutional problem quickly, it may not be able to take such a step at this point. Are you not moving too fast at times for your people?

[Havel] I think this is exactly what I am paid for: To speed things up.

State Council Discusses Arms Trade Controls

Council To Control 'Heavy' Arms

LD2403222692 Prague CSTK in English
1734 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Prague March 24 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa today said decision-making on the exports of heavy weaponry will be within the powers of the State Defence Council. After today's extraordinary session of the council, its chairman Calfa said this applies to the exports of planes, tanks, missiles, armoured vehicles, a greater amount of ammunition and weapons.

Calfa said this step was necessary in view of Czechoslovakia's international commitments to which it acceded at the 46th session of the U.N. General Assembly last year as well as due to the Federal Parliament's failure to pass a new draft constitutional law on the Czechoslovak federation on March 10. The draft was to provide for state control over arms trade.

Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, who is commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces, rejected statements on the possibility of a Czechoslovak Army action in case Slovakia's independence is declared in an unconstitutional way or the left wins the June 5-6 elections in Slovakia.

Said Havel: "Our army will never be used and cannot be used to solve any political problems in the country. As long as I am president I will never allow the army to become in any way involved in domestic political affairs," Havel stressed.

On today's accident of a Russian nuclear reactor near St. Petersburg, Czechoslovak Defence Minister Lubos Dobrovsky said no increase in radioactivity was registered on Czechoslovak territory.

License Required To Trade

LD2403182892 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] The State Defense Council held an extraordinary session today, attended by President Vaclav Havel, to resolve important Czechoslovak international commercial and political obligations in the field of military equipment. It adopted principles according to which only a person who possesses a license granted by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade can trade in military equipment.

Dientsbier Meets With UN Secretary General

LD2503024692 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Slovak 2100 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Jiri Dienstbier held talks in New York with UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali about Nagorno-Karabakh. He indicated that a trip to the region of conflict would be premature at present. As a chairman of the CSCE, Jiri Dienstbier has been authorized to find a peaceful solution to the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Calfa on Government's Work During Elections

AU2403170192 Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 21 Mar 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with CSFR Prime Minister Marian Calfa by an unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "I Do Not Feel Obstructed"]

[Text] On 7 April, the Central Election Committee will meet and then the merry-go-round, so well known to us, will start. This is why we asked Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa:

[Reporter] What is your work like in the government in the election period? Will the ministers' attitudes, influenced by their party affiliations, obstruct the government's work?

[Calfa] Politically motivated differences in opinions regarding solutions to various problems are beginning to appear within the government. This trend is becoming stronger, and I will be happy if it does not become so strong as to obstruct the work of the government.

[Reporter] Does constant pressure on the prime minister pose obstructions to the activity of the government? Do you believe that the dispute over the authorship of the so-called truncheon law will be resolved in the foreseeable future?

[Calfa] There are no obstructions to the government's activity, and I must say that this pressure does not hinder the work of the prime minister, either. Please note what kind of papers and politicians are nurturing this fabricated problem and its political background will become immediately clear to you.

A Federal Assembly commission of deputies is investigating the authorship of the truncheon law. I believe that we will all be relieved after its findings are released.

[Reporter] The time for registration of candidates is drawing near. Have you decided whether you will run in the elections?

[Calfa] I am not going to change my political colors in the election period. I was nominated as a candidate for the Civic Democratic Union in the East Slovakia region.

[Reporter] How did people welcome you during your visit to East Slovakia? What are their ideas about the future of the federation?

[Calfa] I was well received, I believe. Anyway, they consider me to be an East Slovakia resident. As far as the second question is concerned, I can see what confusion the contradicting statements on this subject by some politicians induce in the heads of our people. I believe it to be a real fact that some papers are deliberately creating a false image about the situation.

I have a feeling that the constitutional setup is not in the center of attention of our people and that people believe it to be a political game of the politicians. If only a "game" were involved, then it would be understandable, since some politicians do not have anything else to present. Yet, it is necessary to make it clear that there are also politicians who want—as soon as they have the opportunity—to put their ideas regarding the constitutional setup into practice.

Deputy Minister Discusses Recalled Ambassadors

AU2403170992 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 20 Mar 92 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Federal Deputy Foreign Minister Vojtech Wagner by Ivana Stepankova; place and date not given: "The Replacement of Diplomats"]

[Text] We asked Federal Deputy Foreign Minister Vojtech Wagner several questions about the recall of the Czechoslovak ambassadors to Bulgaria, Canada, and the Council of Europe—Frantisek Barbirek, Rudolf Schuster, and Cestmir Cisar.

[Stepankova] When you receive more certificates from the Federal Interior Ministry, will there be more recalls?

[Wagner] We all know why Mr. Schuster and Barbirek were recalled. It is because of their high functions in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. I am sorry, but I cannot tell you about why anyone else was recalled. The law prohibits me from speaking about these things. In contrast to others, I respect the law—not only because it lays down penalties for divulging classified data. It is necessary to realize that some ambassadors and other diplomats will be replaced this year, simply because their tour of duty will come to an end. I do not rule out the possibility that someone may consider this to be a consequence of the screening law.

[Stepankova] In his reaction to various lists of the State Security agents, Deputy Prime Minister Dienstbier said several times that his ministry had done away with the problem of screening. Why are additional Federal Foreign Ministry workers being recalled?

[Wagner] Based on the government approval of late 1990, the screening of all the employees of the Federal Foreign Ministry took place as early as the end of 1990. In fact, this was not real screening, but rather a check on how many employees collaborated, and if they did, then with what components? You have to realize that we do not have the right or the opportunity to view the files of registers ourselves. We worked only with the data available to us. It was quite a large workload. No legal regulations existed at that time. This means that each and every case had to be judged individually. We really tried to find out to what extent an individual was aware of cooperation and if he did any harm to others. Today, the law exactly defines individual categories of collaborators. I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that time and money are also a thing to consider. The replacement of one employee abroad costs the taxpayers $25,000 to $30,000.

I am saying it openly—and I have never made a secret of it, even when asked by some deputies—I am convinced, based on the findings, that some of these people never harmed anyone. But the law is the law, and we must respect it. A special workplace at the Federal Foreign Ministry ensures that the law is respected. There were several more cases of positive findings at our ministry. We really did not know about these people.

[Stepankova] The law came into force five months ago. Why did you recall those people only now?

[Wagner] According to the law, the organization has one month to ask for a certificate about its employee. The Federal Interior Ministry has a two-month deadline to issue the certificate, and the employee has another month in which he must present it to his employer. If an ambassador is involved, we cannot send a coded message, we must send registered mail. That is, five months is not a long period at all. We must also realize that notifying an ambassador is not the same thing as closing a tobacco shop. In the interest of Czechoslovakia's good reputation, the ambassador must leave his post in a dignified manner and hand over his office—he also has financial responsibility. We respect the screening law.

[Stepankova] Have new ambassadors been appointed?

[Wagner] We are trying to prepare new ambassadors in the shortest time possible. For example, we already have a candidate for Canada. Nevertheless, there will be vacancies in some posts, I am afraid. This is nothing unusual in the diplomatic service.

Laws on Private Health Care, Churches Passed

AU2403105392 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 20 Mar 92 p 2

[ST report: "End of Monopoly in Health Care; From the 33d meeting of the Czech National Council"]

[Excerpts] The last barrier in the way of the emergence of the private sector in Czech health care was removed by the Czech National Council yesterday when it passed the law on health care in non-state medical facilities. The law will go into force on 15 April.

As was pointed out by Czech Health Minister Martin Bojar, what this law cannot do is to deal with the privatization of property in health care or with tax relief and financial assistance for newly established private offices, as was demanded by the health care personnel. The law provides for a combined system of health care, which means that, apart from state polyclinics and hospitals, there can be cooperative, community-run, church-run, or private health care facilities, as well as facilities leased from the state. [passage omitted]

The sanitary, technical, and other specific requirements concerning the operation and equipment of these facilities will be set by the Ministry of Health by means of decrees. [passage omitted] The appropriate health care chambers are to see to it that their members are up to the required professional standards. [passage omitted] The law also specifies all the requisites that applicants for registration must submit.

Under another law that was approved by the Czech National Council yesterday, churches and religious communities will be registered by the Ministry of Culture of the Czech Republic under the condition that at least 10,000 persons of age declare their membership of this church. For churches that are members of the World Council of Churches, this limit is 500. This provision renders impossible the registration of all kinds of utilitarian establishments seeking state support and tax benefits under the guise of a church.

The Czech parliament elected Pavel Hussar as president of the Supreme Control Office of the Czech Republic. It refused to include on its agenda a debate on the treaty between the CSFR and Germany, on the grounds that all Czech National Council committees had already endorsed the treaty. [passage omitted]

The Czech National Council meeting continues today.

Slovak Minister Interviewed on CDU-PAV Role

LD2403105392 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Excerpts] Last Saturday's session of the all-republic Council of the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence [CDU-PAV] was the introductory topic at today's regular news conference with journalists. Ivan Kosec later interviewed Ivan Miklos, member of the

executive committee and candidate nominated for the function of first deputy chairman of CDU-PAV.

[Begin recording] [Kosec] Minister, the Slovak National council may well decide today on your recall. Forgive me for asking, but does that make you nervous?

[Miklos] It does not, and if it did, it would not be for my own sake. The ministerial post is very demanding physically and mentally, and the responsibility is great. Therefore, I only worry, if at all, about the possible delay and missed deadlines at my ministry that could be caused by my leaving.

[Kovec] CDU-PAV has tried from the beginning to set up a right-wing bloc, but you have failed to achieve it. What do you think are the main reasons for this failure?

[Miklos] First, there has been a certain unwillingness and stalling on the part of the Civic Democratic Party [CDP]. Also, we may not have sufficiently declared our intentions and willingness. Second, there has been a pressure of time regarding the quantity and quality of candidates. We are not convinced that we have enough personalities in Slovakia who could run. We do not regard this as fatal, however, because we do not intend to compete with the right-wing parties in any way. We are counting on a post-election coalition. [passage omitted] We will strive in our campaign for the right-wing parties to receive the highest possible number of votes.

[Kovec] What can you say about the results of the Zilina congress of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia?

[Miklos] I have no detailed results. I can only smile at the declarations of unity of the movement because it contains such mutually exclusive views and opinions on such principal matters. I am 100 percent convinced that, should the movement bear responsibility for the governmental policy and its decisionmaking, and be in the governing coalition rather than in the opposition after the election, it would only end in its disintegration. [passage omitted]

[Kovec] You also said that if MFDS wins—which you said you did not expect—society would become destabilized.

[Miklos] Yes, exactly. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Slovak Parliament Endorses Privatization Minister

LD2403224692 Prague CSTK in English 2111 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Bratislava March 23 (CSTK)—Slovak minister for the administration and privatisation of national property, Ivan Miklos, remains in his post after the Slovak parliament passed a motion of confidence on him today. The confidence motion was proposed by a deputy for the Democratic Left Party (SDL-formerly communist) at the last session of the Slovak parliament on grounds that Miklos' ministry lacks a concept for the privatisation process.

Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky told today's parliament session that the government regards calls for Miklos' dismissal as groundless, stressing that they are an "attempt to hinder or even stop the process of privatisation."

In voting on a proposal by Slovak National Party (SNS) leader and deputy Jozef Prokes for the parliament to vote tomorrow on a draft constitutional law on Slovakia's sovereignty, 47 of 134 present deputies were against, 41 in favour and 46 abstained. The Slovak National Council (parliament) comprises 150 deputies.

Dubcek Decries 'Undemocratic' Slovakia Warnings

AU2403144092 Prague CSTK in English 1843 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] Bratislava March 22 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (parliament) Chairman Alexander Dubcek today criticised some Czech politicians for warning against possible undemocratic developments in Slovakia. In an interview for CSTK, Dubcek said they are doing this in order to create the impression that for the sake of maintaining a democratic development in the Czech Republic it would be better if Czechoslovakia broke up.

Dubcek said he wonders what would be the result if judgments about similar trends in Czech political life were made in Slovakia. He said the key to solving Czechoslovakia's constitutional future lies in the hands of both Czech and Slovak political representatives, and not only of those in Slovakia. But, he said, some members of the Slovak parliament Presidium "come out with categorical demands that are unacceptable for the majority of Slovak political representatives."

Referring to last Monday's [16 March] police search in the KSCM-SDL (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia-Democratic Left Party) offices in Prague, including the offices of two federal parliament deputies, Dubcek said had he not given approval for the search, required under the parliament rules of procedure.

Dubcek returned last night from a two-day official visit to Berlin, during which he attended celebrations marking the 400th birthday anniversary of Czech scholar and philosopher Jan Amos Komensky (Comenius).

ODS Official Discusses Elections, Party Future

AU2403150992 Prague RESPEKT in Czech No 11 16-22 March 92 p 7

[Interview with Josef Zieleniec, deputy chairman of the Civic Democratic Party, by Vladimir Mlynar; place and date not given: "A Clash With Us Amounts to a Threat to the State"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Mlynar] Is post-election cooperation possible between the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]?

[Zieleniec] The policies of the ODS and the HZDS are a long way apart. What brings them together, however, is a certain type of responsibility arising from the fact that they are the two strongest parties. The fact alone that the HZDS will probably win in Slovakia and the ODS in Bohemia does not mean that we should bomb the republic. We will deal with anybody of political importance. It is one of the reasons the ODS entered Slovakia. We have not dealt with the HZDS so far, but if there are some talks after the elections, on our side they will be based on the ODS program and we would not move away from this basis. We are a party of principle that does not maneuver to gain power.

[Mlynar] Polarization to the left or to the right might occur during the election campaign. Would such a thing suit you, or would you prefer a right-left bloc cooperation based on consensus as demonstrated by the coalition between the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party in Germany?

[Zieleniec] I must repeat that it depends on the specific policies of the parties and these are not yet known. We are a party that works in the government, and that should make it obvious that we are capable of a reasonable compromise. Because of our strength, a clash would mean a threat to the future of our state. Therefore, after the elections, in the negotiations on the composition of the government we will go to the very limits acceptable to citizens and to those who voted for us.

Of course, a danger exists on the federal level that the left wing, thanks to a substantial victory in Slovakia, will be able to form the Federal Government on its own. If we faced a choice between the acceptance of the return of socialism or dividing the state, the ODS has decided to insist on an immediate referendum in the Czech Republic on the continuing existence of the federation. I myself, however, do not consider such a development likely.

[Mlynar] What changes would you implement in foreign policy, for instance, if your party won the elections?

[Zieleniec] We consider the present foreign policy doctrine inappropriate and disadvantageous, and therefore, we would introduce some changes. We would orientate ourselves toward an explicit integration with the Western world—economically, politically, and militarily. We would not emphasize the postcommunist groupings so much, the so-called Central European triad or the hexagonale. We would not put Czechoslovakia in the position of a bridge between the East and the West.

This does not mean that we are against good relations with our neighbors. We feel, however, the idea that we must integrate with Poland and Hungary before we "enter Europe" is false. This way, we integrate our weaknesses, and we are to enter Europe after we all eliminate them. This concept delays our admission as a full-fledged member of Western civilization, and we believe it is wrong. A similarly irresponsible step was the Czechoslovak proposal to abolish the Warsaw Pact and NATO simultaneously. In the eyes of the West, we have become unreliable as allies. The fact that security guarantees or NATO membership are so remote now is to a large extent a result of our unclear policy regarding the West.

CDU, CPP To Run Separately in Elections

LD2503023192 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Richard Sacher, Federal Assembly deputy for the Christian Democratic Union and Czechoslovak People's Party [CDU-CPP], will not run in the forthcoming election. According to Alzbeta Janeckova, the chief election manager of the Union, the CDU-CPP will go it alone in the election. A post-election coalition, however, was not excluded. The Civic Democratic Party is seen as a possible partner.

HZDS Election Candidates Named

AU2503074592 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Mar 92 pp 1, 2

[GE, DB report: "Unmoved Movement"]

[Text] The second republic assembly of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], awaited with some trepidation and tightly guarded against any leak of information, confirmed the consistency of the most popular political entity in Slovakia.

It proved wrong all rumors and doubts regarding its instability and division into several factions. It approved the assessment of its operation over the nine months of its existence, chose its election leaders for all representative bodies and in all regions including Bratislava, and it actually confirmed the current HZDS leadership in the new elections.

HZDS Chairman Meciar confirmed in his extensive speech, which earned him repeated applause, the readiness of the movement to assume the responsibility for developments in the Slovak Republic after the elections. He outlined an idea of a new global system of cooperation in Europe that would integrate four bodies: Poland, Slovakia, Bohemia, and Hungary.

"We promote the inception of such a regional body in the form of trade ties, provided that it is a region of four nations and not three." He also submitted to the assembly an idea of five alternatives of the constitutional arrangement, that the HZDS would like to present to Slovak Republic citizens in a referendum. The HZDS advocates a treaty between two equal entities, i.e., two republics, and it will support this type of approach after the elections. It intends to gradually attain Slovak statehood by adopting a declaration of sovereignty, a republic constitution, and the aforementioned treaty.

The Martin appeal of five districts, by which means HZDS district organizations allegedly requested that former communists and State Security collaborators be

removed from the movement's lists of candidates, did not make it on the agenda. Both the text of the appeal and those who initiated it remained anonymous.

The most sensitive event of the first day of the congress was the approval of the candidate lists and the HZDS election leaders for the upcoming elections to the representative bodies. Despite the disinformation reports, no fundamental conflicts surrounded them, and on Saturday [21 March] the leaders in the individual electoral districts were known: A.M. Huska, H. Koctuch, R. Zelenay, J. Cuper, R. Filkus, J. Moravcik, O. Keltosova, I. Gasparovic, L. Dolgos, P. Baco, R. Hofbauer, P. Ryska, V. Meciar, J. Findra, A. Kral, J. Smolec, D. Slobodnik, V. Mitrova, M. Knazko, I. Luptak, M. Cic, R. Kovac, M. Kovac, and M. Kontra. Even a casual look at the candidates shows that the HZDS has strong intellectual support demonstrated by names as Abel Kral, Jan Stevcek, Matus Kucera, and others.

On the second day the assembly continued with a discussion of the proposed list and the theses of the election policy of the movement. The election of the movement's officials, however, attracted the greatest attention of both supporters and political adversaries. Confirmed in the posts of chairman and deputy chairmen were V. Meciar, M. Knazko, M. Kovac, and A.M. Huska. The chairman received 214 votes from the 223 delegates; M. Knazko received 185; M. Kovac 140; A.M. Huska 135; and the secretary, O. Keltosova, received 179 votes. The assembly expressed its support for R. Filkus's membership in the Council Presidium, which, however, will decide on it only in its first post-assembly session. Twenty-seven signatories of the former Trnava initiative concluded their operation. Its former members are regular members of the HZDS and not a specific faction. One of the former members of the initiative, J. Budaj, did not appear on the list of the candidates, allegedly because he did not pass the first selection round by two or three votes in Michalovce District, in which he sought support by the HZDS members.

A news conference began yesterday, shortly before 1800. HZDS Chairman Meciar assessed the assembly proceedings. According to him, it is a success that the quality of political representation on the lists of candidates for the Slovak National Council and the Federal Assembly is the same. He denied the existence of any division within the movement, and observed that the letter "p" in the "parts" of the movement should be replaced by an "f." He also commented on the question of raising the declaration of Slovak sovereignty in the Slovak National Council. In his opinion, it would not be politically wise to raise this issue in the parliament prior to the elections. HZDS Deputy Chairman M. Knazko added that no matter how likely its passage in the parliament is, it would be better if a parliamentary majority voted in favor of the declaration. This will be possible only in the new parliament. To the observation that the name of Jan Budaj did not appear on the lists, Knazko responded by saying that this fact does not mean that he would not appear in the movement. Thus, the second republic assembly of the HZDS ended with the movement firm and unmoved.

Sub-Carpathian Party Congress Held

LD2403110392 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 0300 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] The constituent congress of the Sub-Carpathian Republican Party was held in Mukachevo yesterday. The main goal is to set up a sovereign Republic of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Miroslav Sladek, chairman of the Czechoslovak Republic Party, was guest of honor at the congress. According to well informed sources in Uzhgorod, Miroslav Sladek outlined his vision of a sovereign Sub- Carpathian state, which would, for instance, return to the pre-Munich borders. He promised the all-round support of his party for this.

In his speech—delivered in Russian—Miroslav Sladek sharply criticized the Czechoslovak leadership and President Vaclav Havel for their position toward the former Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.

Federal Assembly Deputy Vasil Mohorita, the former youth and Communist Party official, attended the congress in Mukachevo as an observer. The aim of his visit to Mukachevo is allegedly to ascertain possibilities for economic cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Trans-Carpathia.

Independent Candidates Lead Local Elections

AU2403113692 Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech 21 Mar 92 p 2

[KSM report: "Independent Candidates in Lead"]

[Text] Prague— Elections to community representative bodies were held in 375 communities and city districts in the Czech Republic on 29 February. Almost 54,000 citizens took part in the elections. Although the results of these elections cannot be considered conclusive, they indicate the popularity of political parties and movements in rural areas.

Political Party	Percentage of Votes Won
Independent Candidates	16.6
Czechoslovak People's Party	11.8
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	5.0
Agricultural Party	2.8
Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia	2.1
Farmers Movement	1.5
Civic Democratic Party	1.3
Civic Movement	1.3

Other parties and movements won fewer than 1 percent of the votes.

Czech Industry Minister Notes Production Downturn

LD2403152392 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 1730 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Today, the Czech Republic minister of industry [Jan Vrba] held a news conference. The topic was the ministry's status over this recent period. Helena Hubalova is in the studio with a more detailed report:

In 1991, industrial output of this ministry dropped by 29 percent, and this trend has been continuing this year as well. In January it amounted to almost 49 percent. From this it naturally ensues that the January 1991 profit, representing 12.7 billion korunnas [Kcs], dropped in November 1991 to 1.3 billion, and the loss incurred in December even amounted to almost Kcs 2 billion.

There is no need to emphasize the upward trend of insolvency, both primary and secondary. Side by side with this development, supplies have been growing by roughly 6.5 percent. The in-stock supplies of manufactured goods exceed 196 percent. Success in the restructuring of individual industries is not being achieved. This applies to both the expectations and the demands of the markets. The proportion of exports of the processing industry is around 10-11 percent. This is very low. The proportion of exports of heavy metallurgical products is still between 15-30 percent and this is not a favorable development.

All these results and trends do not indicate a sudden revival of production this year, and are not at all attractive for the influx of foreign capital of which we would need Kcs 3.5-4 billion. Last year we succeeded in obtaining less than 1 billion, and this year, if the contracts under negotiation turn out right, we could obtain a little in excess of 2.5 billion.

Cooperative Claims Government Monitoring Activity

AU2503142692 Prague CSTK in English 2235 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Bratislava March 23 (CSTK)—A "Dak Mova" agricultural cooperative spokesman today told reporters he has information that the Czechoslovak Interior Ministry has asked foreign intelligence services to watch the Dak Mova's foreign activity. Peter Popesko said that, "The interest in Dak Mova is apparent from the continuing deployment of agents of the Federal Information Service (FIS) in Slusovice area (South Moravia)." Popesko stressed that the limit of Dak Mova's tax payments to the state was intentionally set at a value exceeding the amount of Dak Mova's property so that an alleged plan of Czech Agriculture Minister Bohumil Kubat to auction off the Dak Mova's property could be realized.

The 1990 additional taxation to be paid by Dak Slusovice, worth 2,447 million crowns (81.5 million U.S. dollars), is a result of an 18-month revision [audit] conducted in Slusovice by the Brno-based financial authority, Popesko said. For comparison, he mentioned the 1990 tax payments to the state by all agricultural cooperatives in Czechoslovakia, which totalled 2,632 million crowns (87.7 million U.S. dollars).

FIS Director Stefan Bacinsky refused to comment in an interview with CSTK today on Popesko's statement on the deployment of FIS agents in Slusovice. The "Slusovice" agricultural cooperative farm was founded in 1975 by uniting 27 farms. Its chairman Frantisek Cuba resigned in August 1990 after he was declared responsible for the cooperative's collapse.

In January 1991 three cooperatives—Dak Mova, Dak Slusovice and Symaz—came into existence. In June 1991 Dak Mova registered in the Slovak capital of Bratislava as Dak Mova Bratislava.

Foreign Minister Jeszenszky Gives Briefing

LD2403165492 Budapest MTI in English 1505 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Budapest, March 23 (MTI)—Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky is leaving for the CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki to exchange views on the development of the process with colleagues from about 50 countries from March 24 to 27.

Jeszenszky, who returned from his five-nation trip to Latin America on Saturday, gave a news briefing on Monday before leaving for Helsinki.

He said in Helsinki he will speak about the increasingly important role the CSCE may fulfil in preventing and settling local conflicts and in promoting peace efforts.

The CSCE's operation should be problem-oriented, and not institution-oriented as so far. It is time for the organization to give way to majority opinions, going beyond the principle of consensus, which would forestall progress in human rights issues or matters of preventive diplomacy, he said.

Jeszenszky said he would support the appointment of minority chief commissioners as was proposed by the Dutch delegate to the latest session of the Western European Union in Brussels. The foreign ministers will look into possibilities for putting an end to the bloody events in Nagorno-Karabakh, and cushioning the Armenian-Azeri conflicts. Recalling his March 11-21 Latin American trip covering Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, the minister said that the region's countries see Hungary as a road to the European Community and a gate to the East.

There was agreement about the need for more extensive business links, he said and added that the smooth-functioning integration of Latin American countries could serve as an example for Eastern Europe. Answering a question, Jeszenszky said it was worth considering for foreign-resident citizens with Hungarian passports to take part in Hungarian home political life and be granted a right and opportunity to vote. He had met with such requests several times while abroad.

Foreign ministry spokesman Janos Herman reported the number of Soviet successor states having diplomatic ties with Hungary had risen to eight after diplomatic relations were established with Armenia through an exchange of notes at Hungary's initiative on March 20. The Foreign Ministry is currently preparing the establishment of diplomatic ties with Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan.

The creation of new-type relations will be the aim of an official visit by Foreign Ministry Deputy Secretary of State Denes Tomaj to Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Bangladesh from March 24 to April 2. The issue of settling debts to Hungary will also be raised in the three Indochinese states.

Last year Hungary's diplomatic corps reprsented Germany in Cambodia, for which Foreign Minister Genscher thanked Jeszenszky in a letter. Bonn has just accredited a permanent representative to Phnom Penh. The Croatian government has accepted the accreditation of Hungarian Ambassador Gabor Bagi to Zagreb. The embassy will be opened soon, Herman said.

The spokesman finally said that the foreign ministry would consider the transmmission of Russian-language TV programmes from the Commonwealth of Independent States in Hungary important from the economic, political and cultural points of view alike. It hopes the relevant institutions will shortly find ways of resuming the transmission, for this is outside the foreign ministry's competence, Herman said.

Agreement Signed With Russia To Import Lada Cars

LD2103191592 Budapest MTI in English 2011 GMT 20 Mar 92

[Text] March 20 (MTI)—The Hungarian Credit Bank and the Russian Avtovazbank have concluded an agreement, whereby they ensure the handling of all financial operations related to the company barters of their clients, an official of the National Bank of Hungary told MTI on Friday.

Avtovazbank, based in Togliatti, is the financial institution of the Avtovaz Company that manufactures the Lada and Samara cars, and the companies that organize the trade of Russian cars. It was set up in 1990.

The now signed agreement intends to promote the imports of the several hundred thousand Lada and Lada Samara cars, and their components. Various Hungarian products are to be delivered to Russia in return. The official of the National Bank of Hungary said he is aware of inter-company barter deals valued at 70 million dollars so far.

Nuclear Waste Contract Given to Russian Firm

LD2403180292 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] A safe, long-term location for the storage of radioactive waste from the Paks nuclear power station has been found. Under an agreement concluded with a Russian firm, the delivery of fresh fuel cartridges to Paks will continue over the next two years, while the burned-out fuel will be transported back to Russia. The contracting party is ready for long-term cooperation in this matter. The managing director of the Paks nuclear power station also pointed out that solid, compact, low-activity nuclear waste is still being sent to the central storage area between Puespoekszilagy and Kisnemedi in limited amounts.

Georgian Independence Already Recognized 'Verbally'

LD2403175992 Budapest MTI in English 1342 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Budapest, March 24 (MTI)—Hungary's Government is not pressed to recognize Georgia's independence since it already did so verbally, a senior Foreign Ministry official told MTI today. The statement followed yesterday's EC recognition of Georgia's independence. (Georgia is not part of the Commonwealth of Independent States.) Budapest is going to establish diplomatic relations with Georgia and waits for the appropriate and favourable conditions to make this step.

Minister Tells Conference Debt Obligations Met

LD2403150492 Budapest MTI in English 1854 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] Budapest, March 22 (MTI)—Hungary is meeting all its debt servicing obligations, and the government will continue to pursue this policy, Bela Kadar, minister of international economic relations, said in Budapest on Sunday, the first day of an international conference on the debt crisis.

Since this policy has evoked confidence in foreign investors, Hungary is the biggest recipient of foreign capital in Eastern Europe. For the time being, there are 11,000 joint ventures in Hungary. The foreign capital injections have encouraged the emergence of competitive ventures, promoted economic transformation, and increased the country's export potential, Kadar said.

The four-day conference is organized by the Prognosis 2000 Foundation, the Institute for Social Research, and the Committee of Futurology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The conference is to focus on the development of the world economy, international debt management, and the developing countries, chances of survival. On Tuesday evening, the conference will be attended by the heads of the Hungarian parliamentary party groups.

Labor Affairs Minister Views Unemployment

AU2503144892 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 20 Mar 92 pp 1,9

[Interview with Labor Affairs Minister Gyula Kiss by Gabor Deregan; place and date not given: "The Agony of Restructuring"]

[Excerpts] In view of Hungary's high unemployment of 440,000, and the fact that this number is five times higher than one year ago, it is hardly surprising that Gyula Kiss regards unemployment as the major issue his ministry is dealing with these days.

[Kiss] Unemployment is present and continuously increasing as a result of the unavoidable economic processes deliberately accepted by this government: such as the creation of a market economy, economic restructuring, and reorganization of ownership relations. This is a very serious and major social problem. I would like to stress this all the more because one often hears opinions, even in the Parliament, according to which the unemployed are generally people who do not like to work and, therefore, money spent on helping these people is wasted. I would like to clearly reject this opinion: The overwhelming majority of unemployed people really are unemployed. Of course, there is a relatively small circle of people for whom unemployment and unemployment benefits represent good business all over the world, including Hungary, but this is no reason to undervalue the situation, fate, and problems of all the unemployed people. [passage omitted]

[Deregan] One has the feeling that the specter of Hungarian unemployment has been an issue for many decades.... In a recent responsible debate, unemployment was treated as someone's shame. Whose shame? The Antall government's shame?

[Kiss] I think that when it comes to the objectively thinking people that make up the majority of our population, we do not have to prove that unemployment is not the shame of our present government. We still remember the concept of "hidden unemployment" or unemployment within the factory gates, a concept that covers real content. There was unemployment in the old regime, too, but it has now come outside the factory gates, both symbolically and in reality, and the government has accepted this reality. [passage omitted]

[Deregan] Everyone is now learning how to "handle" unemployment in Hungary because this is a new problem for us. But one can hear of considerable results in retraining people. There is also criticism in this area though. The question is the following: Why are we spending tens of millions of forints retraining people when we ourselves do not yet know what new factories and units will replace the eliminated jobs....?

[Kiss] Our employment policy has some means of preventing unemployment to a certain extent—not just dealing with it—such as retraining. It is not well known that as a result of these active employment policy means we succeeded in preventing the unemployment of 110,000 people in 1991. I repeat: 110,000 people did not become unemployed in 1991, primarily thanks to timely retraining programs as well as part-time employment and early retirement programs. This is not a secret, but it seems that the mass media is more sensitive to difficulties, and less sensitive to any small achievements. As for reservations about retraining, I also agree that unemployment in Hungary today is not structural, but a result of economic recession. [passage omitted]

[Deregan] The Labor Affairs Ministry is the favorite target of opposition attacks. If there is no topical "scandal" around, unemployment is always there to attack.

Some dailies are warning the people of possible astronomical unemployment figures. What is your opinion about this?

[Kiss] Unemployment is a political weapon for the opposition in its struggle against the government. This happens everywhere in the world where there is unemployment, and we can find unemployment in every market ecomomy regulated by the law of supply and demand. The opposition makes use of this opportunity. I regard this as a natural phenomenon. Distortion, however, should not be part of the aforementioned political means. [passage omitted]

We underestimated the increase in unemployment last year, but predictions of large-scale unemployment for this year are also based on similar uncertain factors. I appreciate the press dealing with this issue in a relatively realistic way and sensing the unemployment rate that the Hungarian economy can still bear today. In my opinion, this rate stands at 12-13 percent, as opposed to the current rate of 8.5 percent. [passage omitted]

State Secretary on Romanian Basic Agreement

AU1703110292 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 13 Mar 92 pp 1,3

[Interview with Geza Entz, state secretary responsible for the affairs of Hungarians living beyond the borders, by Laszlo Meszleny; place and date not given: "Geza Entz on Hungarian-Romanian Relations—No Basic Agreement Without Protection of National Minorities"]

[Text] Many obstacles are still mounting prior to the signing of the Romanian-Hungarian basic agreement. We interviewed Geza Entz on this issue.

[Meszleny] How common is the practice of signing bilateral basic agreements?

[Entz] Making basic agreements is not a common practice in the history of interstate relations in western democracies. However, this kind of very important document does exist in Western Europe, namely the German-French basic agreement signed by De Gaulle and Adenauer at the beginning of the 1960's. This finally ended the conflicts between these countries and, at the same time, envisaged broad industrial cooperation, laid the foundations for regional integration, and established regular contact on a presidential level.

[Meszleny] Nevertheless, we know about a number of previous basic agreements east of the Elba. Why were these made?

[Entz] The signing of such basic agreements among the satellite states and successor states of the Soviet empire was a much more widespread practice. The reason might be that a more refined system of relations did not exist. This had to be established, and it was expedient to settle several issues bilaterally in such agreements. Today, this means that it is only worth signing agreements that have genuine and solid political and economic content that will substantially further the relations of the signing countries. I do not mean relations between governments, but relations between the states and the peoples, which thus also reduce the existing tensions of the region.

When one side acquires unilateral advantages it is actually disadvantageous for both sides because it does not resolve the problems of the region and hinders European integration.

[Meszleny] How can the planned Hungarian-Romanian basic agreement manifest this?

[Entz] The Hungarian-Romanian basic agreement will have to have positive meaning for both peoples. This necessarily has to include the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Therefore, the basic agreement also has to be forward-looking from the point of view of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Without this, Hungary cannot sign a basic agreement. Again though, this is not a unilateral Hungarian national interest but, from the point of view of European integration, the long-term interest of both nations. If we manage to create such an agreement, it will also help Romania's integration in Europe. The democratic public of the world and the international organizations also expect to find the protection of minorities in such agreements. Naturally, bilateral relations also have to be developed in other areas. Our other relations would be hindered if the protection of minorities were not given the necessary importance in the agreement. The necessary importance means that the passages relating to the national minorities must not simply repeat the basic principles of relevant international documents, but they have to have additional meaning. The requirements of international documents can only be seen as the minimum, because they are based on a wide consensus.

Therefore, in addition to using the international documents, the various countries have to use their own internal problems as a starting point. This is a marginal problem in some areas, but it is an essential problem in Romania. Up to now, Romanian politics has emphasized this as a negative issue. According to international and Hungarian expectations, this will have to be given a positive emphasis now. This kind of change cannot realistically be expected in the near future, but the first steps will have to be taken. Minorities will have to be given autonomy that fits into the state system, and the autonomy will have to be based on democratic self-organization. This principle prevails in the concept of the Hungarian bill on minorities soon to be discussed by Parliament.

First, the legal framework of the autonomous institutional system has to be established. The starting point is an autonomy based on the person, which becomes particularly important in the case of dispersed national minorities. Another important factor is the system of local autonomies, which does not only relate to national minorities but is a general basic condition of democracy.

A democratic state cannot deny its citizens the right to establish autonomous structures.

[Meszleny] Which elements are mainly disputed by the Romanian side?

[Entz] The Romanian side's attitude so far shows that they want to evade the national minority issue in the basic agreement or, at the least, make it unimportant. In our view, this cannot be evaded. At the same time, they want to emphasize several other issues; these fall in the Foreign Affairs Ministry's sphere of authority. In addition, we consider it very important to include the establishment and support of regional cooperation in an agreement. This is economic common sense both for the national minorities and for all citizens who live in these areas.

[Meszleny] What response was given to the Hungarian demand for registering regional cooperation?

[Entz] The Romanian side usually opposes this. It was my personal experience at the CSCE conference in Geneva in July 1991 that when the issue of regional cooperation emerged from the national minorities' point of view, the leader of the Romanian delegation detailed at length how it should be limited because it violated national sovereignty. National sovereignty based on complete isolation can be established, but it will preserve poverty.

[Meszleny] Romania insists on registering Hungary's renouncement of territorial demands. Why is this a problem?

[Entz] If the agreement included that such territorial demands do not exist, then, indirectly, this would imply that such demands have existed up to now. Therefore, this also contains a statement that, from the outset, is contrary to the truth. The Romanian mass media—and, surprisingly, the Romanian Foreign Ministry has also recently added this in many of its statements—constantly keeps Romania's territorial insecurity on the agenda. This should be stopped and then the Romanian people's sensitivity would also decrease in this matter.

The further fate of the basic agreement depends on the willingness of both sides to negotiate. Naturally, we are interested in peaceful and good-neighborly relations and in the broadest possible cooperation.

New Liberal Forum Foundation Established

AU2403165992 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 20 Mar 92 p 4

[Report by Maria Szalai: "Liberal Forum Foundation—It Wants To Persuade, Rather Than Defeat"]

[Text] The Liberal Forum established within the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] held a news conference in the MDF Headquarters in Budapest on 19 March. The foundation was represented by four members of the Executive Board: Karoly Alexa, deputy chief editor of HETI MAGYARORSZAG; Laszlo Bogar, political secretary at the Ministry of International Economic Relations; Tibor Balazsi, parliamentary deputy in the MDF faction; and MDF Deputy MDF Chairman Imre Furmann.

The other members of the Executive Board are: Akos Peter Bod, Andras Gergely, Gyula Kodolanyi, Gusztav Molnar, Mihaly Szegedi- Maszak, Jozsef Debreczeni, Istvan Elek, and Ferenc Kulin.

At the news conference the participants told us that the temporary publication LIBERALIS FORUM [LIBERAL FORUM] contained the material of the Miskolc conference. The publication appeared in a limited number of 2,000 issues, and it can be found in the Writers' Bookstore, the Puski Publishing House, the MDF's county offices, and in the MDF Headquarters.

The politicians involved in the Liberal Forum Foundation are carrying out an increasing number of visits in the country. They told us that they would like to promote the ideas of this forum in a broad circle of people.

In his introduction, Imre Furmann said that the national liberals do not represent an internal opposition within the MDF, but they are regular MDF members with equal rights with the other members. Imre Furmann also stressed that a party could only represent true democracy if it also functions democratically. People who fear for freedom and democracy should speak up loudly if freedom and democracy are in danger, but we must find a functional and organizational system and form in which freedom, equality, fraternity, and national ideas can assert themselves without any threat. If we only shout, we will only increase the cacophony.

Imre Furmann also stressed that the three trends within the MDF, trends that check and balance each other, represent a guarantee that the MDF remains a center party and a people's party in the European sense of the word. This does not mean that we want to defeat one trend or another; on the contrary, we want to persuade!

Karoly Alexa stressed the importance of the style, because if there are debates and these are held in a civilized style, this means a cultural position and not just a better political discussion.

Tibor Balazsi informed us about the position of the Liberal Form on the recent decision of the Constitutional Court and said that "the people can become happy and satisfied in a calm atmosphere."

Government Recognizes Georgia's Sovereignty

LD2403192692 Warsaw PAP in English 1827 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 24—Polish Government on Tuesday [24 March] decided to recognize the Republic of Georgia as a state and declared its readiness to establish diplomatic relations, government spokesman Marcin Gugulski announced Tuesday afternoon.

Poland's Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski was authorized by the government to sign appropriate documents, establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Parys Interviewed on Cooperation With NATO

AU2403183792 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 23 Mar 92 p 6

[Interview with Defense Minister Jan Parys by Edith Heller in Warsaw; date not given: "Then the Conflict Will Come to Germany"]

[Text] [Heller] Mr. Minister, what expectations do you have concerning the German defense minister's visit to Poland, which will begin today?

[Parys] Above all, I want to get to know my German counterpart personally. I am interested in the views of that man, who is responsible for defense in our most important neighboring country. It is high time to make good certain historical mistakes. Cooperation between East and West can be successful only if Poles and Germans begin it.

[Heller] Is such cooperationa already beginning?

[Parys] Yes, there have been high-level visits, and we have managed to extend contacts to the level of defense districts, divisions, and regiments. We can also send groups of officers to train at the Bundeswehr command academies. We want to restructure Poland's Army in such a way that it uses the same systems as NATO.

[Heller] What do you think of the idea of renting the gigantic Polish exercise sites to NATO forces, including German units?

[Parys] Hungarians and Czechs are already holding exercises here, and I do not see any political obstacles that would prevent other units, which do not have enough room at home, from coming to our exercise sites for a few weeks. As far as I know, some NATO countries send their units to South Africa, Canada, or Spain. Poland would be closer.

[Heller] After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the security situation in Europe has changed. How great, do you think, is the danger of armed conflict?

[Parys] I am firmly convinced that the peoples who have freed themselves from the oppression by the Soviet empire deserve sovereignty. I hope that these processes will take place without armed conflicts. However, unfortunately, the probability of a peaceful course is not very great.

[Heller] Is Poland in danger?

[Parys] At the moment no state is showing hostile intentions toward Poland. On the other hand, nonmilitary threats are possible as a result of the restructuring of the Soviet empire. There are numerous border conflicts, and the economy is collapsing. The development in the Commonwealth of Independent States is hardly predictable.

[Heller] Recently President Lech Walesa said that Poland will send potential streams of refugees form the east further on to Germany—with a guard of honor. How should one understand this?

[Parys] It seems to me that it is high time to understand that any strengthening of Poland also is a strengthening of Europe. Any weakening of the Polish Army is a weakening of Europe, in particular in the case of destabilization in the east. The fact that we do not have enough money to keep our army should be reason for concern—not only in Warsaw but also in some other European capitals. If a pessimistic scenario should occur. Poland is at the first line of defense for Europe. If it is weak, the confrontation and the chaos will shift to the west—quite simply, to Germany.

[Heller] What do you expect from the West specifically?

[Parys] In talks with representatives of Western states and, most recently, with NATO Secretary General Woerner I tried to explain that the restructuring of the Polish Army is not just our national business. We can choose two paths: a national security system or a defense system that will be part of a broader system—of the NATO system. Certain forms of help are also possible without formal membership.

[Heller] On the other hand, one might say brutally: What does the NATO need Poland for? From your point of view, would it be advisable to accept Poland into the alliance and to thus anger new nuclear powers, such as Kazakhstan?

[Parys] Everyone who considers the possibility of conflicts tries to rule out settling them by means of nuclear weapons. This means that conventional forces would be needed in the case of war, that is, precisely that kind of forces which Poland has. In addition, I do not believe that Poland's cooperation with NATO would damage NATO's relations with other states.

[Heller] Ukraine, for instance, has more conventional forces than Poland.

[Parys] But one does not quite know who commands them. The armed forces there might be subject to a certain anarchization or try to play a political role and

get involved in internal conflicts, for instance a conflict about the Crimea. In short: They would not be the same partner.

[Heller] Recently you said that you see "a threat rather form the east despite increasing activities of the German minority and despite Germany's economic expansion." In Russia this "Parys Doctrine" has been accepted negatively. IZVESTIYA, for instance, wrote that Russia does not want to be seen as an enemy.

[Parys] I am glad that Russia does not want to be our enemy. I like this very much. They should first withdraw their troops from Poland. Then we will cooperate with them.

[Heller] Do you see the "economic expansion" of the Germans and the "increasing activities of the minority" as negative phenomena?

[Parys] I do not let myself be guided by emotions. I am for foreign capital coming to Poland, because my country needs capital, and we should establish favorable conditions for that. It is understandable that any country wants to keep some institutions in its own hands—thus I do not see anything objectionable in economic expansion. However, in my view it is still to small.

Regarding the minority, there are various opinions—I think that fears are often exaggerated. Europe's integration cannot rely on narrow nationalisms, it can also not be supported by efforts for separation or by domination of one group by another one. People who think so must understand that they represent the past.

[Heller] How significant is the past for you, as defense minister of a country, that was cruelly attacked by Germans 50 years ago? Do you consider close political, economic, and military cooperation to be possible soon?

[Parys] Of course. After all, one cooperates with a view to the future and not to the past. Of course, it is difficult to forget the injustice of the time of World War II: Almost every family in Poland suffered. I also try to understand that many Germans, too, were victims of the war. Today many states and peoples in Europe are looking at the Germans, their democracy, and their economic skills with admiration.

Of course, there are also some regrettable aspects. For me personally it was very painful that German policy in the 1980's accepted the communist status quo so much. The followers of the communist regime were treated much more cordially than the members of Solidarity.

At the moment everyone is aware of the fact that there will not be a united Europe without the Germans. We cannot imagine Germany suddenly becoming a neutral, nationalist country, isolated from the European problems. Germany has an enormous responsibility.

Transport Minister on Baltic Summit Results

PM2403091992 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 16 Mar 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Ewaryst Waligorski, transport and maritime economy minister, by Przemyslaw Fenrych; place and date not given]

[Text] [Fenrych] Minister, why was this "summit" conference [of Baltic states' transport ministers in Szczecin 16-18 March] convened so late?

[Waligorski] On 1 September 1990 prime ministers of the Baltic states met in conference at Ronneby near Stockholm. It was decided then that before very long a meeting should take place between the foreign affairs and transport ministers of the states involved. The conference was originally scheduled for June 1991, but did not take place for political reasons. The Russians categorically refused to consent to Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian delegates taking part in the conference, insisting that these republics had no authority to conduct their own foreign policy. For their part, the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians resolutely refused to participate in the conference as members of a foreign power's group of delegates. Other states, such as Denmark and Sweden, decided that it was not advisable to create an international problem, and consequently the conference was postponed until a later, unspecified date. I must stress that I did not expect it to take place so soon.

[Fenrych] Which states expressed their readiness to take part in the Szczecin conference?

[Waligorski] All those which have their own, direct access to the Baltic, and also Belarus, which has access to the sea via the River Neman; Czechoslovakia, which can reach the Baltic via the River Odra; and Norway. In addition, Holland expressed its wish to attend the conference and it will be granted observer status. Furthermore, the conference will be attended by presidents of many international transport organizations as well as UN and EC delegates.

[Fenrych] What are the conference's objectives?

[Waligorski] The conference will address three major themes. First, the transport infrastructure facilities in and surrounding the Baltic Sea. Second, protection of the environment against detrimental effects of maritime and related transport. Third, safety in maritime and related transport. In all references to "transport" I include all its categories: railroad, highway, air, and sea transport. It is too early to discuss the expected outcome of the conference. Meetings of this kind usually do no more than map out the directions for further, more detailed work on all relevant questions. One specific project in which Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are taking particular interest is the proposed Via Baltica—a freeway which will link Helsinki, Warsaw, and Trieste. International agreements on projects of such magnitude are negotiated over years rather than months, and it is

essential to define their chief objectives in clear terms. Other, smaller-scale projects are no less important—for instance, the question of border crossing points in all countries on the eastern coast of the Baltic. To cite an example, Lithuania is negotiating for the preservation and development of a third-grade railroad border crossing between Lithuania and Poland at Trakiszki [Trakiskiai]. The crossing will never develop into a major junction; even after the planned modernization of the railroad track, the maximum speed reached by the trains will be no more than 80 km an hour. A more convenient railroad connection with Vilnius runs through Grodno, where trains can reach much higher speeds, but we want to grant the wish of the Lithuanians, who are very keen on a direct railroad connection with Poland.

[Fenrych] Has the time come at long last when we can take up firm and direct talks with Russia on the subject of discontinuing the blockade of the port of Elblag, cut off by the Russian border? Some time ago there was much talk in Szczecin about a proposed waterway across the Bay of Pomerania, and it was feared that as a result Szczecin would be threatened with the same kind of blockade which has been choking the port of Elblag for the past half-century....

[Waligorski] Our northern land border is an entirely artificial creation: An arbitrary decision of Stalin's disrupted a large number of highway and railroad connections and indeed cut off Elblag's access to the sea. Today we are not insisting on a change of existing borders, but we want them to be as open as possible and to facilitate, not hinder, economic and cultural development of our border regions. This year, the central events of the traditional Sea Days will be organized precisely in Elblag. I believe that we have every right to use the waterway from Elblag through the Strait of Pilawa.

[Baltiysk] to the open sea. I trust that the Szczecin conference will bring us nearer to the final implementation of that right. I will hold talks on this subject with the Russian delegation. In fact, I mention the subject every time I have occasion to talks with Russian delegates—and every time they concede that I am right!

[Fenrych] How did it come about that a conference of such major international importance was convened in Szczecin?

[Waligorski] Well, Krakow contended vigorously for the right to host the conference, since it is a city situated at a junction of major European transport routes. However, we insisted that the meeting be held in a city situated on the Baltic Sea. Fortunately for us, two major maritime conferences were planned at roughly the same time, and as a result we avoided having to compete with Gdansk for the privilege of hosting this one. This was because last year Gdansk hosted a conference of Baltic cities, and so Szczecin was approved as the venue of a conference of Baltic states. This is surely the best possible solution: For a while the attention of all major European transport organizations will be focused on Szczecin; the city will be visited not only by ministers but also by the decision-making officers of all important international road and waterway transport companies. It is to be hoped that through this personal contact they will discover the advantages of cooperation with our city, with its excellent location from the viewpoint of transport routes. Szczecin is situated at an intersection of transport routes and European cultures. With its rich and varied historical past it should in the future become a center which will unite Poles, Germans, Danes, and Swedes, since they all have historical links of one kind or another with our city.

[Fenrych] All this suggests clearly that the conference should bring evident advantages to our city. And yet Szczecin longshoremen hold a grudge against the transport minister....

[Waligorski] Why mention only the longshoremen? Everyone here holds a grudge against me! The road transport people, too: They complain that the Trasa Zamkowa [Castle Way highway] is unfinished; that no bridges have been built on the River Regalica; that Wolin and Stargard are still waiting for a beltway system to be built around them; that there is no North-South freeway; and so on, and so forth. But the truth is that even if we allocated all the budgetary means at our disposal to finance Szczecin's needs, the Szczecinians would still claim that it was not enough. The same complaint would, of course, be heard from Krakow, and everywhere else you can think of. True, we can debate the question whether it is justified to hand out unemployment benefits when we could be building roads. Or else, why the road tax is so low. In the United States the federal government does not give any money at all to finance the road networks: All the funds for road development, construction, modernization, and maintenance come from the road tax. They have so much money at their disposal that they cannot even spend it all. The system is simple: They put a 35-percent road tax on the price of gasoline and that is sufficient....

[Fenrych] Szczecin's longshoremen have a further grudge against you concerning the Polzug joint venture. Why has the minister permitted the setting up a railroad joint venture which will carry cargoes from the port of Hamburg to Gliwice while the port of Szczecin is collapsing for lack of trade?

[Waligorski] It is not in the minister's competence to intervene in joint ventures set up by the Polish State Railroads! The railroad authorities have set up one venture; many more such schemes have been set up by the port of Szczecin.... Besides, the Polzug company will only carry from Hamburg to Gliwice the sort of goods which have been previously transported by road in trucks.... There is nothing to prevent the Szczecin port authorities from setting up their own joint venture to carry cargoes to Szczecin by sea. However, you only have to look at a map of Europe to see that this solution does

not make financial sense for customers from Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, or Hungary. It is also worth remembering that other Polish ships carry cargoes to Hamburg, too, because it is not financially viable for them to take the routes through the Straits of Denmark or the Kiel Canal. Such are the rules of the market! The Hungarians used Polish ports in the past because they would have had to pay in dollars in Yugoslav or Italian ports. Now, when they have to pay in convertible currencies everywhere, they choose the ports which offer shorter routes. This kind of competition is very tough, but it is up to the Szczecin port authorities to find ways to make their own port facilities and services more attractive, bring them more customers, and win bids against other, rival ports. The railroads will surely be only too ready to carry goods from Szczecin. But certainly not for free, either!

[Fenrych] Thank you for talking to us.

Democratic Union's Mazowiecki on Coalition Talks

AU2503092392 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 21-22 Mar 92 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Democratic Union leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki by Artur Domoslawski and Ewa Milewicz on 19 March; place not given: "Why Are We Talking?"]

[Text] [GAZETA] What is your assessment of the Olszewski government?

[Mazowiecki] It is a weak government.

[GAZETA] Why?

[Mazowiecki] Because it has a narrow political base, a political base that is inadequate in relation to the problems that it must solve, and the level of skills and knowledge that it has at its disposal is not particularly high. However, please do not ask me what skills and knowledge the government lacks, or what ministers lack them. I do not want to name any names.

[GAZETA] Nevertheless, speaking on Radio "Zet," Aleksander Hall did name the ministers about whom the Democratic Union [UD] has serious misgivings: Antoni Macierewicz (the Ministry of Internal Affairs), Jan Parys (the Ministry of National Defense) Wojciech Wlodarczyk (the Office of the Council of Ministers) and Jerzy Kropiwnicki (the Labor Ministry).

[Mazowiecki] And those misgivings do have some some basis in personnel policy or in the substance of their policies. For example, you cannot have many different ministries conducting foreign policy and, what is more, in a way that differs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[GAZETA] In December, the UD formulated four conditions for participating in the government and one of the things that UD demanded was that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense should be politically neutral. Jan Rokita, the deputy chairman of the UD parliamentary club, criticized the policies of those ministries and questioned the ministers' competence. Is the prime minister prepared to make policy and personnel changes in those ministries, too?

[Mazowiecki] Prime Minister Olszewski is no doubt convinced that the right people currently head the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, when he made his proposal of broadening the coalition to us, I made it clear to him that our talks would have to encompass the entire government. Any other form for the talks would be unacceptable to us, and that was clear and not open to question from the outset.

[GAZETA] If there are no personnel changes at the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would the UD still enter the government?

[Mazowiecki] Please do not try to force me to conduct negotiations with the prime minister through the press.

[GAZETA] So, are there ministries that have been excluded from the negotiations?

[Mazowiecki] No, it would be simply unacceptable to distribute responsibility according to the following model: There are those who are responsible for politics and there are others who are responsible for the economy. If that is the way in which responsibility is distributed, it is easy to avoid assuming responsibility for the government's whole policy course.

[GAZETA] We take that to mean that everything is open to discussion. Does that also apply to the person of the prime minister?

[Mazowiecki] Everything apart from the person of the prime minister, although when we talked, the prime minister joked that that was also open to discussion. However, I regard that statement as having been solely a matter of courtesy.

[GAZETA] So, is it a question of creating an entirely new government, but with the present prime minister.

[Mazowiecki] Essentially yes.

[GAZETA] You say that the government is weak. Is the prime minister also weak?

[Mazowiecki] I decline to make assessments of that kind. He is my main negotiating partner, and that is not the proper thing to do.

[GAZETA] Is there someone in the present government that you are satisfied with?

[Mazowiecki] Certainly with Minister Skubiszewski.

[GAZETA] That is, the only minister who was in your team. Why should Prime Minister Olszewski agree to such far-reaching changes?

[Mazowiecki] I did not say that he is the only minister who could stay. That team has already acquired a sense

of reality. I know from my own experience that everyone who is placed in a situation in which he is responsible for the affairs of state comes up against reality. It also has a sobering effect on many people, they come down to earth from being up in the clouds of demagogy or, at any rate, discard the illusion that everything can be solved simply, and that reflects positively on a person. The new government has realized that there can be no talk of any breakthroughs and that the economic policies of its predecessors have to be continued to a significant degree.

[GAZETA] Has the government achieved anything at all in the economy over the past three months?

[Mazowiecki] I do not see it having achieved anything in particular, but it has only been in power three months. The government adopted the draft budget prepared by the previous government. I consider that a plus in its favor.

It is also a good thing that the finance minister has been changed, but I will only be able to assess what Minister Andrzej Olechowski has done, when I see the budget that he has prepared. I do not deny Minister Eysymontt's professionalism. There are differences between him and our economists, but we do not reject everything contained in the economic guidelines document that he drew up.

[GAZETA] But a few weeks ago the UD proposed that the government economic guidelines program should be rejected, even without trying to amend at the Sejm commission level.

[Mazowiecki] The UD rejected the guidelines, but that does not mean that it rejects every idea contained in the document. We criticized the declared intention of creating an excessive amount of money—which is what Professor Stefan Kurowski proposed in an extreme form—and the introduction of an extensive system of concessions, because that would signify a return to value judgments being made by the state.

[GAZETA] But Prof. Kurowski is an adviser to the Confederation for an Independent Poland and not to any of the parties in government. He advised the Confederation for an Independent Poland to view the economy as a sponge that has completely dried out and could absorb any amount of money. The government has completely distanced itself from that idea.

[Mazowiecki] The government began to think rationally. After individual ministers undermined the budget by calling for more money for their ministries from Sejm commissions and the previous finance minister, Karol Lutowski, was unable to defend the state's coffers, I hope—but I am not sure—that the prime minister realized that the present government would not allow him to implement any kind of cohesive program.

That is no doubt why—as well as because of foreign reactions that were not favorable toward Poland—the statements being made by the government have undergone a radical change over the past few weeks. The government has been stressing that it will observe Poland's international commitments, continue to pursue an antiinflationary policy course, and control the budget deficit.

[GAZETA] If the government has begun to listen to reason, then why has the UD rejected its program?

[Mazowiecki] Our assessment of the government's program was influenced by a political assessment of the cabinet and its weakness.

Precisely because of the weakness of the present government, I can imagine a situation in which the UD would vote against the budget, although it agrees with what is actually set down on paper. After all, one not only needs to be strong enough to have a budget passed by the Sejm, one also has to be strong enough to implement it. We believe that the government will have to be reorganized for it to be possible to implement a tight budget, which is something that no one, including us, finds appealing, but it is a necessity, and if it is not done, then things can only get worse and quickly at that.

[GAZETA] We listened to the Sejm speeches made by Tadeusz Syryjczyk and Marek Dabrowski, who totally opposed the government program. They considered it to be a reversal of the market economy policy course. Meanwhile, from what you have said, it would appear that the UD rejected the program not for substantive, but for political reasons. So, what you have said confirms the charges that Prime Minister Olszewski has leveled at the UD?

[Mazowiecki] It does not. The government's ability to implement a tough program is also a substantive problem. The economic guidelines document is not just a set of mathematical proofs. In rejecting it, we warned against the pro-inflationary attitudes that were predominant at the time and against the rhetoric of fighting the recession. We are in favor of fighting the recession, but not if the prices is the collapse of our currency.

Finally, it was also to some extent important to signal to the government that one cannot knock the UD and count on its support at the same time. That kind of policy is always short-sighted.

[GAZETA] Why did the UD change its opinion and agree to talks?

[Mazowiecki] It is not we who have changed our opinion. Until now, the prime minister had not displayed the political will for talks on a new, broader coalition and a reorganization of the cabinet. Now he has.

[GAZETA] In that case, why has Jan Olszewski changed his mind?

[Mazowiecki] Please ask him. The important thing is that he has.

[GAZETA] The prime minister has said that it is not only important for him to have the budget passed, but that the government also has to be granted special powers in order to implement the budget. So, the constitution has to be passed, and that requires a two-thirds majority vote. Maybe that is why the prime minister is looking for support? Perhaps he is not concerned about broadening the coalition and reorganizing the cabinet?

[Mazowiecki] That is undoubtedly an important factor. However, the point is that in the longer term no one can outsmart anyone else, because broader cooperation is not something that is needed for one particular moment in the Sejm, but is needed over a longer period of time.

[GAZETA] Over the past three months Prime Minister Olszewski has frequently criticized the policy course pursued by the two previous governments. He said that its continuation "would not be a mistake, but madness," and that it has been a catastrophe for Poland. That would apply to your government and that of liberals, who you want to include in the government. Deputy minister and voivodship governors are being dismissed for either belonging to the UD or for sympathizing with it. So, how do you imagine being able to govern together?

[Mazowiecki] Personnel changes have been made according to the principle of "come what may." The needs in public administration and the economy are so great that personnel policy can be based on a principle other than that of "who is not ours has to go."

I do not want to defend Prime Minister Olszewski's policies and especially not those of his ministers. Back in January, when the three prime ministers met at the Belweder, I told Olszewski that the denigration of the achievements of the past two and half years and the catastrophe rhetoric had not had a good impact on the mood of society and what is worse, it misrepresents the true state of affairs in the country.

One has to distinguish what is caused by objective difficulties—those that are being experienced by all postcommunist states, by, for example, Hungary and Czechoslovakia—from the mistakes that are made in effecting such a great institutional transformation, one that no country has experienced to date.

The prime minister has made no such distinction so far. However, in commencing talks, I cannot insist that Prime Minister Olszewski engage in self-criticism. However, I expect a different kind of rhetoric—a rhetoric of common responsibility for the future and of not questioning the sense of the changes that have already been made.

[GAZETA] You have not answered our question about how you imagine governing together with Prime Minister Olszewski. We have been talking for almost an hour now and you have not made one positive statement about the present government so far. You have only praised Minister Skubiszewski.

[Mazowiecki] I get the impression that you want to trap us in a vicious circle. When the UD, which is artificially isolated in the Sejm, rejected the offer of cooperation, you wrote that we are offended, that we can conduct a modern form of politics, and that we enter into any arrangements under which we would have our hands on the steering wheel....

[GAZETA] You have confused us with the Center Accord. That was what they charged.

[Mazowiecki] Not only they. Now that we want to talk, you are surprised and have given us to understand that we must be out of our minds if we want to speak to them. Don't you see that this is a vicious circle in which all of Poland has found itself and not just the UD or the government? It is a vicious circle that we have to try to break out of.

[GAZETA] We are surprised, because we do not understand what is going on. It is not the case that everybody can form a government with each other.

[Mazowiecki] We are not talking about everybody, but it is difficult to create a coalition in this fragmented parliament. Meanwhile, there are situations in which a grand coalition provides an indispensable way out for a time. That is what the situation is like in Poland at the present time.

[GAZETA] We understand that you are seeking a way out of the Polish impasse by entering the government....

[Mazowiecki] After all, if the government were to collapse—and in the present situation that could happen by chance—we would find ourselves talking to the same parties and people anyway. The "rotten apple" rule is in force in this Sejm. Whoever happens to be prime minister must, in forming a government, include a grouping in the coalition that is a "rotten apple" from somebody's viewpoint. That is why the UD does not want to bring down the government. Talks would be even more difficult if that were to happen, because then there would be new animosities.

In addition to that, Poland would have a disastrous image in the rest of the world. It would encourage the belief there is some operetta-like country on the banks of the Vistula in which governments change with increasing rapidity.

[GAZETA] Why should forcing one's way into government posts be a better recipe for solving problems than creating coalitions in order to settle concrete issues or pass legislation?

[Mazowiecki] These kind words about "forcing one's way into government posts" are simply untrue. We are not trying to push our way into anywhere. So, let's spare ourselves the rhetoric. You have asked whether it would not be better to form coalitions in order to deal with specific legislative matters. That will not provide a permanent solution to anything, but what can I say? That is how we will behave, if the talks do not succeed.

[GAZETA] To be honest, we doubt whether the present coalition plus the UD would have a majority in the Sejm. We also find it hard to believe that the UD would be strong enough to force anything through in that kind of coalition.

[Mazowiecki] I am treating the talks as talks between two coalitions. Our coalition is made up of the UD, the Liberal-Democratic Congress, and the Polish Economic Program. A reorganized government with the support of those 112 votes would be able to pursue a cohesive market-oriented policy.

[GAZETA] We cannot believe that it would be at all possible for the liberals to participate in the coalition. Deputy Henryk Goryszewski of the Christian-National Union has declared that his party will not join any government that involves the liberals. The prime minister has stated that it would "extremely difficult" for the liberals to join his government. Is the liberals' participation in the government one of the conditions set by the UD?

[Mazowiecki] Everything concerning this issue is "extremely difficult." However, we will do everything possible to bring the liberals into the coalition.

[GAZETA] The prime minister has not talked about the UD in the same way as he has about the liberals.

[Mazowiecki] I will say once again that everything concerning this issue is extremely difficult.

[GAZETA] If the prime minister and the coalition do not agree to the liberals' participation, will the UD join the coalition?

[Mazowiecki] I will answer your question if no agreement on that can be reached. On the basis of the talks that I have had so far, I do not think that the obstacles are insurmountable.

[GAZETA] Good, let's assume that your plan succeeds and a broad coalition is formed. However, do you have an idea of what will happen if the coalition collapses?

[Mazowiecki] I hope that the government would not collapse quickly.

[GAZETA] But after all it will not govern forever and it will eventually collapse. Who would for a government then? The Confederation for an Independent Poland? The Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland? Why does the Democratic Union not form a strong opposition, which could replace this government once it collapses?

[Mazowiecki] I am familiar with that theory. According to it, the present government should be allowed to "wear itself out." However, that has two fundamental faults. First, it does not take account of the fact that when one begins to govern, the talk is not longer of "breakthroughs," but of implementing difficult policies. Second, it is mistaken to believe that once a demagogic policy has been compromised, there will be a period during which reason predominates. Experience shows that one demagogue can be followed by other demagogues.

[GAZETA] So, how does the UD want to prevent that from happening?

[Mazowiecki] There is a growing dislike of the entire political scene. That is something the UD is experiencing too although it is in opposition. So, if the UD joins the government, its electorate will continue to distinguish it from the demagogic groupings.

[GAZETA] What will the UD gain from that transaction?

[Mazowiecki] Influence over government and thus over the situation in the country. In addition, if want to do something for our electorate, that is, primarily for the intelligentsia, nonindustrial public sector employees or entrepreneurs and the business community, then we have to be able to influence the way in which the whole economic situation develops. The UD will acquire the reputation of being a party that can rise above animosities. In light of what our country's political life is like, with all its pig-headedness and petty-mindedness, that is something that many people will surely appreciate.

[GAZETA] However, the UD may also fall apart?

[Mazowiecki] The entire history of the UD since its formation has been about fears that it will fall apart. GAZETA has also predicted that on many occasions. However, I would like to point out that not acting involves as much of a risk as acting. One could ask the following question: If our talks fail, will the UD not fall apart then?

[GAZETA] But the "party grassroots" prefer to be in opposition. For example, the UD group in Konstancin-Jeziorna accuses the party's governing bodies of conducting a "policy of procrastination," of supporting the government without being able to influence its actions.

[Mazowiecki] That was a form of opposition to an unclear situation, because the UD was supporting the government although it was not part of it.

[GAZETA] A few days ago, the prime minister did not raise any objections to slanderous allegations that the liberals had plundered Poland, and that may be taken to indicate what his intentions are. You want to include the liberals in a coalition government. Do you not think that new coalition would be schizophrenic?

[Mazowiecki] Those slanderous allegations should have been denounced. It sullies our political life.

[GAZETA] Does the idea of reorganizing the government, which Aleksander Hall's right-wing faction within the UD has been advocating for many weeks now, not stem from an ideological affinity between that faction's leader and the

government? Will participation in the Olszewski government not provide Hall with a pretext for leaving the UD and going over to another political camp?

[Mazowiecki] By the same token, one could say that those who do not want to hold talks with Olszewski do not want to, because that lies in their interest. But, for example, what do Barbara Labuda or Waldemar Kuczynski stand to gain from supporting the talks? We will not get very far by encouraging suspicion.

I want to win the support of all groups within the UD for this idea. All of us would join the government and not just one particular faction.

[GAZETA] Which members of the UD's governing bodies are opposed to holding talks with the prime minister on reorganizing the government?

[Mazowiecki] I am not going to name any names. The members of the UD Council differ in their assessment of the likelihood that the negotiations will be successful and they have different intentions regarding the talks. Some believe that there is a chance of success and that the attempt makes profound sense, others believe that there is no chance of success, but that the proposal of talks cannot be turned down.

[GAZETA] As you do not want to name names, then let us do so: Bronislaw Geremek, Jan Rokita, Andrzej Celinski, and Zofia Kuratowska....

[Mazowiecki] Professor Geremek has not said anything.

[GAZETA] But if the head of the parliamentary club does not say anything that surely means something. Speaking to Radio "Zet," Geremek came out in favor of a coalition made up of the UD, the liberals, and the Polish Economic Program (the so-called "Large Beer"), which would mean that he is not particularly taken with the idea of a coalition with the prime minister's camp.

[Mazowiecki] You know perfectly well that a coalition made up of those three groups would not be enough to change the current situation. I will try to convince Geremek, Kuron, and other opponents that it would be right to form a broader coalition and that it would make sense. However, I cannot give any assurances that the attempt will succeed.

[GAZETA] So, there actually are opponents of the talks. How do you intend to convince them?

[Mazowiecki] Once I have the arguments, I will convince them.

[GAZETA] What kind of arguments?

[Mazowiecki] That the new coalition will produce a qualitative change in the situation and that it is not a sham solution.

[GAZETA] To what extent is the threat of presidential dictatorship, which some UD activists predicted, a serious argument for a coalition composed of the UD and the Olszewski camp?

[Mazowiecki] It was a serious argument. Some of the president's statements arouse such concern. I would like the president to interpret the attempt to reorganize the government, which is aimed at stabilizing the political situation, as providing an opportunity for the president to exercise an appropriate role. It is a question of the president giving his support to reform rather than subjecting it to constant criticism.

[GAZETA] So, has the UD Council rejected the declaration condemning Lech Walesa's recent statements attacking the intelligentsia for the sake of maintaining good relations with the president?

[Mazowiecki] No, it has not. It adopted a different text proposed by Prof. Geremek, which criticizes this type of rhetoric without naming the president directly.

[GAZETA] Why?

[Mazowiecki] I do not know. Maybe the deciding factor was that it was Prof. Geremek who proposed the alternative.

[GAZETA] Do you not share the fears of some of your colleagues that the talks with the UD are only part of an internal struggle within the governing coalition: the prime minister versus Jaroslaw Kaczynski?

[Mazowiecki] I don't think so. If that is in some sense a motive, then it would tend to be one that has an indirect bearing.

[GAZETA] Some UD activists fear that the prime minister will give you a few posts, but you will have no influence on government policy.

[Mazowiecki] We will not enter the government as subtenants.

[GAZETA] Do you believe your partners in the talks?

[Mazowiecki] Whom do you have in mind?

[GAZETA] We are sorry, but you have taught us not to mention any names.

[Mazowiecki] That is a difficult question to answer. If I reply that I believe them, you will say that I am naive. If I reply that I do not believe them, then I would be accusing my partners of playing games with me. Do I believe my partners? Would you, for example, ask Kohl if he believes Genscher, because the latter was previously a member of the Schmidt government? I would rather you asked me whether Polish democracy can already permit the formation of a broad coalition and whether it will be possible to protect and develop Polish democracy as well as economic reform without a grand coalition.

UDMR Welcomes National Unification With Moldova

AU2403195392 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1846 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 24/3/1992—The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] welcomes the efforts for the accomplishment of the national desideratum of the country's reunification, reads a statement of the UDMR Presidium sent to ROMPRES for release. We are of the opinion, that this natural act of historical justice must be implemented by peaceful means, as soon as possible, by strictly observing the principles and norms of international treaties. To put internal and external conditions in place for this reunification is an organic part of this process. The UDMR condemns any attempt at creating a fait accompli in Moldova through military or terrorist methods. A peaceful solution is the only one valid, including all the sides concerned with a stable and lasting settlement. The measures and promises of the Republic of Moldova regarding the protection of minorities can be a good starting point, as they can create the possibilities and guarantees for the people of other nationality to enjoy fully equal rights and accomplish their national identity.

The UDMR believes that following joint efforts by all people in the region, all the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact—this assault on the natural course of history—will be liquidated as soon as possible, the statement reads in conclusion.

Nation's Foreign Public Debt Reviewed

AU2303182892 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 13 Mar 92 p 2

[M.D. article: "Romania's Foreign Public Debt"]

[Text] On the basis of information received from sources at the Ministry for Economy and Finance, we are going to reveal Romania's foreign public debt consisting of long-term and medium-term loans, as they were on December 31, 1991.

A long-term loan of $208 million, without interest, was granted by the People's Republic of China in 1970. Repayment will be ensured by the Romenergo SA company, which will supply energy equipment and services to the Pu-Cheng thermal power station project between 1991 and 1994. The draft bill on national public budget for 1992 provides for the refunding of one installment of this loan, which amounts to 5,4 billion lei, that is, $30 million.

Of the $848 million loan granted by the International Monetary Fund, for financing [inflation-induced] compensations and a "stand-by" credit, Romania has already received 768 million dollars. The payment of this loan will be made in 1993 and 1994.

Of a total loan of $180 million granted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for imports of indispensable goods and for technical assistance, Romania has received $4 million by 31 December 1991. Repayment is to be made starting in 1997. For 1992, the signing of loan contracts worth $2,282 million is foreseen, of which an amount of $1,636 million is to be used up during the same year.

An amount of $1,612 million of the total amount of foreign financing in 1992 is to be used for sustaining the foreign-payment balance and strengthening the foreign currency reserves of the country, while the rest will be used to finance certain clearly defined projects. Loans meant for the redress of the financial balance are conditional, requiring that Romania's Government should take steps to reform the economic mechanism. Thus, to obtain the second installment of the 1991 "stand-by" agreement with the International Monetary Fund, and to facilitate the signing of another similar agreement for 1992, Romania must comply with certain performance criteria, concerning—among others—the volume of bank credits, the budget deficit, the amount of foreign currency assets, and the quantity of money brought into circulation.

The same requirements apply for the granting of the second installment of the Group of 24, within the EEC. To obtain the World Bank loan for structural adjustments, there are provisions stipulating—among other things—further liberalizing prices, accelerating privatization, and creating a more effective social protection system.

Liberal Party's Sandulescu Resigns From Senate

AU2303175192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1721 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 23/3/1992—I.V. Sandulescu, National Liberal Party senator, has resigned from this office. The request is motivated by the fact that at present Mr. Sandulescu holds the office of secretary of state at the Foreign Affairs Ministry which is incompatible with that of senator. It is upon the request of the party and not my own that I renounce the position of senator, Mr. Sandulescu stated in the letter to the president of the Senate. Expressing his regret at having to accept the request Alexandru Barladeanu specified that the vacancy would be filled in by Mrs. Negropontes Tatarascu.

The main item in the agenda of the Monday [23 March] session is the bill on the election of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate.

UDMR Issues Appeal for Unity 10 Mar

AU1803135992 Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 11 Mar 92 p 11

["Appeal by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania" issued on 10 March; place not given]

[Text] We are convinced that the Hungarians in Romania chose the only possible way when they created their interest representation body, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] in December 1989: Aware of its own traditions and language-national links, the UDMR considered it necessary to also assert its identity in the Romanian political life. Inasmuch the Hungarians in Romania have well-determined national characteristics and regard themselves as an entity within Romanian society, and others regard them as such, and inasmuch the Hungarians in Romania have common linguistic and cultural interests—and they do have such interests—these interests can only be effectively represented in full unity.

Unlimited use of our mother tongue, education in our mother tongue, and our own culture and religion are common interests that the (natural) ideological differences should not weaken. The differences appearing on the issue of individual and social rights should not affect this sphere of common identity. If the community is not free, the individual that feels part of this community cannot be free, either.

Anyone who wants to deny the right for a uniform stand from a community that has not yet gained its equality before the law is committing a crime similar to one who, under the slogan of unity, want to deny the freedom of ideological opinion from the Hungarians in Romania, from liberal, Christian-democratic, or social-democratic considerations.

One should not make the national concept and the concept of democracy confront each other, because national affiliation represents linguistic, cultural, historical, and religious definitions without which both the community and the individual would lose their self-identity.

We are aware of the fact that democratic development is impossible without a uniform national development here in Eastern Europe, here in Romania, at this historical moment. We are also aware of the fact that, for the Hungarians living in Romania, the road toward democracy leads through fulfilling our national endeavors, rather than giving them up.

Starting from its internal debates carried out so far, and prior to its upcoming extraordinary congress, the UDMR thinks that it is important for the various views to publicly confront each other on the level of principles. We think that it is absolutely necessary for this organization to become more varied so that all kinds of tactical, strategic, and ideological differences of views appear within the framework of a uniform representation of interests, and to be able to influence this organization's policy from within, and to maintain the unity dictated by common interests.

Ideological division is already possible through the coalition partners of the UDMR, namely the Christian Democratic Party, the Smallholders Party, the Free Democratic Party, and the MISZSZ [expansion unknown].

We do not want to hinder the creation of platforms, and we regard the assertion of the freedom of thought—including the creation of an adequate leadership structure—as essential tasks; at the same time, we think that it is still unclear what role the possible platforms could play in the aforementioned parties. We regard the emergence of platforms directed from above in a public organization as risky or at least questionable, and no external circumstance justifies this process at the moment. After all, this idea is as artificial as a possible forced monolithic unity. We want to give free rein to various ideologies, but we do not allow the division of our membership that has been drawing power from the present unity of the UDMR.

Taking all this into consideration and analyzing the political experiences of the past two years, the signatories of this appeal call upon the UDMR members for unity.

Our answer to the aggresive anti-Hungarian attitude manifested in recent months, and particularly during the election campaign, is a united stand for the formulation and social implementation of our collective rights.

The Principles of Our Unity Program:

—There is no individual identity without national identity.

—The struggle for national identity is inseparable from the struggle for democracy.

—The political life of the Hungarians in Romania is part of this country's political life, and it fits into this country's political life as a uniform whole.

—We must implement the principle of autonomy based on our own Transylvanian traditions and the most up-to-date European models.

We are convinced that the UDMR membership supports our unity ideas.

Therefore, we call upon our territorial organizations that accepted the everyday task of representing our interests to discuss this appeal during their preparations for our extraordinary congress, and take a stand in this decisive issue.

1) Deputy Gyorgy Tokay; 2) Senator Bela Marko; 3) Deputy Lazar Madaras; 4) Deputy Laszlo Borbely; 5) Deputy Attila Zonda; 6) Deputy Bela Nagy; 7) Senator Tamas Csiha; 8) Senator Attila Verestoy; 9) Deputy Gyorgy Frunda; 10) Deputy Gyula Vida; 11) Deputy Karoly Kerekes; 12) Senator Gabor Kozsokar; 13) Deputy Ferenc Pecsi; 14) Senator Gabor Hajdu; 15) Senator Miklos Fazakas; 16) Senator Lajos Demeny; 17) Senator Jozsef Totha; 18) Deputy Zoltan Szilagyi; 19) Deputy Ferenc Baranyi; 20) Deputy Benedek Nagy; 21)

Deputy Laszlo Podhradszky; 22) Deputy Akos Bajcsi; 23) Senator Karoly Szabo; 24) Senator Zoltan Hosszu; 25) Deputy Gyula Brendus.

March 10, 1992.

UDMR Communique States Alliance With CD

AU2403181992 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1702 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 24/3/1992—In a communique sent to the National News Agency ROMPRES for publication, the National Presidium of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] informs, that the firm intention of the UDMR is to militate alongside the united democratic opposition for the building of a state of law, of a functioning market economy, for the application of social welfare measures, for the promotion of the democratization process, and for political pluralism. The National Presidium considers the cooperation within the Democratic Convention [CD] at the general elections as useful and necessary, in the spirit of mutual understanding and assistance.

The UDMR congress is the forum to assign the candidate for the office of president, to back the common candidate of the Democratic Convention, or to nominate its own candidate, by taking the election law as a basis.

Democratic Convention Seen in Danger of Splitting

AU2403112392 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 21-22 Mar 92 p 4

[Marius Stoian article: "Democratic Convention Facing a Key Situation"]

[Excerpts] Undoubtedly, this is a key situation for the configuration of Romania's political arena. Both the National Salvation Front [FSN] and the Democratic Convention [CD], the main parties that contested the local elections, will soon have to come up with a response on the feasibility of the formula with which they are running in the elections. The lack of a clear doctrine, the poor level of awareness among the electorate of the differences between the various ideologies under discussion, and the Front's delay in clarifying its internal situation, something that has been seen as an attempt to preserve power at all costs, resulted in the focus of the election campaign being the disputable antithesis: The preservation of the status quo (of communist structures) associated with the FSN or a genuine change as promoted by the Democratic Convention. [passage omitted]

Various commentators were just waiting to report the profound changes that took place in the ranks of the electorate in the period between May 1990 and February 1992, when it was possible for a person so little known as Mr. Crin Halaicu to win simply because he had the endorsement of the CD. Mr. Halaicu is indeed a noteworthy professional. Despite this, I agree that had he run on a different ticket, he would not have achieved the majority of votes. However, the analysts I have referred to explained the success of the Convention by the fact that its proposed political program was understood. Which is wrong. Unfortunately, in Romania we cannot yet talk about a duel between programs, doctrines, and so forth. [passage omitted]

The Convention won first and foremost because it gave the impression of uprightness and the refusal to compromise on major issues. While it was set up mainly as a credible counterweight to FSN supremacy, the CD is nonetheless dependent on the FSN. [passage omitted] The moment the FSN falls apart, the Convention will lose its main reason for existing. Therefore, the eyes of the CD leaders are anxiously turned to the FSN National Convention [27-29 March] where the party's big trump will be played. If the Front falls apart—although we do not have enough information to be sure about such a possibility—then the CD will be prey to big internal conflicts. [passage omitted]

The announcement about Mr. Nicolae Manolescu's presidential candidacy—rather hasty and premature—was a first shock for the "group of the 14" [CD]. [passage omitted] This candidacy was clearly rejected by Messrs. Campeanu [National Liberal Party] and Cunescu [Social Deomcratic Party]. The only one who behaved in a reserved way was the leader of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party, Corneliu Coposu. Signs of tension started immediately in relations between the National Liberal Party and the Civic Alliance Party [PAC]. [passage omitted]

In this context, two benevolent statements—one televised, the other published in the weekly EXPRES MAGAZINE—by Mr. Manolescu [PAC leader] about Mr. Petre Roman are and, in a way, are not surprising at all. [passage omitted] Nevertheless, during a short discussion a few days ago with PAC vice president, Stelian Tanase, Mr. Manolescu expressed the view according to which any association between the PAC and the FSN was categorically implausible. Moreover, he told me that the FSN's national leader had contacted the PAC leadership several times, but was always given a negative answer. Despite all this, in my view, an alliance—as a reserve solution—between Mr. Roman's future party, whatever its name, and the PAC cannot be ruled out. Another factor that damages the unity of the Convention is the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR], because of its double play in the local elections, when it did not refrain from going along with the FSN whenever this was to its advantage. The fact that the leaders of the Convention do not openly admit that that is how things stand makes you think of the image abroad. A Convention that would eliminate the political formation of the Hungarian minority would suffer a decline in prestige and credibility in the eyes of good old Europe. However, such a strategy is a luxury the CD cannot afford. I am convinced that, if the Convention

falls apart, the regrouping that will take place afterward will not include the UDMR. [passage omitted]

Thus, without fear of being wrong, we may conclude that the Convention—in its current composition—is undergoing shifts. The forum of the ruling party can only speed up or delay its end. What is important to pursue, however, is whether the dismemberment of the two eclectic blocs—the FSN and CD—will generate a new form of alliance that will take into consideration the prospects for the development of society.

Results of Elections for County Councillors Issued

AU2303173192 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1611 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 23/3/1992—On Saturday, March 21 and Sunday, March 22 elections were held for county councillors in Calarasi, Salaj and Vrancea counties. According to the data from the Central Election Commission 37 councillors were elected in Calarasi County: National Salvation Front—15 mandates; Democratic Convention—11 mandates; Agrarian Democratic Party—10 mandates; Republican Party—1 mandate.

The 37 mandates of councillors in Salaj County were distributed as follows: the National Salvation Front, Agrarian Democratic Party, Romanian Ecological Party coalition—14 mandates; the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania—8 mandates; Romanian National Unity Party—6 mandates; Democratic Convention—6 mandates, Union of Democratic Left—1 mandate; Free Change Party—1 mandate; independents—1 mandate.

The 39 councillors elected in Vrancea County were distributed as follows: National Salvation Front—16 mandates; Democratic Convention—11 mandates; Agrarian Democratic Party—8 mandates; Ecological Convention—2 mandates; Republican Party—1 mandate; independents - 1 mandate.

The elections for the county councillors in Bistrita County are to be held on March 25, while elections will be held on March 28 in Braila, Galati, Mehedinti Counties and on March 29 in Arad, Bacau, Gorj, Hunedoara, Vaslui, Timis Counties, on March 30 in Iasi, on April 2 in Teleorman county, on April 4 in Bihor, Buzau, Dolj and Ialomita Counties, on April 5 in Alba, Botosani, Brasov, Caras- Severin, Cluj, Neamt Counties, on April 11 in Tulcea County and on April 12 in Arges, Giurgiu and Prahova Counties.

On April 18 elections will be held for county councillors in Sibiu County.

Dates have not yet been set for the election of county councillors in Constanta, Covasna, Dimbovita, Harghita, Maramures, Satu Mare, Mures, Suceava, Vilcea and Olt Counties.

Campeanu, Quintus Attend Union Alliance Briefing

AU2403181792 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1704 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 24/3/1992—The National Confederate Alliance, a trade union organization set up on March 12 through the association of "15 Noiembrie" and "Hercules" confederations, organized its first news conference today, March 24. The trade union confederation leaders surveyed the directions of action the alliance shall promote in the current situation of crisis in Romania.

Underlining their full independence from the structures of power and from other trade union blocs, one of the leaders showed that the alliance came into being "following the need for solidarity and growing power of the two organizations that have a membership of about 1,250,000 in the union struggle."

During the talks, questions were approached specific to the trade union movement, and reference was made to the relations with other trade union organizations, as well as to the situation created by the subway drivers' strike.

The news conference was attended by representatives of the presidency and the government, members of the diplomatic corps and of political groupings.

National Liberal Party President Radu Campeanu and Minister of Justice Mircea Ionescu Quintus attended.

CNSLR President on Unions' Political Character

AU2403153992 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 18 Mar 92 pp 1,4

[Interview with Victor Ciorbea, president of the National Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Romania, by Paul Lacatus; place and date not given: "Willingly or Unwillingly Trade Unions Make Politics"]

[Text] [Lacatus] Mr. Ciorbea, in January the National Consultative Council [CNC] had a more intransigent position as far as the level of minimum salary on economy is concerned. In the end, have you accepted the government's point of view?

[Ciorbea] Not at all. There is a fundamental difference here between the CNC and the government. Our point of view is that an 8,500 lei salary is not enough, neither for a decent way of life nor for the survival of the employer and his family under conditions of a five to 10-fold increase of prices. Within the CNC we will discuss the future ways to struggle if the government does not understand that it has to adequately increase the level of the minimum salary. The protest demonstrations organized by the CNC proved their usefulness because as a result, the aforementioned salaries and the payment of the employees dues that I was talking about have been raised by an average of 8 percent.

[Lacatus] It was mentioned, sometimes as an accusation, that the actions of trade unions have acquired a very strong political character. Do you believe that trade unions should play an active political role?

[Ciorbea] In defending the rights of its members, trade unions, willingly or unwillingly make politics, that is, economic or social policy, in short: a trade union-type of politics, which is very difficult to be separated from "pure politics." However, the trade union's apolitical state, about which long discussions have been held, does not correspond with reality.

[Lacatus] Can the trade union politics go so far as to become involved in the electoral campaign?

[Ciorbea] I think that at this moment this is a requirement. Two years after the revolution, we have all realized that it is not possible to solve economic and social problems without a solution to the political problems. This does not mean that trade unions should turn into political parties and aim to win power in the state. However, it is absolutely necessary to practice the lobby that we find in all democratic countries in the world and establish certain relations between trade unions and certain political parties in whose platforms the claims and concerns of trade union members are included.

[Lacatus] All parties speak out for the democratization of the country. Have you identified those political forces that really want this and that you can support during the next electoral campaign?

[Ciorbea] During the 12-13 March meeting of the National Confederation presidium of the Free Trade Unions of Romania [CNSLR], the issue of supporting certain political forces in the electoral campaign was discussed. However, the final decision belongs to the General Council, which, at the beginning of April will hold a meeting and will name those political forces that we are going to support, starting from the premises that I was talking about: to be democratic political forces, which should ensure the continuation and acceleration of the democratization process of our country and ensure Romania's credibility in the international arena, something that is necessary to obtain credits and achieve foreign investments, without which it is not possible to overcome the current economic and social crisis.

[Lacatus] Will the political involvement of your confederation be carried out in agreement with your partners within the CNC, that is, the Alfa and Fratia Confederations?

[Ciorbea] Our intention is to discuss this issue—as we usually do—within the CNC and try to combine our viewpoints to achieve as much as possible a common position, also on this issue.

[Lacatus] What is your opinion regarding Mr. Claudiu Iordache's initiative to establish a political party that should make the trade unions its social basis? Does the CNSLR agree to this plan?

[Ciorbea] Each political party tries to recruit people to form its basis from among trade union members because they represent 60 percent of the employees.

[Lacartus] Yes, but in this case, it would mean to involve trade unions as structures, including all their available forces.

[Ciorbea] There have been discussions within the CNC about the possibility of supporting a political party that would be subordinated to the trade union members and would have a direct connection with trade union organizations. To obtain more details, you have to wait until the beginning of April for the decision of the General Council.

Miners' Trade Union Favors Peaceful Dialogue

AU2403123592 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] A news conference was held this morning at the Headquarters of the Mining Trade Union Federation of Romania in connection with the situation created by Miron Cosma's actions and its consequences for the mining trade union activity.

At this news conference, this federation's president, Mr. Eugen Tamas, emphasized that, due to the mass media, some trade union members understood that their problems could be solved only by using the method of incursion, because those in power discuss things only with people who apply force.

At this news conference, it was also stressed that, aside from the demands obtained by Miron Cosma, the latter often acted to the detriment of the miners and the unity of trade unions.

Summing up the news conference, Mr. Eugen Tamas also added that the Mining Trade Union Federation of Romania has to continue peaceful dialogue and to cooperate with the executive. He also stressed that actions such as the miners' incursions should not take place any more.

'Disintegration' of State Agriculture Deplored

92P20176A Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 4 Mar 92 pp 1-2

[Article by St. Dorgosan: "The Disintegration of State Agriculture—Without Anesthesia"]

[Text] We believe that the title says everything. Or almost everything, in light of the fact that our readers became acquainted with this subject in its germination phase, in the new economic and legislative structures created after December 1989.

In the middle of 1990, at the moment in which the first disharmonies between production costs and market prices were showing up, that is, at the time of the first

signs of inflation, we published the article "State Agriculture on the Verge of Bankruptcy". We took our next major position at the time of the parliamentary debates on the land law, which, from the very beginning, caused great turmoil in the activity of the State Agricultural Enterprises [IAS].

"Indeed," Radu Constantinescu told us, "there has been and there still is great confusion since the enterprises are considered to be remnants of socialist agriculture, intentionally omitting the technical-economic and production aspects which they not only possess but also have exclusively in their domain. On the political level, in order to obtain electoral capital, the dissolution of the IAS means the elimination of an obstacle to the market economy—an idea which is completely false. We, workers in this area, have been proposing scenarios for transition to the market economy since May 1990 but we have not had any audience in the government until January of this year. We have supported, with arguments, the need for the existence of this sector which, I repeat, represents an economic pawn, not a political pawn!"

Here is some evidence supporting the assertion of Eng. Radu Constantinescu. Although they hold 17 percent of the agricultural land, in 1991, the commmercial companies created on the structures of the former IAS provided 74 percent of the eggs, 18 percent of sheep's milk, 43 percent of cows' milk, 32 percent of the beef, 74 percent of the pork, 55 percent of the lamb, 90 percent of the poultry, 37 percent of the fruit, 35 percent of the grapes, 22 percent of the vegetables, 70 percent of the soybeans, 17 percent of the sunflower, 20 percent of the beans, and 21 percent of the wheat and rye. Aside from the fact that some people intentionally "become weary" from these figures, they point to an indisputable truth: In all civilized states, there is an agricultural sector in the state domain which acts as a buffer of social protection between the fluctuations of private agriculture (economic recessions, catastrophic calamities, research and production of biological materials, etc.) and the vital necessities, the urgent consumer needs of the population. Certainly, if there is no intervention now, at the 13th hour, on the basis of the land law, the former IAS will be in the same well-known situation as the former agricultural production cooperatives [CAP], that is, total bankruptcy. Otherwise, in accordance with a basic statistical situation, by virtue of the aforementioned law, almost 540,000 hectares of land belonging to the former IAS appear as registered in the name of some owners (on the basis of much discussed actions which have not yet become final from a legal point of view or from the point of view of economic rights—a situation which is creating much confusion and giving rise to abuses!). About 40,000 hectares of land have been occupied illegally by "owners" who assert their position only by the argument of force. Also, in many former IAS enterprises, there have been thefts and swindles and other violations generated by the lack of the legal and economic framework to protect this immense wealth to which no one can claim the right.

Here is something which sometimes is overlooked, because it is known by very few people: The former IAS enterprises have contributed substantially in the past 10 years to liquidating Romania's foreign debts. This is why foreign partners insistently seek to collaborate with them, especially under present economic conditions which are favorable to them, with the brutal devaluation of the national currency.

It seems that there are solutions for recovery, but they are languishing in governmental or ministerial files in the hope that some people can still profit from this chaos by destroying the former IAS like the former CAP, with a certain profit, of course. Our newspaper has presented many examples of fraud and blackmail, so we will not give any details now. The important things are more painful for us: Fodder supplies are nearly exhausted, fall plowing has not been completed yet because there was not enough diesel oil, the number of animals in the livestock sector has decreased drastically, the production of seeds for 1992 is in danger, research and education (funded mostly by the former Department for State Agriculture) are in great danger and, although a collective labor contract has been concluded (a minimum monthly wage of 9,500 lei), there are serious signs of the appearance of unemployment in the large animal husbandry complexes where pork and poultry are produced.

And finally, another piece of information: It seems that some land holders, dissatisfied with their collaboration with some associations, have been moving toward collaboration with former IAS whose technical potential is still high. This is not a bad thing but let us emphasize, once again, the lack of adequate legislation, a situation which can foster abuses and illegal dealings. The application of the land law in this sector has not yet been explained (a year after it went into effect!). This is a disturbing sign along with many others.

International

Draft Agreement on UNPROFOR Discussed

LD2503000792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2300 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 24 (TANJUG)—A draft agreement between the United Nations and Yugoslavia on the status of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for Yugoslavia was the chief topic of a talk in Belgrade today between member of the Yugoslav State Presidency and Chairman of the State Committee for Cooperation with the U.N. Borisav Jovic, and UNPROFOR officials.

The UNPROFOR delegation was headed by UNPROFOR director for civilian matters Cedric Thornberry. A statement released by the Presidency of Yugoslavia says that the mutually initiated meeting discussed questions of the deployment of UNPROFOR police... and the functioning of the state and legal system in the U.N. protected areas (UNPAS).

The Yugoslav and UNPROFOR officials also discussed the question of tracing the borders of the UNPAS, which is seen as a priority task at this stage in the implementation of the U.N. peace plan for Yugoslavia. The brunt of UNPROFOR troops will be deployed in the Serb-populated regions of the breakaway Republic of Croatia, where Serbs last year proclaimed their Republic of Serb Krajina, in response to Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia. Earlier this month, the Krajina parliament ruled that Yugoslav federal laws should be in operation in the territory of Krajina.

The statement specifies that a high level of understanding and cooperation came to light on all questions and it was agreed that similar meetings be held in the future in the interest of a successful deployment of the U.N. operation.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Presidency Mobilizes Territorial Defense Units

LD2403202892 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1826 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 24 Mar (TANJUG)—The Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency today called on the republican government to immediately form and dispatch a mixed group which will do all that it can, in cooperation with the Yugosolav People's Army [JNA] and the EC observer mission, to defuse the situation and seek effective solutions in the municipalities of Gorazde, Visegrad, Bosanski Brod, Mostar, Neum, and elsewhere.

A statement from the Presidency session, which examined the political and security situation, goes on to say that at the request of the Gorazde municipality, approval has been given for the mobilization of a number units of territorial defense with the special purpose of securing vital installations and the safety of citizens in the region.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has been asked to cooperate with the JNA in securing the return of the Sarajevo Radio-Television transmitter on (Mount) Trovrh in the Gorazde municipality, which was seized by a group of armed persons, the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency stresses. The presidency demands the removal of all barricades and the prevention in the future of any disruption to traffic, the seizure of buildings by force, and threats to the lives of citizens and to their property.

The statement also says that the presidency rejects as unacceptable biased assessments of its work as are contained in the letter of the Second Army District command to each member of the presidency individually and in the statement of 23 March, and all other qualifications of this kind relating to the way the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency functions and works. According to the republican constitution, the presidency is only accountable in its work to the assembly and to the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the statement says.

Izetbegovic on Cantonization Position

LD2503110392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0857 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 25 Mar (TANJUG)—Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency and chairman of the Democratic Action [SDA] party said in an interview with OSLOBODJENJE and VECERNJE NOVINE today that his personal position on cantonization in Bosnia-Hercegovina "was and is negative."

Asked why he accepted "the paper" during talks with the leaders of the other two ruling national parties, through EC mediation, Izetbegovic said:

"I had some very difficult times during these talks. My associates and I spent long hours, very long hours, in Brussels and Sarajevo trying to prove to the people we were talking to that ethnic territorialization is not a solution for Bosnia-Hercegovina, that Bosnia is indivisible, that ethnic division does not suit any of our nations, that the Bosnia-Hercegovina public rejected this idea, that this is not wanted by all those who love Bosnia and who understand us. It was no use. We remained isolated."

According to him, "European mediators told us that they fully understood us, but then they said: You will have to accept it because the representatives of the other two nations insist on this very idea." [passage omitted]

"Should we have persisted with our negative stance, the question of the international legal recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which as a result of patient work at home and abroad is now almost within our reach, would have been in jeopardy. There was also a danger that the work of the conference would be adjourned because of our lack of cooperaton. We were not told this explicitly, but this was clearly what we could read between the lines," the SDA leader claims.

Finally, since the Europeans played their card and since the status of the future Bosnian army has been resolved, "we conditionally accepted the paper," Izetbegovic said during his meeting with the journalists of the two Sarajevo dailies, explaining that the word "conditionally" means that nothing has been finally agreed on and that the people must decide about the EC proposal in a referendum.

HDZ Criticizes Maps on Republic's Division

LD2403162392 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1145 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 24 Mar (TANJUG)—The Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] of Bosnia-Hercegovina considers that various maps presenting the so-called division of Bosnia-Hercegovina that have been published after the last round of political talks on the internal organization of the republic are of speculative nature, the new HDZ spokesman Miroslav Parameta stressed at a regular HDZ news conference, adding that these maps have caused unnecessary confusion among the nations.

The paper which was under discussion at the last meeting between the three parties in Sarajevo should undergo some corrections, Parameta added. Because nothing is over, the ethnic criterion is not the only one; there are economic, geographic, and other important criteria which have to be taken into consideration, he stressed.

Bosnia-Hercegovina's HDZ will not give up its original stance regarding an independent and undivided Bosnia-Hercegovina, which was confirmed by a recent referendum on the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Parameta stressed. That is the reason why the HDZ has not drawn up any maps of the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina, nor will it do so. The proposed map would leave the Croats without a single bigger town, without hospitals, universities, without the seat of two dioceses, out of 19 Franciscan monasteries only four would remain within the so-called Croatian canton. In short, Croats would be the biggest losers in the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina, he holds, and therefore the HDZ is for the preservation of Bosnia-Hercegovina as a civilizational entity.

In the course of this week the Bosnia-Hercegovina HDZ will clarify many issues in detail at meetings of its regional committees in Grude, Travnik, Derventa, and Sarajevo at a meeting of its deputies to the republican parliament and at a session of the HDZ Presidium ahead of talks between the three national parties in Brussels, Parameta stated. He said that these meetings will also discuss the public statements of some Croatian intellectuals in Bosnia-Hercegovina and criticism of the HDZ stands in these talks so far.

The date of the Bosnia-Hercegovina HDZ convention should be set at the next session of the party presidium, he said. So far, according to the HDZ statute, 2 April was frequently mentioned, two months after the resignation of HDZ Chairman Stjepan Kljuic, but it seems that the date is not yet certain.

Croatia

Legal System Not To Apply To Serbian Areas

LD2403180792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1226 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 24 (TANJUG)—Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Milan Ramljak confirmed that the legal order of this breakaway Yugoslav republic would not be effective in the Serbian areas in Croatia under United Nations Protection (UNPA) until otherwise decided, the Belgrade daily POLITIKA writes today.

Ramljak is the first Croatian senior official who voiced this fact, little known to the Croatian public. He confirmed it in a statement published by the Croatian press yesterday, POLITIKA writes. Ramljak said that, at the moment, it is not possible for the Croatian political and legal systems to be applied in UNPA because the United Nations maintains that this would prejudice a political solution. Ramljak heads the working group for supporting the U.N. peace operation in Croatia.

The territories, however, will also not be controlled by Serbia or Yugoslavia, because Croatia is of the opinion that this would also prejudice a political solution, Ramljak underscored and noted that a "halfway solution" must be found. The Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted a provision last week, under which the legal and constitutional order of Yugoslavia will be effective in Serbian regions in Croatia.

Under the Yugoslav parliament decision, the federal and Serbian order will remain in effect until a political solution is found for the territories. The majority Serb population proclaimed these territories a republic and called a referendum at which it voted to remain in Yugoslavia after Croatia seceded.

Ramljak said he was personally for the federal order in UNPA for a certain period of time because that was "reality".

President of the executive board of the ruling Croatian party—the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)—Stipe Mesic, however, threatened that, although it was for a peaceful solution, Croatia would take over power on all of its territory. He said it would employ force if it had to—POLITIKA writes, carrying the Croatian press reports on Mesic's address to a Croatian gathering in Paris. Mesic, formerly the president of the Yugoslav State Presidency, held the post of Croatian prime minister in August, 1990. He then sent a convoy of armored police vehicles to Knin, the center of the region populated mostly by Serbs, which was the reason for the conflict between the Croatian authorities and Serbs.

Paraga Criticizes Bosnia Cantonization Plan

LD2403235492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2207 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Zagreb, 24 Mar (TANJUG)—"The cantonization of Bosnia and Hercegovina is directed against the interests of the Croatian people, but as long as there is a Croatian Party of Rights [Hrvatska stranka prava—HSP], cantonization will not pass," said HSP President Dobroslav Paraga at a news conference tonight. He stressed that in Bosnia and Hercegovina this party was "stronger than the HDZ" [Croatian Democratic Community]. The HOS [Croatian Defense Forces, military wing of HSP] rules in Herceg-Bosna, where they have taken over all strategic points, it was said.

"There is no chance of Neum, which is defended exclusively by HOS units, being taken, and all approaches to western Hercegovina are under control with the exception of Mt. Hum," said HSP military commander Mile Dadakovic.

Asked by journalists about the UN peacekeeping forces, the HSP representatives stressed that they are against their presence in Croatia. The arrival of the blue helmets, it was said, only sanctions the existing situation, which is unfavorable for Croatia. After noting that "they are not defending the Ustasha order," the HSP representatives announced they will mark 10 April, the day of the Independent State of Croatia, in 45 towns in Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina. Croatian conciliation and "a scholarly reevaluation of World War II" are the objectives of the observance, it was said.

Figures on National Minorities' Casualties

LD2503020892 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] A session of the commission for the protection and improvement of equality of nations and nationalities was held today under the chairmanship of Croatian Assembly President Zdravko Domljan. According to the latest figures, it was stressed at the session, 7,000 Hungarians have been evicted, while 48 were either killed or are considered missing. Since the beginning of the war 42 Czechs have been killed, and there were several Slovaks among casualties in Ilok, Jelisavac, Mirkovci, and Josipovac. As members of the Croatian National Guard Corps, 142 Austrians and Germans have been killed, while 161 have been taken to prison camps. Several Ruthenians and Ukrainians have perished, but figures are incomplete.

The Croatian Government charged the office for interethnic relations to keep collecting details regarding the location and suffering of national minorities in the war.

UN Officers, Town Residents Under Attack

LD2403165892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1532 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Erdut, March 24 (TANJUG)—Officers of the United Nations protection forces for Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) in Beli Manastir and residents of this town in Baranja spent the entire night in shelters because of an artillery attack launched by Croatian forces. Baranja is a predominantly Serb populated region in the east of the breakaway Yugoslav Republic of Croatia.

The 100 or so shells fired on the town and its surroundings from the direction of Osijek caused extensive material damage, but there were no casualties. TANJUG learns from the Erdut-based Ministry of Information of the Serb region of Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem that the attack was suspended after the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) intervened via a special telephone line but that a new artillery and mortar attack was launched only 15 minutes later on other towns in Baranja, north of Osijek. About 300 shells were fired on these targets.

Late last night, JNA units repelled an attack by Croatian forces from the direction of Osijek on the town of Kopacevo in Baranja. One member of the Baranja territorial defence forces was lighlty wounded in the exchange.

Truce was also violated last night in Eastern Slavonia, when Croatian forces opened artillery and mortar fire along the entire frontline. Three members of the territorial defence forces of Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem were wounded.

Late last night, artillery fire was opened on another two towns in the region, but there were no casualties. All attempts to contact the Croatian side on the "hotline" were in vain. The attacks were repelled by the JNA and the territorial defence of this Serb region in Croatia.

JNA Releases Nine Croatians Captives

LD2403151292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1450 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Bileca, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—Members of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] today released nine members of Croatian forces captured last December outside Slano, near Dubrovnik. The captured Croats were handed over at Blace, on the Stolac to Bileca road. The handing-over was arranged by the International Red Cross. The JNA did not set any conditions for the release of the prisoners. Military sources say that there is no evidence that the nine committed any crimes, or that they fired at the JNA. At the handover point the prisoners were met by their relatives and representatives of the Red Cross organization of Ploce, where all nine were mobilized into the Croatian Army.

JNA Denies Assasination Attempt on Babic

LD2503000892 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2007 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Excerpt] Belgrade, 24 Mar (TANJUG)—The Belgrade-based bureau of the Republic of Serb Krajina announced today that it had been "authorized to publicize a statement from the office of President Milan Babic to the effect that a JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] officer carried out an assassination attempt against Milan Babic, president of the Republic of Serb Krajina, in Knin at about 2100 last night," the bureau says.

Reacting to the allegation, the Knin Corps Command issued a statement this evening saying that "the assassination attempt against Milan Babic is pure insinuation and a perfidious political game with a specific purpose."

"No assassination attempt was made. Last night at about 2100 a Winchester .357 Magnum went off accidentally in Milan Babic's sitting room. At the time a visitor, Dr. Babic, and his young son were examining the gun, which went off as it was being placed on the floor. The bullet hit the ceiling."

The visitor, Zdravko Vranjes, a reserve second lieutenant in the territorial defense forces, is a personal friend of the Babic family and has visited Babic's house many times. [passage omitted]

Babic Issues Statement

LD2503113692 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0025 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Knin, 24 Mar (TANJUG)—Late last night Milan Babic issued a statement in connection with a statement of the Knin Corps Information Service, which denies that an assassination attempt on Babic had been carried out. Babic's statement, which stresses that the corps' information service absolutely prejudges the outcome of the investigation, says:

"Around 2000 GMT on 23 March, a Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] officer in uniform and carrying a gun entered my apartment. I knew him by his surname, Svajo, and he had been to my place twice before with some friends, but it was strange that this time he was coming at that hour and armed with the gun. When I asked him why he was carrying the gun and how it happened that my security guards allowed him to bring it in, he replied that it was a Winchester gun loaded with 10 bullets, and that he had threatened to kill my security guards at the entrance. He showed me a dum-dum bullet and loaded his gun with it aiming at me.

I was in the company of my guests— Branko Mirkovic, Ljubica Solaja, and her husband Milan Solaja. My wife and son were in the same room. I warned him to move his gun; he slightly moved it away from me and fired it, hitting the ceiling. Then he left my apartment in silence. His complete behavior did not seem irrational.

I already knew that he belonged to a unit [formerly] under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Spanovic, now Col. Djukic. I informed Major Cosic, the head of the Knin Corps Security Services, who promised to institute an investigation.

However, at 1930 GMT on 24 March the Knin Corps Information Service issued a statement giving a complete political qualification of the event, saying that no criminal act has been committed. This qualification is not based on an investigation. Instead of letting judicial bodies deal with the case, the Corps Information Service absolutely prejudged the outcome of investigation.

Therefore, the following legal questions arise:

—Why does the statement of the Corps Information Service exclude any further investigation?

—Who, apart from judicial bodies, has the right to exclude every possibility that a criminal act has been committed?

—Why is the Corps so biased to the benefit of the suspect; it draws conclusions on the basis of its own opinion, not on the basis of facts, which in this case can only be established by investigative judicial bodies.

This all shows that the statement of the Corps is aimed at causing confusion in the whole case, thwarting investigation, and not establishing the truth," Milan Babic's statement says in conclusion.

Knin Bureau in Belgrade Ordered Closed

AU2503092292 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Mar 92 p 7

[Report by G. Katic: "Directive Remains Unsigned"]

[Text] Belgrade—The representatives of the newly elected "Vukovar Government" should have taken over the rooms of the Bureau of the Republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] (Terazije 3) mid-day yesterday. This act was supposed to have been conducted by Inspector Vucinic, Simon Djuretic, member of the Serbian Government in the Ministry for Serbs Living Outside Serbia, three policemen (two in civilian clothes), and witnesses Boro and Andjelka Lezajic. Slavko and Nenad Prijic, who were supposed to be future heads of the Bureau, were also present. However, since the executors had no written directive, the current employees of the Bureau, among whom were Caslav Ocic, Jovan Radulovic, Boro Rasuo, and Zdenko Tosic, did not allow a takeover, and the situation turned very nasty for a moment. The takeover was postponed for several hours, while the inspector went to consult his "superiors" about the written directive.

Although journalists were not allowed into the building in Terazije 3, the entrance to which was guarded by a uniformed policeman checking those going in, at around

1300 [1200 GMT] BORBA journalists managed to get to the locked door of the Bureau on the first floor.

"In simple terms, the things that have been happening in the RSK, that is, dictatorship, and political and military control over those poor people, is exactly what Milosevic and his people are doing to our little Bureau," said Jovan Radulovic, ex-minister of foreign affairs in the government of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, and added:

"All we are asking is that the Republic of Serbia officially and by signature stand behind this action of theirs, either at the republican or city level, it makes no difference. The official leadership of Serbia wants to put us again in the position of an ethnic minority in Croatia, and that is the reason why they brought into the Bureau people who are still on the paylist of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Croatia, and Racan's people, who, as members of the Party of Democratic Changes, have lost in the elections.

Boro Rasuo, the present (Babic's) Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RSK, told us that two nights before he had spoken to minister Stanko Cvijan, who apparently promised him that he would not get involved in the dispute. However, yesterday morning he found Djuretic, the advisor in Cvijan's Ministry, in front of the Bureau, and that indicated, Rasuo said, a very glaring involvement in the dispute.

"I regard this as a political, not a police matter," Rasuo went on, "and it can only be discussed on the principle of the rule of law. All we ask the Serbian authorities is that they behave according to the law. We in the Bureau are ready to follow the directive of the people, but not the directive of the putschists in Borovo Selo, who are puppets in the hands of the Belgrade neo- communist regime."

Milan Ivanic, vice president of the (Babic's) RSK Assembly, told us that he was shown a document with the RSK seal. But since the seal is still in the Secretariat in Knin, and has not yet been given to anyone, Ivanic believes that this was a forgery.

We have learned that Nenad Prijic is the new Secretary of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs in Knin, and Slavko Prijic is an assistant at the College of Political Science in Zagreb.

Text of Krajina Assembly Meeting

92BA0647D Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 10 Mar 92 pp 26-27

[Transcript of the meeting of the Great People's Assembly of the Republic of Krajina in Borovo Selo: "The New President's Oath"]

[Text] The Croatian public rarely receives reports on what is happening on the other side of the front, in the occupied parts of Croatia. DANAS is publishing as an exclusive, on the basis of a tape recording, parts of the debate in the third meeting of the Great People's Assembly of the so-called Republic of Krajina, held recently in Borovo Selo. After the first meeting, held in Glina, at which what until that time had been the Serbian oblasts unified to form the so-called Republic of Krajina, and the second meeting, in which the Babic leadership was replaced, the third meeting in Borovo Selo focused on election of the president of the Republic. As is usually the case, several names were in the running. Goran Hadzic, Budimir Kosutic, Borislav Mikelic, Milan Babic... were mentioned as candidates. Election of a president was supposed to signify the end of the split. Representatives of the Serbian Assembly and of the Semberija SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] also attended as guests, among them Budimir Kosutic and Jugoslav Kostic, a member of the truncated Yugoslav Presidency. After the business item on the agenda, the introductory address, the debate and adoption of amendments to the Krajina Constitution, which had been adopted in the previous meeting, and the constitutional law implementing the amendments, the meeting moved on to election of the president.

Immediately after the chair opened debate on election of the Presidency of RK [Republic of Krajina], Ilija Koncarevic asked for the floor:

"The opinion of the Assembly of the SAO of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, of all its 100 deputies, is that before the new parliamentary elections are scheduled, which, God willing, will be coming very soon, we nominate Mr. Goran Hadzic for president of the Republic. We are nominating him because he is a well-known Serbian fighter, because when no one in these parts dared to agree to be chairman of the first committee of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], which led this cause in this area, at that time Goran Hadzic agreed to be chairman of that committee, and that is when his fight began for the rights of the Serbian people. In that struggle of his, he felt the Ustasha power and he still has on his hands the traces of the chains with which he was bound on 31 March when he was returned from Obrovac from the meeting of the Main Committee of the Democratic Party. I think that I express the will of the majority when I say that in his work up to now he has really demonstrated that we can entrust this to him, and let the new parliamentary elections show whether he deserved it."

Following Koncarevic's statement, through an oversight of the chair, there was a vote that should have been taken before on passage of the law to implement the constitutional amendments, and then the increasingly verbose debate resumed concerning election of a president. We were unable to identify some of the participants because in the heat of debate the chair did not introduce them, and they themselves paid even less attention to that. Because the material was so voluminous, we chose only a part of the discussion. At one point, a deputy from Vojnic asked for the floor and said:

"Because you did not sufficiently understand me when I spoke the first time, at this point I would like to be clearer. Neither as a man nor as a deputy do I have a mandate or authority to vote today in this kind of euphoria, to vote for president of the Republic (din and displeasure in the hall). Please, I knew exactly what the response would be to what I said. But I said that intentionally. Gentlemen, I am expressing the views of the deputies of Vojnic Opcina and the conclusions and decision of the Vojnic Opcina Assembly. Are we adhering to the Constitution of the Serbian Krajina? We are not adhering to that Constitution and we are working in a state of euphoria, both in Knin and also in Slavonia, you see, and in Glina, and that is why on grounds of principle the deputies of Vojnic Opcina, regardless of who is in question, will not vote either on the government or on the president of the Republic. And we propose immediate elections, and then we will probably, not probably, but certainly, make our full contribution. I really apologize to Mr. Goran Hadzic as a person, because we do know him, and those who do not know him have heard of him, and it really is unpleasant for me to have to say something like this from this podium when it concerns him. We accord him every respect and gratitude for everything he has done for the Serbian people, but I do not allow people to play with my mind and my brain."

And then another unidentified participant in the debate began with this observation: "I am afraid that certain tones of discord have begun to prevail. We have seen two assemblies in Krajina, we again see here certain local interests. Goran is my dear friend. We started out together, and I consider him a man who could do this job, but I would make another proposal. I think that at this point we must have a man who will be a cohesive factor among all of us. A man who will undoubtedly enjoy the confidence of everyone, who will be capable in these difficult moments to defend by legal means and certainly by other means everything that we have and to lead us in the future. Regardless of all the other duties, I nominate for president of the RK Prof. Budimir Kosutic (applause), and I think that this ought to be one of his patriotic tasks because he comes from this region. He is from the Krajina. That is all I have to say."

The chair immediately reacted: "There is an explanation we must make here. Mr. Paspalj and I were the first people to have a talk with Dr. Kosutic on this matter. However, precisely because the Serbian people need him in another post, and that is a very, very important post, because of the influence of the Jews in this world, Mr. Kosutic has agreed to be our ambassador to the state of Israel. He was very much honored when that conversation took place; however, that was the reason why he could not accept, which does not mean that one day he will not be president of this Republic. That is all I had to say, but I would call upon Professor Kosutic to speak."

Budimir Kosutic, who in the debate of the previous item had been called upon to express his judgment whenever there was a difference of opinion and opposing views, once again went to the rostrum and spoke: "We find ourselves in an exceptional moment in which the Serbian people is on the one hand in a situation of realizing its historical synthesis, while on the other it faces numerous dangers, so to speak, the greatest of which is one that could come from internal divisions. It is clear that we are nevertheless a relatively small people when we look at the dangers we confront.... We have been subjected to exceptional dangers. There are reasons here why our growth rate is negative and why in these moments, precisely because we face numerous external dangers, we must avoid every kind of internal division. And that is why I will say what also President Koncarevic said, "we do not need unity, but we do need concord." And that is why at this moment, it seems to me as I look at the entire situation of the Serbian people, both in the Serbian Republic Krajina and also in B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina], where our people live in their Serbian republic, and also in Serbia, we face certain tendencies which lead to disunity. We see that people emerge with the best intentions who think that they see better and more and who are ready to make certain moves which are not always the best. I say: It is a good thing that we all want to think, but it is not good if we think that what we consider to be best is the only correct thing and for that reason we want to struggle to the end.

"At this moment, I must say that it is not so, as is often said, that we face defeat and since we face defeat, we must make changes that will bring about a change in the entire government, and so it is said that this ought to be done in the Republic of Serbia. And people give speeches to the effect that the Serbian people has been tricked, and it turns out that those who have been leading it have deceived it. Before I set out on my trip, I was in the Republic of B-H, and while I was there I took note of what should be done and what should not be done. But the Serbs did what should not have been done, and for that reason the representatives of the Serbian Republic Krajina wrote a letter pointing out the fact that a position exists that the majority of the Serbian people support, but another position also exists. We do not need that. And I say all this for the simple reason that we must find a solution here and now on which we can all agree, or one on which those who are left in the minority will respect the position of the majority, because, as you know, I have never once been in a situation of not agreeing with everything that happened or that was proposed. It is certain that the president of the Serbian Republic Krajina, Milan Babic, deserves a great deal of credit, just as it is equally certain that he has committed mistakes. And I have said that that also applies to me, because I believe I have also done some things that were good, just as I have done some things that were not good or which others have found not to be good. I can imagine that those others who so judge are not right, but that is not essential. I would not consent to be president of the Serbian Republic Krajina. These are my reasons: First, I think that the president of the Serbian Republic Krajina should precisely be a man who from the first day, in this territory and in this space, has given everything of

himself so that the Serbian people could truly defend itself against the new attempt at genocide which they have tried to commit against it and, as you know, this neofascist government in Croatia has committed grave crimes. Accordingly, this should be someone who from the first day, here in this region of the Serbian Republic Krajina, has led activities and the struggle. As you know, I have not been the one who led these activities; I was born in Serbia. I hope that one day we will again be in one state, in the right way, just as we are now, because we do not recognize the act of secession, that is, we do not recognize that the Serbian lands can be outside the joint state, and we will, of course, see what happens to its borders. We will see about that.

"I have said that I value the constructive things which Babic has done, and they are considerable, just as I am sorry about what he did and certain things that he could have done better or did not do. But I must likewise say that in spite of all that we have to find a way and a space for those deputies who are in Knin to also come to this Assembly. It seems to me that there are 15 of them, who should come, and I also think, and this is something we have not done up to now, that we should create the conditions for all who have entered the struggle, regardless of the posts they hold, to remain together. You know that there has been a reconstruction of the government of Serbia and that I did not stay on as deputy prime minister. So what does that mean? It does not mean anything. Accordingly, if the president of the Serbian Republic Krajina is Goran Hadzic or Milan Babic or whoever you choose, I think that one or the other and everyone must remain loyal to the Serbian cause, never to depart from it, never to seek any collaborators among those who do not think above all of the well-being of the Serbian people, but operate in some other way."

Following Kosutic's speech, everything turned in the expected direction, and Goran Hadzic was elected president of the Republic of Krajina. And however much all of that, proclamation of the republic, the Assembly, adoption of the Constitution, seemed unreal and grotesque, Goran Hadzic took the oath before the deputies in the Assembly: "I swear by almighty God that I will devote all my strength to preserving the sovereignty and integrity of the territorial Serbian Republic Krajina, to realizing the national interests of the Serbian people, human and civil liberties and rights, to respect and defense of the Constitution and law, to preservation of the peace and prosperity of the Serbian people and of all citizens, and that I will discharge all my duties conscientiously and responsibly."

Conditions Set for 'Normalization' of Krajina

92BA0667D Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Mar 92 p 7

[Article by M. Cetnik: "There Is No Dualism of Authority in Krajina"]

[Text] Knin, 12 Mar—The authorities and the people of Krajina must resolve a number of new issues when the protective forces of the United Nations are stationed on its territory. A condition for normalization of the situation is that all economic capacities be started up and political unity be achieved.

That is the essence of the views set forth in a press conference in the Knin JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] Center by Krajina officials elected at the Assembly in Borovo Selo, Republic President Goran Hadzic, and Prime Minister Zdravko Zecevic. Milan Martic, Zeljko "Arkan" Raznjatovic, and others were present during the press conference.

In answer to the questions of the journalists, Goran Hadzic said that he had recently moved permanently to Knin and that he had met with the Kninian General Arap Rob, future commander of a brigade of the U.N. UNPROFOR in the southern sector of Krajina. Evaluating the description of duality of authority in Krajina, Goran Hadzic said that this observation applies only to Knin Opstina and that it is a question of the "megalomania of a group of people." The government elected in Borovo Selo, Hadzic said, has no contact with Dr. Milan Babic, although, in his estimation, Babic's administration has the same political objective, which is: that Krajina be outside Croatia.

Asked whether the post of foreign minister in Zecevic's government has been reserved for Dr. Milan Babic, Hadzic said, acknowledging Babic's political merits, that Milan Babic is "welcome."

In stating his position on these issues, Zecevic emphasized that he is personally against repressive measures and that time is the best sieve for political disagreements, and that the foreign minister must be a professional. In a lengthy speech, Zecevic especially emphasized the need to activate economic facilities in agriculture, tourism on the Plitvice Lakes, and other sectors which do not require major investments.

"The task of the government," Zecevic said, "is to receive and accommodate the so-called urban Serbs in Krajina and the return of the refugees from Serbia." He mentioned in that context the settlement of Novigrad with Serbian refugees from Zadar, Sibenik, and Split, which is being carried out in cooperation with the International Red Cross. Novigrad and Karin Bays, Zecevic believes, should become the waters of the Serbian Republic Krajina. He especially emphasized the difficult position of 27,000 Serbs from Zadar, who have extremely valuable property in that city which has been partially destroyed and whose owners have mainly fled. Zadar, Zecevic said, must become a free city, and by no means a Croatian city, because, Zecevic emphasized, Zadar has not been a part of Croatia since the year 1002. The tasks of the government are also to prevent the squandering of public property and to speed up the judicial processing of wartime speculation and corruption. Resumption of rail service from Croatia through

the Knin junction and similar questions will be resolved, Zecevic said, on the principle of reciprocity, that is, mutual payment of services between Krajina and Croatia.

Asked to comment on the things that happened in the recent meeting of the Brussels conference and certain statements by the Serbian foreign minister, Goran Hadzic rejected any possibility of Krajina becoming part of the framework of the Croatian state.

In conclusion, Hadzic and Zecevic said that Krajina authorities will support those political options in Serbia that have the majority of the electorate behind them.

[Box, p 7]

Letter of the Babic Government to Dr. Boutros Ghali

Knin, 12 Mar—"The government of the Serbian Republic Krajina concludes that any resolution of the Yugoslav governmental and political crisis, at whatever level it might be verified, that does not respect the right of the Serbian people to self-determination carries with it a high risk and possibility of causing new disagreements and even conflicts in these areas, which, we hope, none of us would like to see."

This is the beginning of the letter that the Krajina government loyal to Babic sent from today's meeting in Knin to Dr. Boutros Ghali, president [as published] of the United Nations.

The letter, which was signed by Dr. Milan Babic, expressed the expectation that the world community and European Community will not allow the legitimate right of any principal in the Yugoslav governmental crisis to be neglected and destroyed in an undemocratic way. Any solution that in its final outcome is the result of an evasion of the rightful Serbian interest in the Krajina republic, and which for whatever reason is deemed at the moment opportune, effective, and "fair" in the long run by those who adopt it, the government feels, will prove to be untenable.

Macedonia

SFRY Dinar Still Valid in Republic

LD2403175392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1219 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 24 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will issue its own currency only after the new status of the state of Serbia and Montenegro has been cleared up, when the results of the European Conference on Yugoslavia are known, and the question of the division of state property and debts has been resolved, as the Government of Macedonia has set out in a letter to the National Bank of Yugoslavia board of governors.

Bearing in mind all these reasons, the government of Macedonia will propose to its Sobranie (parliament) monetary independence when the time is ripe. However, the whole task is not technically feasible in less than a month and a half, and that is by the end of April, writes today's daily BORBA.

The letter says that the National Bank of Macedonia representatives will continue their work as usual in the organs of the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

BORBA writes that the National Bank of Yugoslavia board of governors has adopted a decision to increase monetary control of the National Bank of Macedonia because of the possibility of Macedonia's monetary secession. This would include the setting up of a mixed work group which would control payment operations, the use of the monetary issue, and part of the hard currency transactions. The National Bank of Macedonia is of the view that there is no ground for the National Bank of Yugoslavia to undertake any kind of measures against Macedonia, said National Bank of Macedonia Governor Borko Stanoevski.

Government Subsidies for Press Considered

92BA0660B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Mar 92 p 10

[Article by Dragan Nikolic: "The Price of a Democratic Word"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] War between NOVA MAKEDONIJA and REPUBLIKA. Accusing NOVA MAKEDONIJA of closing down REPUBLIKA, Ljubisha Georgijevski is overlooking the basic fact of the dispute—that REPUBLIKA did not pay a single bill to the printing house in six months of publishing.

The Macedonian government is attempting to pacify "a flaming situation in the press"—with subsidies, for which it will allocate 190 million dinars from the budget. Blaze Ristovski, vice president of the Macedonian government, says that the government wishes, with this money, to help "the development of newspapers in Macedonia," and the Macedonian minister of information, Martin Trenevski, that the closing down of any newspaper means "the Macedonian media area will become poorer." According to the government concept, which has already been shown to media organs, the government would subsidize three daily newspapers, NOVA MAKEDONIJA, VECER, and REPUBLIKA, the weeklies EPOHA, ZBOR (REC), and PULS, and newspapers of the Albanian and Turkish nationalities (and perhaps others), as well as several district and other newspapers.

The government revealed its concept at the same time that the first protest meeting was held of the forum for freedom of the press of the director Ljubisa Georgijevski before the Assembly of Macedonia on the occasion of the closing down of the "first private and independent daily—REPUBLIKA," whose owner is the drama writer

Jordan Plevnes, who lives in Paris. According to Georgijevski, REPUBLIKA was silenced by NOVA MAKEDONIJA, and because of that it is necessary to "demonopolize" it—to take away its building and divide it equally among all the newspapers, and sever the ("federal") printing house and distribution from it, and submit this to the whole press, since, allegedly, "social" funds have been invested in all this. It is held that such a "dismantling" would be appropriate for the newspaper which, it seems, in six months of publishing, did not pay a single bill either to the printing firm of NOVA MAKEDONIJA or to the printing firm of PROSVETA in Kumanovo.

Ljubisa Georgijevski said that his forum is on the side of REPUBLIKA only because "the big ones beat up the little ones" and that he is on the side of the weaker one, and that who is guilty and who is right should be decided by a court, and not by his forum and him. Neglecting the unfavorable fact of the failure to pay a bill, as the central fact of the dispute, Georgijevski wants to transfer the whole situation to other indisputable waters of demonopolization. Up to now no one has disputed the right of REPUBLIKA to come out in the interest of "raising the level of competition, even if in his jargon and the typical party orientation" and "it does not contribute to the civilizing of the media area in Macedonia." It is said only that it is necessary to have money for that and that NOVA MAKEDONIJA is the last one that should provide it. At a time when the balance of forces is changing in Macedonia, and demonopolization and privatization are lagging, the slogans that have been heard ("Death to Communism—freedom to the people," "He who wants to ban REPUBLIKA today will want to ban MAKEDONIJA tomorrow," "The director of NOVA MAKEDONIJA is the heir to Ceausescu"...) suggest that "revolutionary radicalism" is attacking the Macedonian pluralistic scene. A spokesman for MAAK [Committee for All-Macedonian Action], Dragi Ivanovski, announced at a press conference the possibility of a new Macedonian "revolution of a proletarian nature," and Kiro Gligorov, turning to the women, that he is concerned about the fate of "fragile democracy." Every revolution, moreover, begins in such a way that it ceases to recognize laws and to respect stable norms.

Montenegro

More Border Incidents With Albania Reported

AU2503100292 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Mar 92 p 4

[C. Vukasinovic report: "Draft on Mount Prokletije"]

[Text] Titograd—It is still not clear how the incident came about on the border between Yugoslavia and Albania three nights ago, in which Miodrag Rackovic (25), a member of the special police force, was killed, and Inspector Zeljko Stamatovic was badly wounded, but the causes of this tragic event are quite clear. For some time now the Albanian side has not guarded its border, so the only dam against the stream of Albanians wanting to leave the "country of eagles" are the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] and the police force.

Pavle Bulatovic, minister of the Montenegrin police force, told us how much the border was endangered and how it was guarded.

"Due to the general situation in Albania, we had to take extra precautions for the security of the border," Bulatovic said. "The border is, of course, guarded by the JNA, while deep control of the border area is done by the police force. We have both had a lot of work recently."

Lately, the incidents have become more frequent and more serious. The duty-free shop on the border crossing Bozaj was broken into, and traces indicate that the goods were taken to the other side of the border. In Ulcinj, an Albanian murdered one of our ethnic Albanians, and then set him on fire, all in order to rob him of 300 German marks.

There is plenty of evidence, and individual cases, of this border being used for a lot of arms smuggling," Bulatovic said. "Taking into account the situation in both Albania and Yugoslavia, we have had to take serious measures in order to guard the border. Several routes used by the Albanians to cross the border have been discovered."

Albanian citizens cross the border by land and by sea. Not long ago, on lake Skadar, in campaign by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a whole convoy of boats was intercepted bearing about 50 sheep and ten calves. Livestock is used in exchange for food (flour, sugar, oil), washing powder, and other products not available in Albania. The Albanians on our side of the border, who often say that they are endangered, do not hesitate to take advantage of their "brothers". Under the pretext of family visits, they take these Albanians in to do heavy work on their farms for next to nothing, they sell their livestock cheaply, and when they have no more use for these "relatives," they send them back to Albania.

"The Committee for solving border incidents keeps asking the Albanian side to arrange border security according to international regulations, but, so far, there has been no response," said Bulatovic.

Meeting With JNA on 'Single Defense System'

LD2403195192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1828 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 24 (TANJUG)—The leaderships of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) met today for talks "on all key issues concerning organization of defence in keeping with the commitment of Serbia and Montenegro to a single defence system in a federal state," it was announced here today.

A statement released from the talks says that it was decided that experts from the republics of Montenegro and Serbia and the JNA prepare as soon as possible a

proposal for a single Yugoslav defence system. Serbia, Montenegro, the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Serb-populated regions in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina want to remain in a common state.

The new federation will have a single defence, foreign affairs, monetary system and market. The statement also says that "the army must at this early date move in the right direction in view of imminent major changes in the defence system."

An interest was exhibited in a greater engagement of the Montenegrin industry in military production. The participants in the talks also reviewed the latest international obligations of the federal bodies, the bodies in the republics of Montenegro and Serbia and the JNA in the quest for a political settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

Leaders Comment

LD2403223492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1559 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Mar (TANJUG)—Montenegrin leaders, including Presidency President Momir Bulatovic; Dr. Branko Kostic, vice president of the SFRY Presidency, Assembly President Dr. Risto Vukcevic, Premier Mile Djukanovic, and other members of the republican government, had talks today with Colonel General Zivota Panic, acting chief of general staff of the Yugoslav Armed Forces, and a group of generals from the Federal Secretariat for National Defense.

The statement on the talks says: "Views were exchanged on all important defense organization issues against the background of Serbia's and Montenegro's commitment to have a single defense structure in the federal state, on the basis of full equality of both republics. This requires that these issues are tackled both from a constitutional and from a legal point of view. Since major changes to the defense system are involved, in the context of which an important position attaches to the federal forces, it was decided that the army must start working on these solutions at this early stage. The need was stressed for greater involvement of Montenegrin industrial capacities in meeting the requirements of the armed forces.

It was decided that teams of experts, made up of representatives of the republics of Montenegro and Serbia and of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], should accelerate their work on preparing the proposals which will ensure a single defense system in Yugoslavia.

During the talks, special attention was paid to the commitments placed on federal, Montenegrin, and Serbian organs and also on the JNA by implementation of the UN peace plan, by the results of the conference on Bosnia-Hercegovina under the aegis of the EC, as well as by the overall results in the quest for a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis."

Prime Minister on Slovenia, Macedonia Recognition

AU2503092892 Titograd POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Mar 92 p 3

[TANJUG report: "Two Preconditions for Croatia"]

[Text] Sarajevo, 17 March—"We see no reason for Serbia and Montenegro to introduce a new currency. Our currency is the dinar," Milo Djukanovic, premier of Montenegro, said last night on TV Sarajevo's program "Klub 92."

He stressed that Serbia and Montenegro would protect themselves if Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro decided to leave the present monetary system. Asked if Montenegro would recognize ex-Yugoslav republics, Djukanovic said that the recognition of Slovenia and Macedonia by Montenegro was unconditional, but that in the case of Croatia there were two preconditions.

The first one, according to Djukanovic, is the redrawing of the border on the Prevlaka [peninsula], and the second is the guarantee of full security to the Serbian population in Croatia. The Montenegrin premier said that, as far as Bosnia-Hercegovina was concerned, Montenegro would respect any agreement and solution made by the three constituent nations of that republic.

Future Constitution of Republic Debated

92BA0667C Titograd POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Mar 92 p 4

[Article by B. Novakovic: "The Foundations of the New System"]

[Text] Titograd, 11 Mar—The foundations of the arrangement and operation of Yugoslavia as a joint state, the essence of which the citizens of Montenegro took a position on in the referendum, will be the backbone for drafting the new constitution of the Republic and the constitution of the future joint state. That is why a team of experts needs to be formed in the shortest possible time to write the first version of that document. Affirming that this is its commitment, the Constitutional Commission of the Republic parliament today proposed certain basic characteristics of that most important legal document.

After all, said Dr. Risto Vukcevic, its chairman, the favorable outcome of the referendum decided Montenegro's constitutional status in that it decided in favor of continuing life in the joint state. So that now that all the conditions have been brought about the drafting of the new constitution of Montenegro will now begin on the basis of a decision of the Republic Assembly (15 May 1991).

Dilemmas

But numerous dilemmas must be resolved before this job begins. And while it is certain that this will be a clear and

brief document that will be dedicated to a multiparty system, parliamentary democracy, civil rights and liberties, and the rule of law, it still is not clear whether the constitution of the joint state should first be drafted and then the Republic constitution, or whether these two documents can be adopted simultaneously. Opinions differ. Thus, Blagota Mitric and Dimitrije Bielica favor the drafting of the federal constitution, judging that the rights of the Republic derive from that document. They did not bypass the fact that there already exist the Bases for Regulation and Operation of Yugoslavia, which spell out the rights and powers of the republics, which are extremely broad, but, in their estimation, the "top down" order of things is still the more logical. Milos Radulovic, however, believes that we should first speed up the Republic constitution and only then draft the federal constitution. And the most frequent choice being expressed today would be for the two documents to be done simultaneously.

It is very essential, it was estimated today in the meeting, to form a team of experts who will draw up the first version of the constitution. While in the estimation of some participants Montenegro does not have sufficient legal theorists, the commitment is to a team which will include representatives of all the parliamentary parties. This, Miodrag Vukovic believes, will put in an equal position all the political options, and in this way there will be an abundance of ideas, and after that it is much easier to arrive at a consistent text. For Sefer Medjedovic, the need for the future Republic constitution to express Montenegro's specific character as compared to the other members in the joint state is an essential issue. The more faithfully the constitution reflects our reality, he feels, the greater the extent to which the constitution will be ours.

An Atypical Situation

Zoran Zizic, deputy prime minister, in whose judgment this constitution must spell out the status of ownership, sovereignty, and the degree of sovereignty to be transferred to the federal state, clarified some of the dilemmas concerning adoption of the federal constitution and its manner of adoption. At present, Zizic said, the situation is utterly atypical in this respect. Serbia has a Republic constitution, but Montenegro has yet to adopt a new document. That is why it is best to conduct a parallel effort of drafting both the federal and republic documents, but the possibility of first adopting the constitution of the joint state is not precluded. But there are impediments even here. After all, the essential thing to its adoption is to ensure the continuity of Yugoslavia (which can be achieved if the constitutional document is adopted by the present Federal Assembly) and its legitimacy. But that legitimacy does not exist because of the present status of the Federal Chamber. It is a fact that this problem can be surmounted legally, Zizic said, but for the moment there is no agreement as to which of the possible ways is to be used.

Concluding the debate, Dr. Risto Vukcevic said that our overall situation argues that we should work first to set up the state on new foundations, which will be done by the new constitution, which will guarantee civil rights and liberties, the rights and liberties of ethnic groups, and will establish a state based on a market economy, private enterprise, and the rule of law.

Facts on Referendum Detailed

92BA0667A Titograd POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Mar 92 p 5

[Unattributed article: "The Facts Are Different"]

[Text] Titograd, 11 Mar—Dear Mr. Gurare, thank you for your fax of 5 November 1991. In connection with the press release of the International Federation for the Rights of Man [IFRM], I inform you of the following:

The parliament of Montenegro debated the referendum on 18 and 23 January 1992. It decided at that time that in coming months all political parties (within and outside the parliament) would inform the citizens of Montenegro of their political views through the state-owned media. In any case, all important sessions of the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro are covered live by television.

Discussion of the referendum was organized by the republic election commission, which conducted preliminary multiparty elections; on that commission, the incumbent party has only two representatives. All the parliamentary parties received equal space in the state-owned media.

In a session held 24 February 1992, the Montenegrin parliament adopted a decision to hold a referendum on 1 March 1992. The embassies of all member countries of the EC, the embassies of the United States, the Russian Federation, and certain other states, and also the Conference on Yugoslavia and Lord Carrington personally were informed about the referendum question and the reasons for the decision to hold the referendum. This was a sign of our openness to foreign observers at that referendum.

The results of the referendum were announced in the report of the election commission and were signed even by representatives of the political parties which called for a boycott of the referendum. Full multiparty representation was ensured in the proceedings of the committees of voters, and not a single reproach of any importance was recorded concerning voting irregularities.

The electorate of the Republic of Montenegro numbers 421,548. There were 278,382 votes cast in the referendum (66.04 percent), 267,076 (95.94 percent) of them "for" continuation of life in a joint state—Yugoslavia, and 8,957 (3.22 percent) "against," with 0.85 percent of the ballots invalidated.

It is a complete falsehood that the state-owned media listed the names of persons who did not vote in the referendum.

It does not take very much goodwill and common sense to realize how nonsensical this assertion is.

The Citizens Forum of Montenegro has informed the public that it has about 400 members. Most of them held absolute power as communist officials for a long time, and they long ago lost the confidence of the citizens of Montenegro. This can be checked very easily if you are interested.

Finally, Montenegro sincerely wants to protect the body of human, ethnic, and civil rights of its inhabitants and to respect the universal declaration on human rights.

Therefore, with high estimation of all the efforts being made to that end, and thereby also for the role of the nongovernmental International Federation for the Rights of Man in Paris, I express amazement that you did not find it suitable to check your facts related to the referendum in Montenegro. I am certain that if you had examined the preparations, course, and results of the referendum that was held, the press release you issued would have had a completely different purport.

Financial, Monetary Trends Considered

92BA0667B Titograd POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Mar 92 p 5

[Article by B.R.: "January Was Also Positive"]

[Text] Titograd, 11 Mar—The faster rise of prices that began in November and December continued at a still stronger pace this January. That resulted in a rise of all types of revenues in the giro accounts of juridical persons in the economy. The accounts of these persons received 12,754 million dinars, or 366 percent more than in the same month of last year. The revenues which make up gross income this January have a 4.3-percent smaller share in total revenues than in the same month of last year. It can be concluded from this that the juridical persons were making up the shortage of funds by opening credits and taking other loans in the amount of 1,009 million dinars. It is logical that the structure of withdrawals from accounts also changed: Material costs, as always, are the most important item and amount to 8,408 million dinars, or 58.6 percent of total expenditures.

Movements in the inflow and outflow of funds in payment transactions between Montenegro and other republics show that this January Montenegro had a surplus of 589 million dinars. Only in payments with Bosnia and Hercegovina did Montenegro have a deficit of 298 million dinars. Montenegro had its largest surplus with Serbia, amounting to 744 million dinars, 407 million of which were with Serbia proper, 239 million with Vojvodina, and 95 million dinars with Kosovo and Metohija. There were no payments between Montenegro on the one hand and Slovenia and Croatia on the other.

Serbia

U.S. Ambassador Opens Pristina Exhibition

LD2403164992 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1820 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Pristina, 23 Mar (TANJUG)—U.S. Ambassador in Yugoslavia Warren Zimermann today opened an exhibition in Pristina organized to mark the 50th anniversary of the Voice of America [VOA].

Today VOA broadcasts over 20 hours of news daily in 47 languages. This radio station continues to broadcast even after the fall of communism, Zimermann said opening the exhibition. This was the first time for a long time that representatives of the political parties of Serbs and Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija could be seen at the same place.

The opening ceremony deviated from the agreed protocol and there was a great deal of confusion about the translation of Zimermann's address. Sucri Nimani, the interpreter, first translated the speech into Albanian and then into very bad Serbian. It has been unofficially learned that there was an argument between Miodrag Djuricic, the organizer, and Warren Zimermann and that the ambassador had apologized for the mistake.

In Pristina today Zimermann had separate talks with representatives of Albanian parties and of the provincial secretariat for education, science, and culture but although a statement was promised no statement has been forthcoming from any of the sides.

'Intellectuals' Lodge UN Protest Against Germany

LD2403135492 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1741 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Novi Sad, March 23 (TANJUG)—Representatives of lawyers, engineers and professors of Novi Sad today lodged a protest to the United Nations Security Council against Germany and Austria and their foreign ministers, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Alois Mock, respectively, over their gross "interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, with the intention to break it."

The memorandum points out Germany's and Austria's "political and economic violance" and "instigation and preparation of armed conflicts on ethnic and religious bases" in Yugoslavia. This causes major detriment to Yugoslavia, especially the Republic of Serbia, and threatens peace, warns the memorandum by intellectuals from the capital of Serbia's northern province of Vojvodina. The protest was also sent to U.N. Secretary General Butrus Ghali, the U.N. General Assembly and the United States President George Bush.

Draskovic Congratulates Albania's Berisha

LD2503095292 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0918 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Mar (TANJUG)—Vuk Draskovic, chairman of the Serbian Renaissance Movement, today congratulated Sali Berisha, Democratic Party of Albania president, on his victory. "I congratulate you most cordially on your victory. You have defeated communism and opened the door for the democratic, economic and general renewal of Albania. You achieved this yesterday, and, I hope, the democratic opposition will soon do the same in Serbia," Draskovic writes to Berisha.

Draskovic expressed the firm conviction that "a democratic Serbia and democratic Albania will establish good-neighborly relations based on broad cooperation between our two states and on the respect for the current borders and comprehensive rights of the Albanian minority in Serbia and the Serbian minority in Albania."

Slovenia

Carrington Arrives for Talks With Kucan

LD2403214592 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2000 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Lord Carrington, chairman of the conference on Yugoslavia, arrived on a visit to Slovenia tonight. After landing at Brnik airport he had a working dinner at Strmol Castle with his host, Milan Kucan, president of the Slovene Presidency. Yugoslavia's legal succession and the future work of the Brussels conference will be the main topic of Lord Carrington's talks with Slovene leaders .

Four Parties Attempt To Form New Coalition

92BA0665A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 11 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Veso Stojanov: "Attempted Political Coalition of Four Center Parties"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] The initiative has been taken up by three parties; the four have met and are urging at least one more of the large ones to join them; they are tacitly counting on the Reformers; with Dr. Joze Pucnik, nothing will change in the government.

Ljubljana, 10 Mar—After Lojze Peterle's unsuccessful attempts to strengthen the government coalition with two opposition parties, and after the former president of the Demos coalition, Dr. Joze Pucnik, stated in a DELO interview last Friday that the Social Democrats would not support Peterle's government, preparations began this week for what is already the third attempt this year to remove Peterle from his position as prime minister.

It is interesting that the initiative has been taken up this time by three parties that until recently were still participating in the government coalition and whose ministers are still attending government meetings. As we have been able to learn, there is to be another attempt this week to put together a minimal joint program for a new center coalition and to seek a new prime minister to head the government until the next elections.

After last night's meeting of representatives of these four parties, one could hear in party circles that the first "artistic impression" of the new center coalition was quite good.

After the joint formation of a new coalition program, which would emphasize most the issues of the amount and method of allocating the state budget, privatization, new electoral legislation, and several other less important matters, the programs of the Liberal Democratic Party [LDS] and the Slovene People's Party [SLS] would also constitute the core of the new coalition.

Without the participation and support of these two largest parliamentary parties, or at least one of them, the new center coalition, in fact, cannot count on the success of its initiative in the voting on a constructive vote of no confidence in Lojze Peterle's government.

As we were able to learn, there was not yet any mention last night of who the politician would be that would replace Lojze Peterle at the prime minister's desk until the elections. They may have agreed that they would begin concrete talks on the new prime minister only after the joint minimal program is finalized and after it is also known which parties will agree to participate in this new center coalition.

In spite of this, the names of five or six people who are supposed to be this coalition's possible candidates are circulating among the public. They are mentioning Igor Bavcar, Dr. Peter Tancig, Janez Jansa, Dr. Joze Pucnik, Dr. Janez Drnovsek, and possibly also Marjan Cetar. It is hard to predict which of the six the new coalition will choose. According to the information that we have gathered today, Dr. Peter Tancig and Igor Bavcar have the most chances. In all likelihood it will not be Janez Jansa, since he would not be supported by the Liberal Democrats and probably not by the Socialists either; also questionable would be the Reformers' tacit support, on which the creators of the new coalition are tacitly counting, although they are not being invited directly. Dr. Pucnik is likewise a questionable name, since we were told today by several representatives of the parties in the possible new coalition that they probably would not support him, since they do not know what could be changed in the government's policy with him.

Both of the largest parliamentary parties (the LDS and the SLS), for the time being, still have reservations about the new coalition. The SLS says that a broader center coalition is interesting, to be sure, but its primary task would have to be to make it possible for electoral legislation to be passed as soon as possible. The LDS also

thinks the same way. The fall of Peterle's government alone does not seem to them to be a sufficient goal, and consequently they will request that their interlocutors show them the new government's program. In their opinion, the new government would have to submit the electoral legislation for Assembly proceedings as soon as possible. At yesterday's meeting between Joze Skolc and Igor Bavcar, however, the Liberal Democratic leader rejected the possibility that his party would support the candidacy of Janez Jansa.

Proposals To Solve SFRY Crisis Forwarded

92BA0665B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 11 Mar 92 p 5

[Article by Darijan Kosir: "Slovene Proposals for Solving the Yugoslav Crisis"—first paragraph is DELO introduction]

[Text] Kucan and Rupel on the Brussels conference; according to Kucan, at Monday's session of the peace conference in Brussels there was qualitative progress; what kind of agreement with the EC?

Ljubljana, 10 Mar—Judging by yesterday's tenth plenary session of the conference on Yugoslavia in Brussels and by the preceding separate talks with Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance, we can say that the conference has just entered a new qualitative phase, in which an attempt will be made to solve problems that are important for settling the Yugoslav crisis. This would be the most concise assessment of yesterday's continuation of the conference, as it was given by President of the Slovene Presidency Milan Kucan and Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel at today's press conference after their return from Brussels.

At the session, Slovenia supported the following positions:

First: Kucan and Rupel emphasized again that the conference is the forum without which the Yugoslav crisis cannot be solved, and consequently a solution that will bring peace to the state has to be found at it; the blue helmets, in fact, can only ensure a cease-fire, but peace will be guaranteed only after the signing of an agreement among the republics that would both define the immutability of the state (former republic) borders, and also include a provision on the nonuse of weapons on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. If this Slovene proposal were accepted, the concept of a YU-KVSE [Yugoslav Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], as Slovene Foreign Minister Rupel presented it months ago, would be realized.

Second: Slovenia is of the opinion that the key thing in the Yugoslav disassociation—the Badinter Commission has already concluded that this is a case of the collapse of a state, and not secessions—is succession: Without it, in fact, it is not possible to avoid the conflicts caused by the rest of Yugoslavia with respect to the international promotion of Slovenia. Consequently, in the opinion of the Slovene side at the conference, it is necessary to state clearly who is a successor in the case of Yugoslavia, and then establish a working group to study the possibilities for succession in the areas of borders, international treaties, membership in international organizations, Yugoslav claims and debts, citizenship, and war damages. According to Carrington, in the next few days the conference's commission on economic relations is already to begin discussing debts and claims, and a special emissary for sucession will also be appointed. He will prepare the starting points on this topic for a plenary session, while the Badinter Commission will decide on the disputed points if there are any complications. In this framework, Slovenia proposed again that the Western states should freeze the Yugoslav property abroad with which the war was even directly financed at one time.

Third: With respect to economic cooperation, Slovenia's proposal was aimed at the elimination of discriminatory measures in trade among the Yugoslav republics, and the signing of a declaration on the elimination of discrimination was even proposed. Serbia, which recently finally nationalized Slovenia's property, valued at 480 million marks, insisted again that it had not introduced any such measures, but then the foreign minister (Jovanovic) of the absent Milosevic, who had had a traffic accident, got mixed up during the discussion of eliminating the EC's sanctions against Serbia: In fact, he said that it was not fair to demand that Serbia eliminate discriminatory measures as long as the same measures by the EC were in effect against Serbia. He thus admitted quite clearly that Serbia had really introduced such measures. Slovenia also pointed out that it had recently signed economic cooperation agreements with Bosnia and Macedonia, of which the people in Brussels had not been informed.

Fourth: With respect to the possible establishment of a court for human rights in Yugoslavia, Kucan and Rupel pointed out that Slovenia was by no means against oversight of the implementation of human rights here, but that on the other hand there was a prominent institution already in existence—the European Court for Human Rights—which could also extend its jurisdiction to Yugoslavia, even though individual states were not currently members of international organizations.

Fifth: It seems that in the talks between Kucan and Rupel and the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, the issue of Slovenia's future relations with the EC was clarified. Delors is of the opinion that in view of Slovenia's economic capabilities, it should be protected against being left hanging in mid-air after May 1992, when the validity of the old Yugoslav agreement on cooperation with the EC expires. His proposal is as follows: In May, we are to sign an agreement on economic and financial cooperation with the EC, which would include a progressive clause on future associate member status and Slovenia's membership in the EC as the final goal. Consequently, we can expect that an association agreement will actually be concluded with a certain period, also in view of Delors's statement that in view of its economic capability, Slovenia should be offered something more than the East European troika. In the coming days, a group of experts

will also come to Slovenia to assess the state of the economy, and their determinations will be the basis for the discussion of association.

And, sixth: During the conference, Kucan also met with President of Bosnia-Hercegovina Izetbegovic and Macedonian President Gligorov. The former confirmed for him that there were no longer any obstacles at all to the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and that this republic would also asked Slovenia for recognition (Rupel added that the EC would certainly recognize Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia, and the United States would recognize Slovenia), even though there had been a great deal of complications at the conference on Bosnia-Hercegovina with respect to cantonization. Gligorov also proposed signing an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Slovenia and Macedonia next week, in Skopje.